

Parallel Religious Revolutions in Britain in 1688 and Egypt in 2013

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By

Thomas West and Sonia Alianak

**Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing**



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By Thomas West and Sonia Alianak
Bibliographer Nellie Rodriguez

This book first published 2022

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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ISBN (10): 1-5275-8154-3

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-8154-8

To Anahid Mihian Alianak

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CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction: Religion and Revolution/ Counter-Revolution

Revolutionary periods, such as those experienced in England in 1642 - 1688 and Egypt in 2011 - 2013, are characterized by idealistic goals. So when and why did the idealistic goals of religious toleration and constitutional democracy in England and Egypt, respectively, as introduced by the new post-revolutionary rulers James II and Mohamed Morsi, lead to new - revolutions? Why did religion not stabilize regimes (unlike Marx's palliative or Alianak's stabilization in times of crisis) but lead to revolutions? This book explores these questions and attempts an explanation by introducing a theoretical construction of the presence of sectarian strains in both countries that magnified the perceived unwitting "basic blunders" of these new inexperienced rulers, and hence led to revolutions, albeit with different end - results – a constitutional monarchy in England with the re-establishment of a "secure" Church of England, and a return to a perceived nonsectarian military rule an illiberal democracy in Egypt.

Revolution, Sectarian Strains, and a Theoretical Introduction

"Yahweh," "Jesus Christ," and "Allahu Akbar!" are the cries of the faithful followers of Abraham in their search for God's will. Their religious ethos is their continuing emotional effort to deconstruct the mind of their prophet, whether it be Moses, Jesus, or Muhammad. This religious ethos, which tries over and over to please God, often takes the form of many sects. And that is what our book is about accounting for sects in Christianity and Islam, and identifying when they lead to revolution. This book explores this question in general in chapter one and in particular in subsequent chapters, concentrating on sectarianism in Britain during the

Glorious Revolution of 1688 that overthrew James II of England, and the anti-Morsi overthrowing of the first democratically elected president of Egypt in 2013.

So why compare one with the other? We posit that revolution tends to happen when one sect tries to impose its version of Christianity or Islam to create uniformity among the believers. But this attempt often fails owing to the resistance of the other sect or sects, who rise up in protest, whether in Restoration England or more recently in Egypt, because religion tends to be non-negotiable and hence tends to lead to revolution in all times and places studied. We turn now to a Literature Survey of Religion and Revolution.

Literature Survey of Religion and Revolution

The literature recognizes a spectrum of revolution and religion. At one extreme, religion is used as a palliative, an “opium,” a painkiller, by rulers to placate the misfortunes of the people as Karl Marx once wrote in terms of economic factors (Bottomore, 1983, pg. 413, 416). However, he overlooked the fact that in a secular society with hardly any faith or love of God, which is at one end of the spectrum, religion is useless in preventing revolution. The spectrum of religious ethos stretches from uniformly religious societies, through sectarian societies that coexist, to sectarian societies that are divisive at the other end. While it is the latter that this book concentrates upon, it is necessary to explore the ruler’s options in each of these eventualities in the society where revolutions might or might not happen and can be or are prevented.

The analysis leads to two dimensions: (1) Degree of Religious Ethos (RE) and Revolution (R); (2) Leaders or rulers (L) and their perception by the people, and their use of religion in the spectrum of different religious ethos (RE) and Revolution (R) or no Revolution (NR) (see Table 1.).

Religious ethos feeds or energizes the emotional effort of the faithful to deconstruct the mind of the prophet. It tries over and over again to please God, which may be in the form of a uniform feeling of religiosity or the many sects which may coexist or be very divisive, and may be leaderless masses.

The leader’s use of religion spans one extreme of non-use of religion, to the middle where religion is used as a pervasive palliative at all times, through its use in crisis times, to the other extreme of divine right or descendants of the prophet.

