

# Love, Friendship, and Expediency in Cicero's Letters



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By

Gabriel Evangelou

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To my dear friend, Andreas

“Friendship is a calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason and cemented by habit; springing from long acquaintance and mutual obligations; without jealousies or fears, and without those feverish fits of heat and cold, which cause such an agreeable torment in the amorous passion”

—David Hume (*EMPL* 189).

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## PREFACE

This monograph is a revised version of the PhD thesis that I wrote in 2010–2014 at the University of Edinburgh, entitled *Φιλία in Cicero's Correspondence*. Since the completion of the thesis, a great number of insightful discussions of Cicero's correspondence have been published that offer valuable insight into Cicero as a letter-writer and as a man of extensive knowledge of Greek philosophy. The inclusion of these studies in the discussion found in this book has allowed me to elaborate further on the scholarly consensus of the circumstances under which Cicero was communicating with his correspondents and on the necessity of bending the truth on certain occasions, in order to survive as a politician in such tumultuous times. The discussion has also been greatly enriched by all the valid points that many colleagues have raised at several conferences, in which I presented parts of my research on Cicero's letters between 2010 and 2020.

I am a truly indebted to several persons who supported me throughout the composition of this book. I firmly believe that it would not exist in its current form, had it not been for any one of them. First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Dominic Berry, who was my main supervisor in Edinburgh during my Master's degree and PhD studies. His course on Cicero's letters introduced me to the medium of epistles and helped me appreciate Cicero as an author and as a historical figure. I would like to thank him especially for challenging my interpretations of Cicero's letters in a respectful and constructive manner which led me to reconsider some of my initial impressions of Cicero's oeuvre. Similarly, my secondary supervisor, Dr. Simon Trépanier, was the reason that I studied Epicureanism and the person solely responsible for my renewed interest in Greek philosophy. I owe special thanks to Dr. Michael Lurie for his guidance as my supervisor during my first year as a PhD student. I found his candour incredibly refreshing and his comments on my initial work on Plato's *Lysis* illuminating.

My deepest gratitude goes to all the colleagues who have disagreed with many of my interpretations and have offered some excellent counter-arguments, most of which I have incorporated in this monograph and address in detail. I am mostly obliged to Prof. Jakob Wisse and to a great



extent to Dr. Benjamin Gray, Assoc. Prof. Kathryn Tempest, and Prof. Kathryn Steele. Through their remarks on my PhD thesis and on papers that I have given at various stages of my academic career, they have contributed significantly to the argumentation of my discussion. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable support that I received while working at the University of Cyprus and the University of Crete, after the completion of my PhD studies. Many of my colleagues, including Dr. George Paraskeviotis, Dr. Andreas Serafim, Assoc. Prof. Melina Tamiolaki and Prof. Stelios Panayotakis displayed genuine interest in my research and helped facilitate a productive and collegial environment, because of which I found the time and the strength to complete this book.

Last, but not least, I would like to express my profound gratitude to the few affectionate friends that I made throughout my life, as well as to my parents and my sister, all of whom inspired me, each in their own way, to investigate *φιλία* in the ancient world by focusing on Cicero's riveting letters.



## INTRODUCTION

### FRIENDSHIP, *AMICITIA*, AND ΦΙΛΙΑ

*Prima facie*, a reader of Cicero's philosophical treatises is given the impression that there is enough evidence to determine with absolute certainty Cicero's philosophical beliefs.<sup>1</sup> This can be observed in the great number of studies of his works which argue that he was an Academic Skeptic<sup>2</sup> who did not see any value in Epicurean philosophy. Although conclusions on his philosophical views of φιλία tend to be drawn primarily based on his treatises, there has been a recent shift in focus to studies of his letters that examine his relationship with his family, friends, and allies.<sup>3</sup> However, while the statements that he makes in his letters to his allies are examined without the assumption that they are certainly sincere, his claims to Atticus and his family receive a different treatment. By and large, it is assumed that they reveal his genuine feelings for them because they are private works in which Cicero is expected to express his thoughts<sup>4</sup> without any considerations about the

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<sup>1</sup> Starr (1980), 865 asserts that "Cicero's views are abundantly evident in his speeches and letters".

<sup>2</sup> Schmidt (1978-1979), 124; Powell (1990), 18; Griffin (1997), 108 n.84; Evenepoel (2007), 178; Woolf (2015), 117; Gilbert (2015), 1 n.4. Atkins (2000), 506 refers to Cicero as a "loyal Academic". For an overview of the scholarship on Cicero's philosophical affiliations, see Glucker (1988), 38-9 n.18. Görler (1995), 86-110 convincingly argues against the view of Cicero having changed his philosophical affiliation to the Old Academy of Antiochus and shows that passages from *De oratore*, *De republica*, and *De legibus* do not provide conclusive evidence of a change from Academic Skepticism ever having occurred. He maintains (p.94) that in certain passages of those works it can be observed that Cicero is simply "silencing (temporarily) unwanted criticism" and that (pp.110-1) "some sort of change did take place... in interest, and even more so, in philosophical method".

<sup>3</sup> Some recent studies of Cicero's letters and his relationship with his correspondents include Baraz (2012), Wilcox (2012), Williams (2012), McConnell (2014).

<sup>4</sup> Brunt (1986), 12 asserts that "his intimate correspondence discloses the real beliefs and feelings present to his conscious mind" and Griffin (1995), 326 that his letters "were not written for publication". Osgood (2011), 73 expresses a similar view by referring to correspondence as "not intended for wide circulation". However, it appears that at least some of Cicero's letters were either written with the intention

perception of these statements by the public or his fellow politicians. They seem to ignore the possibility that the privacy, or the illusion of privacy,<sup>5</sup> that personal correspondence provides can lead to a higher degree of insincerity<sup>6</sup> than the bending of truth that can be found in his speeches and philosophical works.<sup>7</sup> Since his claims to each correspondent were private, he could make

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of publication or even ended up being circulated without the author's consent. An example can be found in Wilcox (2012), 69 in her discussion of Cicero's letter to Trebonius, in which it is revealed that Trebonius had read one of Cicero's letters to Calvus and accused him of inconsistency (*Fam.* 15.21.4). In this letter Cicero draws a distinction between two types of letters by noting that *aliter enim scribimus, quod eos solos, quibus mittimus, aliter, quod multos lecturos putamus* (*Fam.* 15.21.4). Wilcox (2012), 27 also attributes Cicero's tendency to list in his letters the benefits that his correspondents received by being his friends, in the hope of circulation of these letters which could result in more *φιλία* in the future with people who would want to enjoy similar benefits. Shackleton Bailey (1977), 307 argues that Cicero's letter to Lentulus (*Fam.* 1.9) was written with circulation in mind either of the letter itself or of its content. Similarly, Lintott (2008), 223 refers to Cicero's letter to Lentulus as a typical example of a letter that Cicero composed for men other than Lentulus, hence its close resemblance to a public speech rather than private communication. Conversely, Hall (1996), 23 observes the risk that one was taking by writing a letter since any letter could eventually become public. Mitchell (1973), 10 also notes the public character that Cicero's private communication could take. Cicero's intention to publish some of his letters is clear in a letter to Atticus from July 44 in which he reveals that both Tiro and Atticus had saved some copies from his correspondence (*Att.* 16.5.5.). Interestingly, in a letter to Tiro, Cicero teases him after observing the use of a peculiar word in one of his letters to him and interpreting it as Tiro's effort to have some of his letters published along with the rest of the correspondence that Cicero was preparing for publication. Additionally, in a letter to Atticus from March 49 he responds to Atticus' report that one of his letters (*Att.* 9.11A) *pelvugatam esse* (*Att.* 8.9.1), by stating *ipse multis dedi describendam* (*Att.* 8.9.1). Since Cicero was composing certain letters with the intention of publication, it would follow that he would refrain from discussing sensitive matters and would be disinclined to display complete candour in such letters. On the publication of Cicero's letters to Atticus, see esp. Nicholson (1998) and White (2010), 31-61. Setaioli (1976), 114 provides an examination of the scholarship but refrains from offering a specific date, as he argues that the available evidence is not conclusive.