Table 1: Revolution or no Revolution

Rel. ethos (RE) and (R) Leader Perception	Secular	RE Uniform	RE Sects Coexist and L L Nonsectarian	RE Sects Divisive & Leaderless Masses L Sectarian
L Non-Use	NR	R	R	R
L Palliative Uniform	NR	NR	NR	R
L Crisis Use	NR	NR	NR	R
L Divine Right	R	NR	NR	R

First, let us take the leader's non-use of religion and the occurrence of revolution. At one extreme, where a secular society exists no revolution tends to happen modifying the ideas of Marx quoted earlier, which seem to imply the use of religion as a pervasive "opium," a palliative, that works at all times. This tends not to be true in the middle where Religious Ethos exists, whether in a uniform society or where sects coexist, where revolutions are prone to happen when the leader does not use religion. Examples here are Tunisia (2011) and Egypt (2011) where Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak did not resort to religion (Alianak, 2014). Extrapolating from Marx, it can be said that here revolutions could have become unlikely or even prevented. It is in a divisive sectarian society where the leader is perceived to be sectarian despite their pervasive palliative use of religion that revolutions tend to happen, which is the focus of this book.

Second, we take the cases where the leader uses religion at crisis times and the occurrence of revolution. At one extreme where the society is secular no revolution tends to happen if the leader does not use religion at times of crisis. In the middle of the Religious Ethos spectrum, where the society is uniform or where sects coexist but the leader is perceived to be nonsectarian and uses nonsectarian religion at crisis times revolutions tend not to happen or can be prevented. In her 2007 book *Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium*, Alianak explains the non-occurrence of revolution in Saudi Arabia under their Saudi Kings and Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser in terms of the leaders' co-optation of the religious establishment and use of religion at crisis times in nonsectarian societies. She elaborates on this by showing that it also true

in sectarian societies where the leader is perceived to be nonsectarian and uses religion at time of crisis, as in the well-known cases of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (1979 – 2003) and Hafez al-Assad in Syria (1970 – 2000). It is when the Religious Ethos is at the other extreme that is where sects are divisive, and where the leader is perceived to belong to one of the sects or to have a sectarian agenda - that revolutions tend to happen, and which the present book emphasizes.

Third, we explain cases where the leader claims “divine right” to rule, or their descent from the Prophet Muhammad. At one extreme of the Religious Ethos spectrum, where the society tends to be or has become secular, the claim of “divine right” by a leader tends to result in revolution. However, in the middle of the spectrum, where society is uniform or where sects coexist and the leader is perceived to be nonsectarian, no revolution tends to happen. At the other extreme, where society is divisively sectarian and the leader is perceived to be sectarian, supporting one of the sects, revolutions tend to occur, such as in the case of James II in England from February 1685 until December 1688 when he was deposed by the Glorious Revolution, which the first part of this book will elaborate upon. There are, however, certain cases in which the leaders are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and are non-sectarian and no revolution has happened, notably in Jordan and Morocco (Alianak, 2014). The ruler of Jordan is King Abdullah II and the monarch of Morocco is Muhammad VI. Both withstood the tidal wave of revolutions during the Arab Spring in 2011 by resorting to reform instead of being toppled by making use of their religious credentials and pedigrees as explained by Alianak in her *Edinburgh The Transition towards Revolution and Reform: The Arab Spring Realised?* (2014)

In our present study we consider societies imbued with religious ethos, where one sect attempts to impose or is perceived to impose its version of Christianity or Islam. We begin with “The Now” (2013) when, in a popular reaction against the authoritarian secular values of Hosni Mubarak, Egyptians turned to religion and democratically elected Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party, the Freedom and Justice Party, to take the reins of power in 2012. But Egyptians soon came to regret their choice as Morsi was perceived as imposing his own Muslim Brotherhood version of Islam on the country. Through leaderless mass demonstrations at Tahrir Square, they sought the help of the military and deposed Morsi only one year after his coming to power.

After that we proceed to examine “The Then,” when James II attempted to impose Catholicism on a strongly Anglican and Protestant society which rose up in revolt, relying on the intervention of William of

Orange, the nephew and son-in-law of James II, who gathered a fleet of frigates and large transport vessels (for horses) from Amsterdam in a bloodless invasion and forced the Catholic King into exile in Catholic France, where Louis XIV and James II were second cousins.

What were the Religious Ethos in Islam and the corresponding Religious Ethos in the West at the time of the anti-Morsi revolution in Egypt in 2013 and the Glorious Revolution in Great Britain in 1688?

Religion, Revolution, and Sectarian Strains in Islam: The Right to Rule and the Right to Revolt

What are some of the major theories about the Right to Rule and the Right to Revolt that were known on the eve of the coup, or revolution, of 2013 in Egypt, which is one of our case studies pertaining to Religion, Revolution and Sectarian Strains?