<sup>5</sup> On the limited expectation of privacy in the letter exchange between Roman aristocrats in the age of Cicero, see esp. Miller (1914), 69, Hoffer (2003), 93, Von Albrecht (2003), 68-9, Steel (2005), 59, Hall 2009, 25, Schröder (2018), 81.

<sup>6</sup> Rawson (1978), 120 suggests the existence of different levels of sincerity in Cicero's correspondence and that he was more comfortable expressing his actual thoughts to Quintus rather than men like Lentulus.

<sup>7</sup> As Wilcox (2012), 25 observes, Cicero's efforts to "conceal or disguise" in his letters are apparent. She also stresses (p.278) that "Cicero's self-representation in

conflicting statements about his *φιλία* with them and the rest of his friends and allies. Accepting Cicero's claims in his letters as facts results in assertions<sup>8</sup> made about Cicero as a person which are not necessarily representative of his *φιλία*.<sup>9</sup> In order to avoid making similar assertions about Cicero's emotions, feelings, hopes, and intentions,<sup>10</sup> it is necessary to examine Cicero's

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letters is not always, or even usually, innocent".

<sup>8</sup> There is a great number of assertions found in scholarship on Cicero's thoughts and feelings with the following being examples indicative of the tendency to treat his claims as if they were facts. Leach (1993), 20 asserts that Cicero's "own real love is the Republic". This statement appears to be based on Cicero's remarks about his love for Rome and about the actions that he took to save it from Catiline and Clodius. A similar observation can be found in Baraz (2012), 44. Waters (1970), 215 asserts that Cicero "hoped to find himself on the level of Pompey". Rawson (1978), 15 refers to Cicero as "feeling a bond with Caesar" and (p.18 n.53) asserts that he "felt only partly alive when out of reach of Rome". Lastly, Taylor (1949), 170 claims that "Cicero felt frankly envious of Cato's fame and wished that he had the courage to die in like manner".

<sup>9</sup> Waters (1970), 212 n.40 observes that "most of what we 'know' about him comes from his own pen". Similarly, according to Grillo (2012), 219, considering the limited number of extant letters that Cicero received, a study of the correspondence does not reveal the "love and friendship in Cicero's letters", but rather "Cicero's performance of interpersonal relationships". The view of Cicero's letters as a "performance" can also be found in Wilcox (2005a), 278 n.30.

<sup>10</sup> In the study of Cicero's letters, it is imperative to bear in mind that a reader of a story with fictional characters and an omniscient narrator can claim knowledge on each character's thoughts and feelings for one another based on the narrator's remarks. Conversely, a similar observation cannot be made about a historical person like Cicero. Therefore, the analysis of Cicero's correspondence that follows does not attempt to discredit and replace previous studies on Cicero as a person with new assertions about him, but to examine patterns in his behaviour and the treatment of his correspondents, in order to suggest the possibility that his life reflected Epicureanism more than he admits in his works. The caution that this book strives to exercise can also be observed in a remark found in Waters (1970), 212 n.40 who maintains that "one does not always put on paper one's inmost thoughts or secret ambitions, even for the benefit of close friends or members of one's family". Baraz (2012), 46 raises a similar point by noting that "we can never know what the historical Cicero truly thought" and (p.55) "any letter penned by Cicero cannot be taken to present the author's thought in an entirely direct and unmediated way". Williams (2012), 228 stresses that strong statements indicating an intimate *φιλία* between Cicero and his correspondents are not limited to his well-known close friends, including Atticus, but also to men "of whom we otherwise hear little or nothing". He, thus, suggests that the reader of the correspondence should not assume that his professions of affection for his correspondents are necessarily an accurate reflection of the *φιλία* that he developed with them.

candour<sup>11</sup> in his philosophical works and private letters.

The first point that needs to be addressed before examining Cicero's philosophical views is the use of the term *φιλία* over *amicitia* or "friendship" in this monograph. Most studies of Cicero's *De amicitia* state that he provides a discussion of friendship or of *amicitia*. However, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and even Platonic notions about *φιλία* feature so prominently in his dialogue that it can be argued that he is not providing an account of *amicitia* as used by his contemporaries, but of the Greek *φιλία* with some noteworthy additions of his own.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the use of the word "friendship" in ancient studies tends to create confusion. As Hays states, friendship can be identified as:

"voluntary interdependence between two persons over time, that is intended to facilitate socio-emotional goals of the participants, and may involve varying types and degrees of companionship, intimacy, affection and mutual assistance".<sup>13</sup>

While it is evident that the term "friendship" can be used for relationships ranging from strong bonds to associations based chiefly on utility,<sup>14</sup> it needs to be stressed that it has certain limits. For example, it does not describe either familial relationships or the relations between towns.<sup>15</sup> Turner, who also argues against the translation of *φιλία* as "friendship", notes that, unlike *ἔρως*, *φιλία* denotes a "non-passionate affection".<sup>16</sup> Annas observes that *φιλία* is a broader term than friendship, but her suggestion to translate *φιλία* as "commitment" does not appear to be an adequate solution.<sup>17</sup> The word

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<sup>11</sup> Baraz (2012), 73 argues that when there is benefit involved in Cicero's correspondence, it is less likely to find sincerity in his claims.

<sup>12</sup> In contrast, Leach (1993), 10 n.22 maintains that these additions are not Cicero's own views about *φιλία* but Greek notions from non-extant Greek philosophical texts.

<sup>13</sup> Hays (1988), 395.

<sup>14</sup> In contrast, Werking (1997), 17 argues against the notion of a utilitarian relationship being a type of friendship.

<sup>15</sup> Konstan (1997), who provides an excellent study of *φιλία* and *amicitia*, nevertheless uses the word "friendship" in the title of his work, despite his discussion including sections on relationships that cannot be identified as friendships.

<sup>16</sup> Turner (1947), 352. Konstan (1996a), 388 displays passionate opposition against the use of "friendship" over *φιλία* by stressing the confusion that such an action causes in the study of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Versenyi (1975), 187 also stresses how problematic the translation of *φιλία* as "friendship" is.

<sup>17</sup> Annas (1993), 223-4. Conversely, in an earlier article (1977), 532, she admits that although "the Greek term cannot be equated with 'friendship'... there is no other reasonable translation".

“commitment” indicates a pact or a relationship that cannot easily be broken. It cannot describe *φιλία* based on pleasure, as identified by Aristotle, considering Aristotle’s emphasis on the superficiality and ephemerality of such associations.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the use of the word “friendship” in reference to *φιλία* between allies can be misleading, if their relationship is simply an alliance that does not involve any type of affection for each other.<sup>19</sup> In contrast, Sheffield rightly refers to friendship as one the many “interpersonal relationships” that the term *φιλία* covers.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, in order to avoid this apparent confusion, the term *φιλία* is used throughout this book.<sup>21</sup>

While scholars tend to translate *φιλία* in their studies, most discussions of *amicitia* leave the Latin term untranslated in their titles and, to a lesser extent, in the main part of their works.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, there is a notable debate in scholarship about the definition of *amicitia*.<sup>23</sup> The *communis opinio* is that it was used to denote a political alliance between men.<sup>24</sup> According to Syme, “*amicitia* was a weapon of politics, not a sentiment

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<sup>18</sup> Annas’ suggestion is also rejected by Konstan (2000), 13 n.21 who argues that “commitment” lacks the emotional depth that *φιλία* denotes.

<sup>19</sup> Mitchell (1973), 12 n.36 draws a distinction between allies and actual friends. In contrast, Grillo (2012), 141 uses the term “friendship” to refer to Cicero’s relationship with Dolabella which suggests a relationship that does not appear to have existed between the two men. The appropriate words to describe their association would be an *amicitia*, a *φιλία*, or even a temporary alliance.

<sup>20</sup> Sheffield (2011), 253.

<sup>21</sup> Similarly, El Murr (2014), in his analysis of Plato’s views of *φιλία*, also uses the term *φιλία* over “friendship”.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. Haley (1980), Brunt (1988), Burton (2004), Gruber-Miller (2009). In contrast, Rawson (1978), 12 who describes Pompey’s association with Crassus after the conference at Luca as “friendship”, uses single quotation marks in her reference to their relationship as friendship, which suggests inadequacy of the term “friendship” to express the mere political alliance that their association was at that moment. Therefore, the use of *amicitia* would be more accurate and less confusing in that context.

<sup>23</sup> Leach (1993), 8.

<sup>24</sup> Deniaux (1993), 49 reduces *amicitia* to a mere exchange of services. Rawson (1978), 3 argues that part of the reason that *amicitia* played a more important role in politics than in modern times was the lack of political parties with which one could align oneself to receive the support that one needed. Similarly, according to Taylor (1949), 7, “*amicitia* was the good old word for party relationships”. Burton (2004), 214 also stresses its significance for all Romans. On the role of reciprocity in Cicero’s correspondence, see Stroup (2010), 93-7.

based on congeniality”.<sup>25</sup> Powell argues that even though most of the extant sources in which the word *amicitia* is used suggest a strictly political character, it does not necessarily follow that it was primarily or solely used with this meaning in Cicero’s age.<sup>26</sup> Instead, it is likely that the extant texts aimed at a Roman aristocratic audience were concerned with public relations rather than personal associations. The ambiguity of *amicitia*<sup>27</sup> can be attributed to the different ways in which writers from the first century BC<sup>28</sup> used it based on their personal agendas. As Grillo observes, while Caesar suggests that personal *amicitia* also requires public backing,<sup>29</sup> Cicero distinguishes personal *amicitiae* from political *amicitiae*, hence his continued *amicitia* with Caesar despite their disagreements in the 50s (*Prov. Cons.* 50).<sup>30</sup>

Considering the conflicting views about *amicitia* based on each author’s perception of the term and the limited primary sources on Roman *amicitia*, modern attempts to provide a single definition of *amicitia* fail to show its range and cannot accurately describe how it functioned in the Late Roman Republic for all classes.<sup>31</sup> Powell, for example, rightly observes that *amicitia* “refers properly to a personal relationship involving genuine feelings of goodwill and affection on both sides”.<sup>32</sup> The key word in Powell’s

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<sup>25</sup> Syme (1939), 12. The importance of *amicitia* in Roman politics is also explored by Konstan (1997), 122-48.

<sup>26</sup> Powell (1990), 22-3. Additionally, Rollinger (2007), 346 draws a distinction between Cicero’s account of *amicitia* in *De amicitia* the kind of *amicitiae* that the average Roman tended to pursue or form.

<sup>27</sup> Brunt (1988), 367.

<sup>28</sup> All dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

<sup>29</sup> The view of public backing as an absolute necessity in any *amicitia* in Cicero’s age can also be found in Rawson (1978), 3. In contrast, Brunt (1988), 367 argues that it “does not necessarily connote, though it may involve, collaboration in public affairs”.

<sup>30</sup> Grillo (2012), 145-6, 149. However, his conclusion (p.146) that “the Romans were capable of drawing the line between the personal and political dimension of friendship” is not particularly convincing, as it is almost entirely based on Cicero’s texts without examining his possible intentions by making such claims. Additionally, as Grillo himself points out (p.147), Matius’ reply to Cicero in *Fam.* 11.28.2 suggests that, in addition to Caesar, other Romans considered public support of an *amicus* an essential part of *amicitia*. Leach (1993), 8 displays a more reserved opinion of Cicero’s works as evidence of the types of *amicitia* that existed in the first century BC.

<sup>31</sup> Burton (2004), 213-4 stresses that the sources on *amicitia* come from writers of the elite class.

<sup>32</sup> Powell (1990), 22. Burton (2004), 212 attempts to provide a definition of



statement is “properly”. In other words, Powell is describing the ideal kind of *amicitia*. A proper definition, however, needs to stress that it was also used to refer to relationships that were solely based on benefit and thus did not necessarily involve any kind of affection for the other person. It also needs to state that it was not used to describe relationships between family members. As a result, this monograph argues that a study of *amicitia* should examine its known functions<sup>33</sup> rather than define it based on limited sources. The extant texts on *amicitia* suggest relationships between non-relatives that were formed for some type of enjoyment, such as of each other’s company, of the political or social benefits that their association entailed, and of the services that they could offer one another with personal, domestic, and financial matters.

A term with an even wider range than both friendship and *amicitia* is *φιλία*.<sup>34</sup> According to Aristotle, while one cannot have a *φιλία* with an inanimate object, there is potential for a *φιλία* to be developed between two persons, as long as there is some sense of justice between them (*Eth. Nic.* 1161b 1-8). Because of its notably broad use and perplexity in Greek texts,<sup>35</sup> it is difficult to provide a proper definition of *φιλία* that includes all its different uses by Greek writers. Attempts have been made, but appear to be unsuccessful. Konstan’s definition as “any affective bond between individuals, whether friends, kin, or fellow citizens” seems to be quite misleading.<sup>36</sup> Considering some of Aristotle’s, Epicurus’, and the Cyrenaics’ remarks on *φιλία* based on utility, it would follow that an “affective bond” between two or more persons is not necessary to consider their relationship a *φιλία*. Nevertheless, Konstan’s definition does suggest that it can describe relationships between people that both *amicitia* and “friendship” cannot,

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“authentic friendships” without stating on which Roman author’s opinion he is basing his definition. He rightly points out that Roman *amicitiae* were “non-sexual” associations, that they did not include familial relationships, and that they tended to have a utilitarian character. However, his assertion that they were “voluntary... relationships... bonded solely by trust based on a *rough* similarity of age, status, level of affect, character, and morals” does not incorporate forced *amicitiae* between political allies, such as Cicero’s with Caesar and to an extent Pompey.