The Koran and the Hadith, the actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, depict the Prophet as a sovereign, a statesman, and a judge, but also as a rebel before he became a head of state. According to Bernard Lewis, “The Prophet as rebel has provided a sort of paradigm of revolution opposition and rejection, withdrawal and departure, exile and return,” movements of opposition in Islam have attempted to emulate with a few succeeding like the Abbasid Caliphate in Iraq emanating from Eastern Iran, the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt having gone to Yemen and then North Africa, and Khomeini in Iran after being exiled to Iraq and living outside of Paris (Lewis, 1988, pg. 6, 7).

According to the first Caliph (the successor of the Prophet), Abu-Bakr, the right to rule and the right to disobey hence insinuating the right to revolt were reflected in his statement: “Now it is beyond doubt that I have been elected your Amir, although I am not better than you. Help me, if I am right; set me right if I am in the wrong; truth is a trust, falsehood a treason ... Obey me as long as I obey God and His Prophet; when I disobey God and His Prophet, then obey me not” (Ahmad, n.d., pg. 3). Absolute power of temporal authority was also criticized in the Hadith (Sahih al-Bukhari): “Verily, the worst title is ‘King of Kings’; there is no King that has absolute power except Allah” (“King of Kings” March 13, 2016, pg. 2).

The first four rulers of Muslims were those known to be “rightly-guided” (the “Rashiduns”), although the term proved to be controversial. Ultimately, those who defended the caliphate (the empire), and were “elected” and were not blood relatives of the Prophet but related to him through marriage, won. Those who were supporters of Ali, the blood

cousin and father-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, who called for a state run by the Prophet's family, branched off and created Shiism. Thus was created a sectarian rift in terms of the right to rule Muslims. According to Manfred Davidmann, "Not an issue for them and not being considered by them is the taking over of Mohammad's actual role as intermediary between God and people ... not competing for an exclusively religious leadership of the Muslim people, of the believers, of the Muslim community at large" (Davidmann, 2003, pg. 9). Henceforth, Davidmann divides his study into the "Divine Right to Rule" of the Secular Ruler and the clerics. The secular rulers "... used Islam ... as a means of ensuring that joiners transferred their total allegiance to the new super tribe of Muslims in the service of the Muslim organization, that is in the service of their rulers and their rulers' establishments" (Ibid., pg. 10).

However, a penchant for revolting on the part of Muslims was seen in the occurrence of three consecutive assassinations of Caliphs, starting with the second Caliph Umar, the third Caliph Uthman, and the fourth Ali. Notable here is the revolt by discontented tribes people and mutineers which resulted in the murder of Uthman, the first Umayyad Caliph in 656 CF. What ensued was a non-revolutionary period of the rule of the Umayyad dynasty of the cousin of Uthman, Muawiya, one of the descendants of Umayya. The Umayyad family ruled the Arab empire from 651 to 750. The Umayyads, "claimed that the caliphate had been bestowed on them by God...And so the Umayyads were using religion to tranquilize their population, to justify enforcing obedience" (Davidmann, 2003, pg. 12).

Another, this time major, revolution occurred in 750 when the Abbasids, the distant cousins of the Umayyads and distant cousins of Mohammed's uncle Abbas, rose in rebellion and established the Abbasid Dynasty in Iraq. The Abbasid Revolution established "equality" between Muslims of Arab descent and other Muslims by ending the Arab empire of their predecessors. According to Peter Mansfield, "The Arab tribal aristocracy had been ousted by the new social class of government officials, landowners and merchants ... and Muslim scholars collectively known as 'ulema' (Mansfield in Davidmann, 2013 pg. 11). The Abbasid dynasty also laid claim to the caliphate. first from Ali to the first two Abbasid Caliphs and later under Caliph, al-Mahdi (775 - 85) to the Prophet's uncle al-Abbas. So rulers used "religion (Islam) to justify and validate their authority over the population and their rule, by claiming 'divine right' to rule" (Davidmann, 2003, pg. 13), as did the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt in the tenth century (Lewis, 1988, pg. 7).

Henceforth, the “Divine Right to Rule” of the Secular Rulers was pitted against that of the ulema for the next one hundred years. Historically, the struggle was over the extent to which the ulema “ought to be taking part in or controlling secular (social) decision-taking in the name of religion” (Davidmann, 2003, pg. 13). The Caliphs and the ulema claimed “divine right” for social decision-making, authority over people, and personal power. “One side was based on authority handed down from the Prophet, on succession, and on heading the community as Imam. The other side was on the basis of a mass of traditions which were additional and external to the Koran, additional to what Mohammed had revealed, additional to the word of Allah (God) as revealed by Mohammed” (Davidmann, 2003, pg. 18). It took the ulema 120 years to sift and validate the Hadiths (traditions). Here, the Sunnite position postulated that the sharia (religious law) was to be based on the Koran, Muhammad’s traditions in his everyday life, and the opinions (rules) of Muslim clerics. Both the rulers and clerics attempted to “to make the other serve its own ends” (Davidmann, 2003 pg. 25). Present- day echoes and connotations, although muted and somewhat reconciled, can be discerned, in Egypt when the al-Azhar’s fatwas (religious rulings) were sought by Egyptian Rulers such as Nasser and Sadat to validate socialism and capitalism, respectively (Alianak, 2007).

However, there is no religious hierarchy in Islam, but there is a class of religious professionals whose position is acquired by learning and not ordination, and who act in a sociological sense (Lewis, 1988, pg. 7). Further, Islam is conceived as a polity and not just a religious community. Thus, there is no separation between church and state in classical Islam which predates Westernized Islam. Muhammad established an Islamic state. Hence, Islam as a religion was from the beginning associated with exercising power (Lewis, 1988, pg. 5, 6). Therefore, the significance of religion in any opposition to an existing regime took religious forms, and in turn the prevailing regime would defend its legitimacy in religious terms too (Lewis 1988, 9).

Present- day rulers, or those who seek to rule, find it wise to claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad as a pedigree to elicit obedience from their peoples. Notable here are the monarchs of Morocco, Muhammad VI, who is the thirty-fourth direct descendant of the Prophet, and Jordan, Abdullah II, who is the forty-third direct descendant of the Prophet. They survived the Arab Spring by merely introducing reform and thus averting revolutions because they were trusted (Alianak, 2014). Would-be rulers also seek this advantage by constructing their ancestral tree of descent from the Prophet, whether true or fabricated. Examples

here are Saddam Hussein of Iraq (Alianak, 2007) and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS or ISIL.

While opposing the rulers, modern- day revolutions took religious forms and were directed against perceived enemies, both external and internal. The external enemy was the non-Islamic world, whereas the internal enemy comprised rulers who were named as apostates, unbelievers (Lewis, 1988, 8, 9). These two reasons are given by modern day religious revolutionary movements and extremist theorists like Sayyid Qutb, Ruhollah Khomeini, Osama bin Laden of Al-Qaeda, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS or ISIL, to name only a few extremist Islamists. Clearly, in a society which is perceived as entirely corrupt, revolutions have been called for. But opinion is divided here. Maulana Wahiduddin Khan opts for peaceful means, citing a Hadith: “God grants to non-violence what He does not grant to violence” (Khan, November 23, 2011, pg. 2). Moderate Islamists, like Hassan el-Banna, who established the Muslim Brotherhood, took mostly the non-revolutionary stance of evolutionary reforms.

The views of radical Islam were presented by Qutb, who justified Islamic revolution in his book *Signposts*, and who was hanged in 1966 on charge of plotting a coup in Egypt (Shadid, 2002, pg. 58). Qutb denied absolute power to the state or government, whose authority he considered to be neither divinely ordained nor timeless. Sovereignty, according to him, resided in God and was delegated to the umma, the community. Therefore, government was legitimate so long as it adhered to the sharia, Islamic law, which was interpreted by popular view. He advocated an Islamic state as a constitutional state and government of the community based on the sharia (Moussalli, 1995, pg. 90, 94). However, for Qutb, the contemporary Muslim society was a jahiliyya, which secularized God and did not apply the sharia. As a result, he implied a call for revolt through “the abolition of man-made laws. Those who have usurped the authority of God and are oppressing God’s creatures are not going to give up their power merely through preaching hence, the need for a religious vanguard whose duty was to lead the struggle where the role of the poor was emphasized by Qutb (Shadid, 2002, pg. 60).