<sup>33</sup> On the different types of *amicitia*, see Hellegouarc’h (1963), 41-90.

<sup>34</sup> Cooper (1977b), 620. Conversely, Konstan (1996b), 71 argues against such a view of *φιλία* in classical Greece.

<sup>35</sup> Nichols (2006), 5. Haden (1983), 349 observes that its ambiguity was well-known in Plato’s time as indicated in the *Lysis*. Bolotin (1977), 139 also stresses the deceptiveness of the term.

<sup>36</sup> Konstan (1996a), 388. Equally problematic is the reference to *φιλία* as “friendliness or affection” in Freeman (1938), 161.

i.e., relationships between family members.<sup>37</sup> Aristotle notes that the word *φιλία* can refer to familial relationships, such as between spouses (*Eth. Nic.* 1161a 22-23), parents and children (*Eth. Nic.* 1161a 15, 1161b 11-12), and brothers (*Eth. Nic.* 1161a 3-6, 25).<sup>38</sup> Since, as Haden observes, *φιλία* is a “complicated phenomenon, as the vast range of its Greek usages makes apparent”,<sup>39</sup> a further study is necessary to examine its differentiation from other similar Greek terms.

Although the writings of Plato and Epicurus are valuable in a study of *φιλία*, only Aristotle provides a systematic account of *φιλία* in his works.<sup>40</sup> He draws a functional distinction between *φιλία*, *φίλος*, and *φιλέω* noting that a man cannot be a *φίλος* of a child, because they are not equals, but he loves the child and can be loved in return (*Eth. Eud.* 1239a, 4-6).<sup>41</sup> Therefore, *φίλος* does not apply to relationships between parents and children and *φιλέω* (and *φιλοῦμαι*) denotes affection for someone,<sup>42</sup> without necessarily suggesting that they are *φίλοι*. Konstan’s claim that *φίλος* means the same as “friend” is not completely in line with evidence found in Aristotle’s *Ethics*.<sup>43</sup> According to Aristotle, the relationship between people who are not equal can be called *φιλία*, but they are not *φίλοι* (*Eth. Eud.* 1239a 4-5). Similarly, he states that, although a relationship between two men based on usefulness can be considered *φιλία*, they are not *φίλοι* of each other, but of gain instead (*Eth. Nic.* 1157a 15-16). Since such strict limits do not apply to

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<sup>37</sup> In fact, Aristotle refers to *συγγένεια* as a type (*εἶδος*) of *φιλία* (*Rhet.* 1381b 28-29).

<sup>38</sup> Considering that this study examines Cicero’s association not only with Atticus, Pompey, and Caesar, but also with Terentia, Tullia, and Quintus, the only appropriate term for such a wide range of relationships is *φιλία*.

<sup>39</sup> Haden (1983), 354.

<sup>40</sup> Cooper (1977b), 621; Tamiolaki (2018), 433-4. It is worth noting that Aristotle is not simply offering his own views of *φιλία*, but instead provides an account of all forms of *φιλία* in his time, even the types of which he seems to have disapproved.

<sup>41</sup> Konstan (1996a), 388 points out the problems that arise in studies that treat the terms *φιλία* and *φίλος* as denoting exactly the same kind of relationship. He (1996b), 75-8 also provides an insightful discussion of the uses of the term *φίλος* in classical Greek and emphatically notes that it is much narrower than the term *φιλία*.

<sup>42</sup> According to Aristotle, there is also a notable difference between *φιλεῖν* and *φιλεῖσθαι*; he argues that only the latter can be used for inanimate objects, since the former denotes some kind of activity (*Eth. Eud.* 1237a 38-40). Similarly, Nichols (2006), 4 states that, when Socrates refers to the relationship between parents and children, he opts for *φιλεῖν* and not *ἐρᾶν*, as the latter “corresponds to erotic love”.

<sup>43</sup> Konstan (1996a), 388 and (1996b), 71. El Murr (2014), 29 n.12 also translates *φίλος* as “friend”, but stresses the inadequacy of the term, since “dear” and “friendly” sound “more natural in English”.

the modern concept of a “friend”, it appears that φίλος and “friend” display some noteworthy differences in their usage.

Moreover, Aristotle maintains that, despite the striking similarities between *φιλία*, *εὖνοια*, and *ὁμόνοια*, they also have certain significant differences.<sup>44</sup> The latter two tend to be translated as “goodwill” and “unanimity”. *Ὁμόνοια* is a narrower term than *φιλία*, as, according to Aristotle, it only refers to political matters (*Eth. Nic.* 1167a 28-29) and is thus a civic type of *φιλία* (*Eth. Nic.* 1167b 2-3).<sup>45</sup> He offers a description of *ὁμόνοια* by noting that τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα (*Eth. Nic.* 1167a 26-28). He also clarifies that *ὁμόνοια* is not simply about ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, but rather about having the same thought on the same person (*Eth. Nic.* 1167a 34-35). He also asserts that those who have many friends are in fact friends of no one and are called ἄρεσκοί, i.e., political friends (*Eth. Nic.* 1171a 15-17). In contrast, *εὖνοια* shares more common traits with *φιλία*. For Aristotle, *εὖνοια* is a prerequisite of *φιλία* (*Eth. Nic.* 1167a 3-4, *Rhet.* 1381a 1-3): both φίλοι and εὖνοι want what is best for another person (*Eth. Nic.* 1155b 31-32). However, εὖνοι are well disposed towards people whom they do not know (*Eth. Nic.* 1155b 34-35). As a result, since they do not know how they feel about one another, their relationship cannot be referred to as a *φιλία* (*Eth. Nic.* 1156a 2-3). Though they do approve of each other, they do not spend time with one another (*Eth. Nic.* 1157b 17-21, 1158a 6-9). As a result, *εὖνοια* is considered the beginning of *φιλία* and not one of its forms (*Eth. Eud.* 1241a 14).

Studies of Cicero’s life that suggest disingenuousness in his works have received notable criticism in scholarship.<sup>46</sup> A prime example is Carcopino’s *Cicero: The Secrets of his Correspondence*,<sup>47</sup> which depicts Cicero negatively

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<sup>44</sup> See also Annas (1977), 534-5.

<sup>45</sup> Shklar (1993), 207 points out that, even though Aristotle’s πολιτικὴ φιλία is useful in terms of preventing civil strife, it, nonetheless, does not entail a personal bond between fellow citizens.

<sup>46</sup> However, as Waters (1970), 13 observes, his political career and his public speeches have received a notably different treatment. Smethurst (1955), 111, 119 questions the historical value of Cicero’s political works and stresses the contradictions found in them. Gruen (1969), 106 makes a similar remark by stressing Cicero’s tendency to depict negatively the state of Roman politics when his role in them was forcibly limited. On criticism of Cicero’s political activity, his speeches, and treatises, see also Seager (1979), 107 and Ward (1972), 250.