Khomeini led the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and established a theocracy. The revolution’s identity was Islamic and its success was henceforth in influencing the role of Islam in the contemporary Middle East. At times of crisis or emergency, Muslims rely on their religious community for identity: “Power seeks legitimacy, and attains it more effectively, among Muslims, from Islam rather than from national or patriotic or even dynastic claims, still less from the Western notion of national or popular sovereignty. To Muslims Islam offers the most

intelligible formulation of ideas, on the one hand of social norms and laws, on the other of new ideals and aspirations for the future” (Lewis, 1988, pg. 5). The aim of the Islamic revolution, in Iran and later elsewhere, was to do away with all alien and “infidel” impositions on the Muslim peoples and land through Westernization, and to restore the true Islamic order of the Prophet’s time, even though this involved utilization of Western electronic devices such as cassettes used by Khomeini in rousing the masses through recordings of his religious sermons directed against the secular shah (Lewis, 1988, pg. 13, 14).

Against this right to revolt as expounded by extremist Islam, are the views pertaining to the leader’s right to rule through democratic means and, change through evolution rather than revolution, as promoted by moderate Islam. Notable here are the views of the Muslim Brotherhood which participates in electoral politics in Jordan as an opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) which was formed in the wake of the political party law of 1992, and the newly legalized Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) after the Arab Spring of 2011, which got Mohamed Morsi elected to the Egyptian Presidency in 2012. The FJP was banned in 2013 following the revolution which toppled Morsi. This episode in Egyptian history will be discussed later.

Seeking power through political parties was not encouraged, promoted, or called for by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) in Egypt, but the movement evolved as al-Banna did not spell out what specific form political participation would take (Alianak, 2012, pg. 110). Rather he called for “stages” of gradual Islamization in his “methodology” of the Ikhwan (Brotherhood). The first stage would start at the level of the individual through education to achieve Islamic purification. This would be followed by the establishment of the Islamic society and Islamic nation, then by the Islamic government, then embarking on the Islamic motherland and eventually arriving at the Islamic empire (al-Banna, 2008 pg. 8, 10). Thus the Muslim Brotherhood was envisaged to go beyond the nation -state into the realm of international involvement. This would involve many states, starting in Jordan and Egypt.

Although the original aim of the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan was tarbiyya (preaching and education) to change the individual first, then families, and finally the society, it went beyond this task by being involved in the Jordanian political system. However, it was not aggressive about this pursuit because it deferred to the monarch, King Abdullah II, the forty-third direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan contented itself by acting as the loyal opposition

rather than seeking complete control of the government. Indeed its party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), went so far as to exercise self-limitation in order not to antagonize the monarchy (Alianak, 2007, pg. 27, 30). A senior Brotherhood member reaffirmed this stance: “It would be unjust if the Brotherhood were to come to power before a majority of society is prepared to support them” (Leiken and Brooke, 2007, pg. 111).

In Egypt, although the Muslim Brotherhood leadership did not call upon its members to participate in the Arab Spring demonstrations that eventually toppled President Hosni Mubarak, they benefited from the revolution of 2011 by being allowed to form a legal political party, the FJP. But even so they were cautious by insisting that it was a “civil party,” with an Islamic reference reminiscent of the Christian Democrats of Europe (Alianak, 2012, pg. 115). However, emboldened by its initial parliamentary success, the Brotherhood became less cautious and fielded a candidate for president, Mohamed Morsi, who was elected to the post in June 2012. Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt was too optimistic and over-confident of its message, as will be elaborated on later when considering the reasons behind the removal of Morsi, even though he resigned from the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood upon accession to the presidency, through the coup, or revolution, of June–July 2013. This will be the heart of the matter of this book. We turn next to the subject of religious ethos in the West.

Religion, Revolution, and Sectarian Strains in the West: The Right to Rule and Right to Revolt

What were some of the major theories about the Right to Rule and the Right to Revolt that were known on the eve of another of our case studies pertaining to Religion, Revolution, and Sectarian Strains, the 1688 Glorious Revolution in Britain?

Beginning with the Old Testament, God is depicted as the one who chose kings to rule over Israel, which gave them the right to rule. The right to rule was ordained by “Yahweh,” as in the case of the choice of Saul reaffirmed by Samuel, the prophet: “Yahweh has appointed you king over Israel” (1 Samuel 15: 17). However, when God was dissatisfied, for example with King Saul, he had him removed. The Old Testament reads, “The word of Yahweh came to Samuel, ‘I regret having made Saul King for he has turned away from me and has not carried out my orders.’” (1 Samuel 15: 10). And thereupon Samuel told Saul “Since you have rejected the word of Yahweh, he has rejected you as King.” (1 Samuel, 15: 23). Ultimately, David inherited the Kingdom of God (Israel), and Yahweh

said to him: “You are the man who shall be shepherd of my people Israel, you shall be the leader of Israel” (2 Samuel, 5: 2-3).

In the New Testament, Jesus laid the ground work for obedience to the ruler and the separation of church and state with his answer to the Pharisees and members of Herod’s party in connection with the lawfulness of paying taxes to the Roman emperor: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22:21). In early Christianity, great stress was placed on obedience to civil authority, the provider of temporal welfare of mankind. Saint Paul in his Epistle to the Romans stated that, “You must all obey the governing authorities. Since all government comes from God, the civil authorities were appointed by God, and so anyone who resists authority is rebelling against God’s decision, and such an act is bound to be punished” (Romans 13:1-3). And Peter in his first letter wrote: “For the sake of the Lord, accept the authority of every social institution, the emperor, as the supreme authority ... Have respect for everyone and love for our community; fear God and honor the emperor” (1 Peter 2:13–17). The church and its popes continued to market this package deal with their endorsement of the line of emperors from Constantine, Theodosius, Eastern Roman emperors, and Charlemagne of the Western Roman Emperors, to the Catholic Holy Roman Emperors.

A “moderate papalist,” Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) supported the monarchy as the best form of government for whom civic obedience was called. However, he disliked tyranny and called for a justifiable public act of resistance by the whole people against an unlawful ruler. But he also called for a moral condition binding those who resist, namely that their action is less injurious than the abuse they are replacing. Thus, although he regarded sedition to be a deadly sin, he did not consider justifiable resistance to tyranny a sedition. He introduced moral limitations on rulers. He also described circumstances in which it was lawful for the church to depose a ruler who was against the whole divine system by which God ruled the earth. However, he did not mean to abandon secular rulers’ power with regards to seculars or deny the distinction between church and state authorities (Sabine, 1961, pg 250, 256).

The struggle between the pope and clergy had its effect on secular power and the right to rule as seen by the reformer John Wycliffe (1320–84), in the fourteenth Century. Wycliffe, a Yorkshire man, attributed the Black Death the bubonic plague that swept through England in 1349 to God’s indictment of an unworthy clergy, and this radiated far and wide as an indictment of the papal hierarchy and its luxurious life. He advocated doing away with this edifice and called for royal divestment of

all church property in his work in 1377 *De civili dominio* [On Civil Dominion], which took the form of calling for the supremacy of the king over the priesthood in 1379 in his *De ecclesia* [On the Church] (“John Wycliffe” April 11, 2016, pg. 3, 5). In his reform efforts, Wycliffe counted on royal support against the pope and the hierarchy, by a strange paradox strengthening secular power. For him, the king was the vicar of God, and resisting him was wicked. Further, the king was the temporal head of every single national church. Hence, it was the duty and right of the king to correct the abuses of the church government. It was thus that “the divine right of the king became almost an official philosophy” for Anglicans, and later Lutherans Martin Luther relied on German princes by the same token (Sabine, 1961, pg. 314, 15).

The struggle for power between religious sects accentuated the positions of divine-right theorists and their opponents. This right was defended in terms of stability and political order by those who propounded a national establishment against the internationalism of the pope originally, while only later taking the form of the struggle of absolutism versus constitutionalism. Divine right assumed that authority had religious sanction and origin (Sabine, 1961, pg. 391, 2) This was depicted in France, by Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty and the rule of King Louis XIV, and in Scotland and later in England by James I.

The theological basis for monarchy was enunciated by James I in his *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, written in 1597–8, where he explained the Divine Right of Kings. By “free monarchy” he meant a royal ruler independent of coercion from foreign princes and domestic sectaries and feudatories (Sabine, 1961, pg. 395). According to Christopher Hill, this “would not have shocked contemporaries,” for even, “Shakespeare’s historical plays illustrate the Elizabethan sense that a strong monarchy was essential to defend national unity against foreign invasion and domestic anarchy” (Hill 1961, pg. 64). It was up to James I to define the extent of his prerogatives vis-à-vis the House of Commons and the judges in this struggle for sovereignty. Whereas Queen Elizabeth was a near absolutist, but preferred to disguise it, James I was very explicit. However, James I “took care always to operate within the Common Law, he never resorted to imprisonment without trial or raised taxes without parliament’s consent. He did not practice what he preached” (Houston, 1976, pg. 38). But he felt that if the House of Commons’ attempted encroachments on monarchical prerogatives went unchallenged, the crown would go by default given that up to the end of the sixteenth century the Commons had played a very limited part in government. Accordingly, he also periodically defined his positions on divine right in speeches before Parliament (Houston, 1976,