<sup>47</sup> Carcopino (1951).

and argues that he was an evidently self-centred person<sup>48</sup> who did not develop strong relationships with anyone, including Tullia and Atticus.<sup>49</sup> Conversely, any remarks about a strong marriage with Terentia, a love of Tullia, and an intimate *φιλία* with Atticus have not faced similar criticism. The view of Cicero having been a follower of the Academy is based to a certain extent on his claims about philosophy in his letters and on remarks made by characters from his philosophical works,<sup>50</sup> but, most importantly, on *De Natura Deorum* (1.11-12)<sup>51</sup> in which his adherence to the Academy is explicitly stated.<sup>52</sup> As a result, the references to him in scholarship as an Academic Skeptic do not take into account Cicero's actions but only his words. Efforts to examine Cicero's or Caesar's philosophical views based on the available evidence on their lives have been limited<sup>53</sup> and, when used, criticised by other scholars.<sup>54</sup> As a result, the possibility that Cicero's views of *φιλία* were in accord with Epicureanism has been completely rejected.<sup>55</sup> This monograph draws a sharp distinction between theory and practice of philosophical beliefs in one's everyday life. It maintains that one's actions define one as a person more than one's words and thus argues that

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<sup>48</sup> Similarly, Nicholson (1992), 110, 121, apart from attacking Cicero's style in his speeches, accuses him of being vain. Griffin (1995), 328 also refers to him as "a vain man", but rejects the view that he was "self-absorbed", by arguing that he was "rather other-directed".

<sup>49</sup> Williams (2012), 219 n.85. This monograph argues that, despite Carcopino's overly negative attitude towards Cicero, some of the examples that he provides in his analysis of Cicero's *φιλία* with his correspondents show that his bond with them was significantly weaker than his claims to them would suggest.

<sup>50</sup> Hendrickson (1926), 239, 251; Schmidt (1978-1979), 116; Atkins (2000), 496-7.

<sup>51</sup> All references are to Cicero's works unless otherwise stated.

<sup>52</sup> Sedley (2009), 30 notes that while being a member "of one of the Athenian schools had meant belonging to an unbroken living tradition stemming from the founder", in the Roman Republic "that same adherence came typically to take the form of reverent study of the school's canonical texts". Similarly, Castner (1988), 35 argues that based on the evidence available on the known Roman Epicureans during Cicero's time, it appears that they were superficial followers of Epicureanism considering the "ornamental role that Epicureanism played" in their lives. Brunt (1989), 197 maintains that one should bear in mind that the fact that many men were adherents of certain philosophical schools does not necessarily suggest that they were also firm believers of their school's principles.

<sup>53</sup> The study of Cicero as a Platonist in Boes (1990) and of Caesar as an Epicurean in Bourne (1977), are some of the notable exceptions.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Berry (1992), 250; Griffin (1997), 97 following Brunt (1989); Baraz (2012), 46-7 n.5.

<sup>55</sup> For example, Griffin (1997), 108 asserts that Cicero never "seriously entertained the idea of converting to the sect".

the study of Cicero's treatment of some of his correspondents is more valuable than the study of his claims about *φιλία* in isolation.

Cicero's attacks against Epicurus and his philosophy can be found in his letters, his speeches, and, most frequently, in his philosophical works.<sup>56</sup> The apparent consistency in his expressed views of Epicurus suggests that there should be no doubt over his thoughts on the school and its followers. However, a reader of the correspondence needs to bear in mind that his works are simply sources of his professed views of Epicureanism and not necessarily evidence on how he truly felt about Epicurean philosophy as a whole.<sup>57</sup> While affiliation with Epicureanism was possible even for politically engaged men,<sup>58</sup> the Epicurean school did not have the prestige

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<sup>56</sup> Some examples indicative of Cicero's professed opposition to Epicureanism can be found in *Fam.* 7.12 and *Leg.* 1.41, 48-49, 52. His opposition to Epicurus' teachings are clearly expressed in *Fin.* 1.15, 17, 18-23, 25, 26. In Book 2 of *De finibus*, Cicero discusses in detail why he finds Epicurean philosophy problematic and provides counter arguments to the points that the Epicurean Torquatus raises in Book 1. He attacks Epicurus (*Fin.* 2.12) for his limited education (*Fin.* 2.30) and for not being clever (*Fin.* 2.80). His strongest argument against Epicurus' philosophy is for its misuse of the word ἡδονή or *voluptas* (*Fin.* 2.14-16, 19-20, 26, 28, 29-31). Reinhardt (2005), 152 also regards the Epicurus' thesis on pleasure as the aspect of Epicurean philosophy that Cicero considered most the most problematic. Epicurus' doctrines are also criticised for their lack of consistency (*Fin.* 2.32, 35, 99, 114). Negative depiction of Epicurus and his followers can also be found in *Red. sen.* 14-16, *Sest.* 21-25, *Pis.* 42-44, 68-72, and *De or.* 3.63-64. Schmidt (1978-1979), 125 argues that the facts that Cicero does not refer to Epicureanism explicitly in the prefaces of his philosophical works does not prevent his readers from identifying Epicurus as target of Cicero's criticism. Gilbert (2015), 4 convincingly argues that Cicero's polemic against the Epicurean school in his public works was "a consistent campaign to undermine and demolish the influence and popularity of Epicureanism in Italy". Maslowski (1974), 55, 60 expresses a similar view by noting that, through his polemic against Epicurus, Cicero wanted to neutralise the influence of the Epicurean school, because of his conviction that it would have a harmful effect on the values of Roman society.

<sup>57</sup> For example, Woolf (2004), 312 asserts that Cicero "considers Epicureanism an intellectually lightweight doctrine".

<sup>58</sup> Discussions of Romans affiliated with the Epicurean school with active public lives can be found in DeWitt (1932), 92, Momigliano (1941), Bourne (1977), 418, Castner (1988), 430, Griffin (1997), 103, Benferhat (2005). The popularity of Epicureanism in the first century BC can be observed both in primary and secondary sources. For example, in *Tusculanae Disputationes* Cicero notes that Epicureans *Italiam totam occupaverunt* (4.7). However, the assertion found in Sedley (2009), 44 that it became "as widely and unabashedly espoused as any other creed" seems to be an exaggeration of its acceptance by men such as Cicero and his contemporaries.

that both the Academy and the Stoics enjoyed in Cicero's age.<sup>59</sup> It was a philosophical creed with practical character<sup>60</sup> that was accused of being anti-social,<sup>61</sup> for subverting religion,<sup>62</sup> and for promoting abstention from politics. Cicero, who constantly professed his love for the Republic, had a particular public persona to maintain which was incompatible with Epicurean philosophy.<sup>63</sup> As a man without any family connections in his ascension to politics,<sup>64</sup> he had more to prove than men like Caesar or Clodius Pulcher. Though there is no evidence to suggest that his philosophical views would have affected his fellow politicians' stance towards him and that a possible adherence to the Epicurean school would have damaged his career, he, nonetheless, had reasons to express a disagreement with Epicureanism in his works. By publicly rejecting the Epicurean account of *φιλία* and embracing notions found in the works of Aristotle in *De amicitia*, he does not seem to focus on philosophy or the philosophers themselves—who are not even mentioned by name—but on their expressed views.<sup>65</sup> He was able to project an image of a man who, unlike the Epicureans or people who behaved similar to them, was mostly concerned with the good of the Republic. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that he would have wanted his fellow allies to see him as a man interested in an association with them from a strictly utilitarian point of view. His relentless opposition to Epicureanism<sup>66</sup> was a constant reminder of the value

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Freeman (1938), 156 maintains that, despite the Epicurean school's success, Epicurus' teachings were clearly inferior to Plato's and Aristotle's.

<sup>59</sup> DeWitt (1942), 281-2. Nevertheless, as Fuhrmann (1992), 151 observes, there was a notable increase of the number of Epicureans in Rome in Cicero's time.

<sup>60</sup> Erler (2009), 47.

<sup>61</sup> Smethurst (1955), 113; Long (1986), 289. According to Schmidt (1978-1979), 124, 125 Cicero considered Epicurean philosophy "socially dangerous" and "irresponsible".

<sup>62</sup> Brunt (1989), 186. On the allegations of atheism that Epicureans faced for their views on religion, see also Erler (2009), 46. Sedley (2009), 30 notes that, apart from "suspicion of atheism", Epicureans were criticised for their "political minimalism".

<sup>63</sup> DeWitt (1942), 282 argues that "for social ends it was more prudent to profess to favor the Academy" and (1947), 197 that adherence to Epicureanism would not help one interested in an active political or social life.

<sup>64</sup> Rawson (1978), 9. For a comprehensive discussion of Cicero as a *novus homo*, see van der Blom (2010), 35-41

<sup>65</sup> Englert (2014), 254 makes a similar observation on *De republica* by arguing that, even though the Epicureans are not named, it is evident to the reader that Cicero's attacks at the beginning and the end of the dialogue are directed at Epicureanism.

<sup>66</sup> Baraz (2012), 54 n.22. Cooper (2012), 249 observes that Cicero "castigates Epicurus mercilessly". Griffin (1997), 106 notes that Cicero "was at pains to attack the Epicureans".

that he attached to virtues and of his interest in having *φιλίαι* with morally good men.<sup>67</sup> Since he had read works of Epicurus that do not survive,<sup>68</sup> his philosophical treatises would be expected to offer a deeper understanding of Epicurus' views of *φιλία*. However, his efforts to reject Epicurus led to a misrepresentation of the school<sup>69</sup> in his philosophical treatises by giving his audience<sup>70</sup> the impression that Epicurean philosophy was incoherent.<sup>71</sup> His treatment of Epicureanism added to the confusion over Epicurus' account of *φιλία* which was not clear in Cicero's time.<sup>72</sup>

A reader of Cicero's attacks on Epicurus and his followers is faced with an apparent paradox: why would one of Epicurus' most hostile critics<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Baraz (2012), 45 also argues that Cicero's claims in the preface of his philosophical works about the purpose that they serve do not necessarily reveal his genuine intentions with the composition of these works, considering the opportunity which they provided him to influence his readers and their perception of him. Hendrickson (1926), 251, in his analysis of *Brutus* also observes Cicero's use of his treatises as a platform to express his position to the public.

<sup>68</sup> Striker (1993), 4.

<sup>69</sup> Vander Waerdt (1987), 408; Griffin (1997), 108; DeWitt (1947), 198. Glucker (1988), 37 n.16 suggests that Cicero does not misrepresent Epicurus only in his philosophical treatises, but also in his letters. He argues that by telling Pansa, even in a jocular manner, that Pansa has stopped sending him letters because of his conversion to Epicureanism (*Fam.* 7.12), he is giving the reader of the correspondence the impression of a kind of self-centredness that was at variance with Epicurean philosophy. Armstrong (2011), 123 refers to Cicero's and Plutarch's remarks on Epicurean philosophy as an "artful misrepresentation" of Epicurus' views of one's virtues.

<sup>70</sup> Wilcox (2005a), 274 observes that the audience of Cicero's works was the aristocratic men of the Republic. This view is also expressed by Schmidt (1978-1979), 125. Griffin (1995), 331-346 discusses the philosophical allusions in Cicero's correspondence with Trebatius, Varro, Pansa and Cassius and argues that especially his letters to and from Cassius reflect "the level of readership he could expect for his philosophical works".

<sup>71</sup> Striker (1993), 17.

<sup>72</sup> Annas (1993), 240 attributes this confusion to Epicurus for not providing a systematic account of *φιλία*. Konstan (1996a), 387 maintains the same position. According to Cassius, the confusion over Epicurean philosophy was the result of the bad translations of Epicurus' writings (*Epicurus, a quo omnes Catii et Amafinii, mali verborum interpretes, Fam.* 15.19.2).

<sup>73</sup> Glucker (1988), 69 refers to Cicero as "one of the most thorough critics of Epicurean philosophy in the whole of extant literature". DeWitt (1932), 175 partly ascribes Cicero's fierce polemic against Epicurus to the popularity that the Epicurean school had attracted in Rome in Cicero's time.

develop *φιλία* with such a great number of professed Epicureans,<sup>74</sup> including his seemingly closest friend, Atticus?<sup>75</sup> This paradox has not been adequately explained. Bourne has pointed out that Cicero's anti-Epicureanism is at variance with his friendship with several Epicureans of his time<sup>76</sup> and DeWitt has argued that "he possessed more sympathy [for Epicurus] than his fancied responsibility to contemporary orthodoxy allowed him to admit".<sup>77</sup> As an adherent of the Academy and an "eclectic thinker",<sup>78</sup> there was no need for Cicero to admit that he saw value in the doctrines of only one school;<sup>79</sup> he could have accepted views of other philosophers, like the Stoics,<sup>80</sup> and incorporated them into his writings.<sup>81</sup> However, he chose to express such a strong disagreement with Epicureanism that he refrains completely from praising the school even for some of its doctrines in his works. Considering the importance that both Cicero and

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<sup>74</sup> Griffin (1997), 105-6 n.78 points out the great number of Epicureans featured in Cicero's correspondence between 47 and 44, despite Cicero's attacks on Epicurean philosophy intensifying in his treatises of this period.

<sup>75</sup> The consensus in scholarship is that Atticus was Cicero's most intimate friend. See, for example, Rauh (1986), 7; Roskam (2007), 49; Englert (2014), 253; Woolf (2015), 5; Berry (2020), 60.

<sup>76</sup> Bourne (1977), 418.

<sup>77</sup> DeWitt (1937), 328. With this remark DeWitt seems to suggest that, because Epicurean ethics were at variance with Roman ethics, such as one's sense of justice and duty to one's country, Cicero could not have publicly praised Epicurus even if he did agree with some of the views expressed in Epicurus' works.