pg. 38, 39). For example, in his speech about the monarchy to Parliament, on March 21, 1610 (Kenyon, 1986, pg. 11, 13), he stated: "The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth; for kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called gods "Kings are justly called gods for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth..." Further, he emphasized that the kings are "accountable to God only." In this connection, he called "blasphemy" "to dispute what God may do," and was vehemently opposed to sedition: "so is it sedition in subjects to dispute what a king may do in the height of his power, but must kings will ever be willing to declare what they will do, if they will not incur the curse of God." God would punish "wicked kings." Citing God's "paction" with Noah after the deluge, he argued that in the "state of settled kings," the king is bound to observe his laws. Accordingly, he concludes his speech: "I will not be content that my power be disputed upon, but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my doings, and rule my actions according to my laws."

James I defined his position on these laws in his speech to the judges in Star Chamber in June 1616 (Kenyon, 1986, pg. 84, 86). He called all common and municipal laws "unjust and unlawful" that are not in accordance with God's Law, and called for obeying God's Law. Here the monarch's role was central, according to James: "It is the king's office to protect and settle the true interpretation of the law of God within his dominions, and it is the judges' office to interpret the law of the king, whereto themselves are also subject" (pg. 84). The king was conceived thus to be the sole and final interpreter of God's law. Having asserted his divine superiority to the Commons and the judges, the monarch reiterated his absolute power and religious right to rule through divine power.

In his relation to the sects, James I, who had been targeted by the Gunpowder Plot, sought to control non conformist Catholics by sanctioning harsh measures against them. Notable here was the passage by Parliament of the Popish Recusants Act in May 1606, which mandated citizens to take an Oath of Allegiance denying the Pope's authority over the king. However, James I was conciliatory towards Catholics who took the Oath and tolerated crypto-Catholicism, even at court, and those Catholics who, "would be quiet and give but an outward obedience to the law" (Akrigg, 1984, pg. 207, 8; Willson 1963, pg. 148, 9).

The theory of the divine right of kings was reaffirmed by Robert Filmer in his best-known book *Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings*, published posthumously in 1680. Filmer had started it as a middle-aged man upon observing the heated controversy between Charles I, James I's

son, and the House of Commons in the 1620s, and it is believed that he completed it before the Civil War began in 1642 (“Robert Filmer,” February 5, 2016, pg. 2). He died in 1669. It was not until 1680 that it was published by the royalists during the constitutional crisis where the Whigs attempted to exclude the heir, James, the Catholic Duke of York, from acceding to the throne. It was an immediate success and aroused the wrath of anti-royalists, notable among whom were Algernon Sidney and John Locke (Parry, 1978, pg. 73).

According to Filmer, the person is not born free and is helpless when they come into the world, and as such is dependent on their parents, especially their father who has absolute power over them. Therefore Filmer was against the doctrine of contract between the king and the people, which for him lacked historical foundation (Carswell, 1989, pg. 177). Instead he advocated a patriarchal relation between the king, the father, and the children, the people. He based this on the Old Testament of the Bible where God granted absolute power to Adam, which was the foundation and basis of royal authority. After Adam this was passed by heredity to the heads of families, the kings from God. He wrote: “Kings are either fathers of their people, or heirs of such fathers, or the usurpers of the rights of such fathers” (Parry, 1978, pg. 75). In case of confusion, where there is no heir discerned, the selection of a new king falls on the heads of families, but this does not constitute free consent of the people as those choosing the monarch act as mere intermediaries of God and do not have the power to put limits or conditions on the exercise of royal power which is absolute and descends from God (Parry, 1978, pg. 75, 76).

Filmer’s *Patriarcha* was divided into three chapters: “I. That the first Kings were Fathers of Families; II. It is unnatural for the People to Govern, or Choose Governments; III. Positive Laws do not infringe the Natural and Fatherly Power of Kings” (West, 1996, pg. 4). The king was subject only to God’s law. The people were to obey him. But the sovereign had the duty to give paternal care to their subjects, their family, according to Filmer: “As the Father over one family, so the King, as Father over many families, extends his care to preserve, feed, clothe, instruct and defend the whole commonwealth ... so that all the duties of a King are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people,” The duty of subjects was to “honor thy father,” as instructed by the Fifth Commandment (Parry, 1978, pg. 77). Therefore, Filmer was against the people judging and deposing a king. Accordingly, he was also a critic of democracy, which he considered to be mob rule in Athens, and not real justice (“Robert Filmer,” February 5, 2016, pg. 3).