<sup>78</sup> Sacharoff (1972), 117 refers to Cicero as an "eclectic" in terms of his analysis of philosophical notions, "without giving assent to anything except on the evidence of his own experience and reason". In contrast, Glucker (1988), 63 argues that Cicero's remarks in his philosophical treatises do not give the impression of adherence to an eclectic set of philosophical principles, "but of the bee flitting from flower to flower and choosing according to its tastes and mood at the time". According to McConnell (2014), 226, "Cicero does not wish to be committed unconditionally or rigidly to one particular set of tenets".

<sup>79</sup> Bourne (1977), 421. A similar view is expressed by Sedley (2009), 30 in his discussion of "philosophical syncretism".

<sup>80</sup> Ueberweg (1863), 149; DeWitt (1942), 282; Sacharoff (1972), 117; Atkins (2000), 506; Sharples and Sorabji (2007), 2.

<sup>81</sup> Powell (1995b), 36 notes that, even though the Stoics' perception of *φιλία* may have influenced Cicero's account of *amicitia* in *De amicitia*, the extant sources of their views of *φιλία* are limited and thus it cannot be considered with certainty the basis of Cicero's philosophical dialogue. He also rightly points out, that, unlike Cicero and Aristotle, the Stoics did not regard *φιλία* as an absolute necessity for the attainment of happiness.



Epicurus<sup>82</sup> attach to *φιλία*, it is quite peculiar and improbable that he would not find any merit in Epicurus' teachings. In contrast, as Erler observes, "Plutarch's strict anti-Epicureanism does not exclude borrowing from Epicurus in other areas when it seems opportune to him". He also points out that Plutarch is able to separate the philosopher from the person and to praise Epicurus for some attributes of his character.<sup>83</sup>

Whereas Cicero refrains from praising Epicurus for his doctrines, his attitude towards at least some Epicureans is remarkably more positive.<sup>84</sup> He makes a distinction between the founder of the school and his followers by arguing that the latter are *boni* and *beati* (*Or.* 3.64). He also admits that *sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiares, tam bonos, tam inter se amantes viros* (*Luc.* 115).<sup>85</sup> His opposition to Epicureanism is further clarified in *De finibus*.<sup>86</sup> He points out that there are many Epicureans who do not follow the principles of Epicurean philosophy in their everyday life; not only are they loyal to their friends, but also concerned about their country (*Fin.* 2.81). He concludes that some Epicureans' actions are, surprisingly, better than the beliefs that they profess to hold, while the opposite is common with most people (*Fin.* 2.81). Therefore, his polemic is not against Epicurus or his followers, but against those who chose to follow the school's doctrines faithfully. In *Fin.* 2.44 he sheds some light on his fervent and public condemnation of Epicureanism. He suggests that his issue is not with every Epicurean, but with anyone, including the average person, who acts like an ardent follower of Epicurus. His condemnation of Epicurean doctrines appears to be a warning against most of his fellow citizens whose pursuit of personal gain and pleasure prevented them from living virtuously and from contributing to society.

Cicero's attacks thus mainly target Epicurus' notions and not the views of his contemporary Epicurean philosophers. Although he expresses disapproval

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<sup>82</sup> Rist (1980), 121; Bourne (1977), 429.

<sup>83</sup> Erler (2009), 5.

<sup>84</sup> For some additional positive remarks that Cicero makes about Epicureans in his works, see MacGillivray (2015), 14 n.48.

<sup>85</sup> Maso (2008), 274 n.45 interprets Cicero's remark as evidence that he respected their philosophical doctrines. He also notes that he esteemed his Epicurean friends.

<sup>86</sup> Brinton (1988), 170 points out that *De finibus* offers insight into Cicero's perception of the contrast between his and Epicurus' philosophical views. However, as Reinhardt (2005), 152 points out, even in the first Book of *De finibus*, in which the Epicurean, Torquatus, provides a comprehensive account of Epicurean philosophy, the reader is faced with the likely bias that Cicero may be displaying, even though he is tasked with arguing in favour of Epicurus and his principles.

of certain Epicureans, such as Oppius and Balbus, for following Epicurean principles in their everyday lives, his philosophical treatises examine and try to show the fallacy specifically in Epicurus' views. This can be attributed to the difference between Epicurus and Cicero's contemporary Epicureans, with the latter suggesting an intrinsic value of *φιλία* (*Fin.* 1.69, 2.82).<sup>87</sup> As Sedley observes, "the study of foundational texts became increasingly important as a way of maintaining one's school's identity".<sup>88</sup> Hence Lucretius' claim that he was only following Epicurus' works in the composition of *De rerum natura* (3.1-13). As a result, this study focuses on the writings of Epicurus and their interpretation by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Lucretius, and to a lesser extent Seneca, instead of the writings of Cicero's contemporary, Philodemus.<sup>89</sup>

This study examines the possibility of Cicero having been less concerned about his family than his letters from exile suggest. It argues that Cicero displays a self-centred attitude and an interest in achieving his goals at the expense of Tullia and Terentia. It maintains that Cicero did not develop with them the altruistic form of *φιλία* that Aristotle advocates in his *Ethics*. Annas argues against using the term "altruism" in studies of ancient philosophy, as she considers it anachronistic. She bases her view partly on the lack of a "distinct virtue of self-sacrificingness" in ancient ethics. However, her suggestion to use the term "other-concern" instead of altruism is problematic.<sup>90</sup> Such a term does not reflect the depth of the *φιλία* described in the works of Aristotle who asserts that οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι (*Eth. Nic.* 1156b 9-10) and that friends are willing to sacrifice themselves for one another (*Eth. Nic.* 1169a 18-20).<sup>91</sup> I thus follow Konstan who, in an extensive examination of "altruism" in ancient philosophy, concludes that it is appropriately used in reference to certain aspects of Aristotle's account of *φιλία*.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Brown (2003), 79 also stresses Cicero's intention to separate his contemporary, "more timid" Epicureans and their views of *φιλία* from Epicurus'. Sedley (1989) 98 n.3 points out that in Philodemus' time there were debates between readers of Epicureanism on the school's views of *φιλία* and that "Epicurean theories had been expanded and updated to meet contemporary challenges".

<sup>88</sup> Sedley (2009), 37.

<sup>89</sup> For a discussion of the co-founders of the Epicurean school and of Philodemus' influence on other Epicureans in Cicero's time, see Sedley (1989), 98, 103-7.

<sup>90</sup> Annas (1993), 225-6.

<sup>91</sup> According to Aristotle, even death cannot break the bond of *φιλία*, as people remain faithful to their deceased friends (*Rhet.* 1381b 25-26).

<sup>92</sup> Konstan (2000), 16-7.

The following chapters investigate the types of *φιλία* that Cicero developed with Atticus, his family, as well as Pompey and Caesar. The first chapter examines *De amicitia* in an effort to provide the philosophical background necessary to understand his professed views of *φιλία*. The discussion aims to show the great similarities between *De amicitia* and Aristotle's *Ethics*, the limited relevance of the Platonic dialogues to his treatise, and an ostensibly strong desire to discredit publicly the Epicurean account of *φιλία*. The second chapter offers a discussion of his *φιλία* with Atticus by stressing the fundamental role that utility played during their long-lasting and well-attested *φιλία*.<sup>93</sup> It argues that although it appears that he considered Atticus his closest friend, he was not entirely frank with him about his perception of their *φιλία* and, on some occasions, intentionally exaggerated his affection towards him, in order to persuade him to offer his assistance with a request that he was reluctant to grant. The third chapter focuses on his banishment and the observations that can be made on his relationship with Terentia, Tullia, Marcus junior, and Quintus by his treatment of them both during and after his exile from Rome. It suggests an effort to use emotion as persuasion by exploiting their feelings for him, so that he could secure a faster recall to Rome. Lastly, the fourth chapter examines the nature of Cicero's association with Pompey and Caesar and its relation to Aristotle's account of civic *φιλία*; it demonstrates that their *φιλία* depended almost exclusively on the exchange of services and that its sole purpose was to enhance Cicero's political career or to enjoy the protection that they were offering to him from his political rivals. The discussion that follows explores the discrepancies between Cicero's words and deeds<sup>94</sup> and how benefit defined his *φιλία*,<sup>95</sup> which appear to have resembled Epicurean

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<sup>93</sup> On utility in Cicero's *φιλία*, see Dahlmann (1938), 230-1.

<sup>94</sup> Tatum (1990), 208 makes a similar observation by noting that although religion features prominently in Cicero's speeches, it is notably absent from his correspondence. The tendency of one's actions not following one's words is stressed by Epicurus in one of his *Κύρια Δόξα*: εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε διώξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονται σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι (*Sent.* 25). As Riley (1980), 57 observes, the importance of words and actions being in agreement is emphatically noted by Colotes in his criticism of Plato (*Adv. Col.* 1108b). Atkins (2000), 515 also points out the discrepancies between the theory in Cicero's statements, as found in his political works, and his practice. Conversely, Boes (1990) argues in his discussion of Cicero's professed philosophical views that they were, by and large, in line with Cicero's actual views of philosophy. For a comparison between philosophical affiliation and actions of Roman men with active public lives, see Griffin (1989).

<sup>95</sup> For an informative discussion of the benefits that *amicitiae* in Cicero's time tended

φιλία more than it has been observed in scholarship hitherto. Considering that Cicero's statements can have multiple interpretations, this study aims to show that there is a pattern in the way that he communicates with his correspondents in terms of the candour that he displays to them in his letters and of his appeal to their φιλία as a means to ensure that they would provide him the assistance that he required. A different Cicero will emerge from this study, one which could surprise the reader – less admirable, no doubt, but perhaps real in a way that the traditional Cicero is not.

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to entail, see esp. Rollonger (2017), 350-6.

# CHAPTER 1

## CICERO'S ENGAGEMENT WITH GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Before examining Cicero's views of *φιλία* in his correspondence, it is imperative to look into his philosophical works and especially *De amicitia*.<sup>96</sup> In this treatise, there are, without a doubt, a great number of allusions to the works of three of the major Greek philosophers, viz. Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. The account of *φιλία* that Cicero provides is particularly similar to Aristotle's, but principles found in Epicurean and Platonic texts are also discussed, especially the utilitarian nature of the Epicurean *φιλία*. Nevertheless, *De amicitia* is more than a rehash of Greek philosophy for the Roman audience. Cicero seems to build on the Aristotelian views of *φιλία*, but also addresses the question whether a true bond of *φιλία* can be formed between men in politics.

Cicero's professed views of *φιλία* can be found in several of his philosophical treatises, including *De legibus* (1.34, 49), *De finibus* (2.78-85, 5.69), and *De amicitia*. In all these works Cicero is consistent in his account of *φιλία*. The chief point that he addresses in his discussion of different aspects of *φιλία* is its overall significance in one's life. He rejects the Epicurean view of *φιλία* because of its strictly beneficial nature and asserts that *φιλία* has intrinsic value, i.e., it is sought for itself and not for the benefits that arise from such associations. Although *De amicitia* is a treatise written by Cicero, it does not necessarily follow that it represents his actual or even professed views of *φιλία*. It could be argued that the main speaker, Laelius, simply expresses his own views of *amicitia*.<sup>97</sup> However, an

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<sup>96</sup> Sedley (2009), 35 notes that through his philosophical works, Cicero "set out to represent in Latin the main Greek philosophical canon" and (p.39) "to create a Latin philosophical vocabulary". Swain (1990), 195 argues that although Plutarch does not refer to Cicero as a philosopher, his contribution to Roman philosophy warrants the title. A more extensive discussion of Cicero as a philosopher can be found in Griffin's (1995) examination of philosophy in the correspondence.

<sup>97</sup> Laelius' relationship with Scipio resembles greatly Cicero's with Atticus. According to Powell (1990), 9, although Scipio did support Laelius, it is highly unlikely that

examination of the text indicates that *De amicitia* is not an atypical Ciceronian dialogue. Throughout the treatise it is evident that even though Cicero is following notions of *φιλία* of Greek philosophers, he is expressing his own views by providing his account of *φιλία*.<sup>98</sup> This observation is based on a reference to Atticus as the dedicatee of *De amicitia* (*Amic.* 5)<sup>99</sup> and on views in the dialogue that seem to spring from Cicero's personal experience with his friends and family.

The date of composition of *De amicitia* provides a strong indication of the purpose of the dialogue. Though the exact date is unknown, the treatise must have been written between March and November 44,<sup>100</sup> i.e., after *De divinatione* and before *De officiis*.<sup>101</sup> Considering that the dialogue was written after Caesar's death, it has been suggested that Cicero saw the composition of *De amicitia* as "an alternative method of serving the interests of his country" in the hope of improving "the morale of his contemporaries".<sup>102</sup> However, it could serve another purpose. Its composition coincides not only with the end of Caesar's dictatorship, but also with Cicero's return to public life. Therefore, it could be argued that Cicero could have had his political advantage in mind while composing this treatise by influencing his friends' and political allies' perception of himself in terms of the significance that he placed both on his *φιλία* and on the state.

A further matter of considerable significance in the discussion of Cicero's views of *φιλία* is the apparent paradox found in *De amicitia*: although Cicero claims that he wrote the treatise after a request from his friend Atticus, who is believed to have been a professed Epicurean, he displays an evidently anti-Epicurean attitude throughout the dialogue.<sup>103</sup> His firm opposition to Epicureanism varies from censure of the Epicurean account of *φιλία* to criticism of followers of Epicureanism and even of views about

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Laelius was, in fact, in need of "Scipio's persuasion to achieve" his senatorial career. Cicero's choice of Laelius as the representative of his views of *φιλία* could also be attributed to Laelius' reputation as a wise man (*Fin.* 2.24).

<sup>98</sup> Powell (1990), 7.

<sup>99</sup> All references are to Cicero's works unless otherwise stated.

<sup>100</sup> Armistead-Falconer (1953), 103.

<sup>101</sup> According to Zetzel (1972), 178, that *De amicitia* must have been written in the summer of 44.

<sup>102</sup> Powell (1990), 7.

<sup>103</sup> For some insightful studies of Cicero's anti-Epicureanism, see esp. d'Anna (1965), Maslowski (1974), Leonhardt (1999), Lévy (2001), Maso (2008), Englert (2014), Gilbert (2015), 116-163.