The divine right of kings was disputed by Oliver Cromwell, the English revolutionary military and political leader (1599–1658), on religious grounds, and by John Locke (1632–1704), the English political theorist who was the chief apologist of the new regime of William of Orange after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, on more secular grounds.

Cromwell believed that God guided him in his victories and decisions. His speeches and writings are full of references to signs from Providences for his actions, such as his religious conversion in 1630 when he became an Independent Puritan; his participation in the House of Commons, especially following his election as a representative from Cambridge in the Short (1640) and Long (1640–1649) Parliaments; his entering the English Civil War on the side of Parliamentarians, where he was eventually promoted to one of the New Model Army's commanders (1645–1646), which absolutely defeated the Royalist forces at Naseby; his being a signatory to King Charles I's execution order in 1649; his becoming the First Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland (from December 16, 1653 to September 3, 1658); and his turning down of the invitation to assume the crown in 1657, the year before his death in 1658.

Cromwell told a cousin about his conversion and about seeking God's acceptance, and even hinting of predestination of himself: "Truly no poor creature hath more cause to put forth himself in the course of God than I ... The Lord accept me in His Son, and give me to walk in the light, and give us to walk in the light, as He is the light ... Blessed be His name for shining on so dark a heart as mine!" (Ashley 1969, 48–49). Thus he believed that God acted through human agents and that he was destined to be one of these. He stated at Putney on November 1, 1647: "I am one of those whose heart God hath drawn out to wait for some extraordinary dispensations ... (Hill, 1970, pg. 219). Further, he believed in signs or providences as clues to the will of God (Fraser, 1974, pg. 266). This was especially true at the times of political crises or moments of decisions about battles, when Cromwell was reputed to have gone to his knees and sought to interpret God's will (Ashley 1969, pg. 50).

Moreover, based on religious grounds, Cromwell sided with Parliament against King Charles I, supporting it in the Civil War. In the Long Parliament in October 1640, he directed an attack against the religious policy of King Charles I and Archbishop Laud, then was nominated to a subcommittee of the Grand Committee on Religion dealing with the scarcity of preaching ministers (Ashley, 1969, pg. 55). However, his loyalty to Parliament was not unconditional. He believed that it should be accountable to God's cause as well as the godly people. For example, as

Lord Protector he later dismissed it on religious grounds after a speech on February 4, 1658 to Parliament when he appealed to God: "And let God be judge between you and me!" (Cromwell in Smith, in Little, *The Cromwellian Protectorate*, 2007, pg. 24).

As a military commander, "Old Ironsides" (Cromwell's nickname) expressed his conviction that God was on their side and guided them to victory. He stated: "As to outward dispensations, if we may call them, we have not been without our share of beholding some remarkable providences, and appearances of the Lord. His presence hath been amongst us, and by the light of His countenance we have prevailed" (Cromwell in Fraser, 1974, pg. 266). Therefore, while the godly New Model Army was victorious, Cromwell believed that it was clear that Providence was on its side, at least initially (Little, 2009, pg. 217, 218). Moreover, he justified the army's fight against the king as lawful as it was, he believed, being called by God to do what it did in the interests of humanity (Fraser, 1974, pg. 266).

Upon the defeat of the monarch and the king's trial as debated by the House of Commons on December 26, 1648 he leaned toward the king's conviction: "Since the Providence of God hath cast this upon us, I cannot but submit to Providence, though I am not yet provided to give you my advice" (Cromwell in Fraser, 1974, pg. 275). However, he was later convinced that signs of God revealed step by step that King Charles I had to be executed, and accordingly was one of the signatories of that order (Fraser, 1974, pg. 285).

When he became Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, and Scotland (along with Ireland on December 16, 1654), Cromwell addressed Parliament on September 12, 1654 in religious terms: "I say to you again, in the presence of that God who hath blessed and been with me in all my adversities and successes, that was, as to myself, my greatest end" (Cromwell, *Text of Speech to Parliament on Tuesday September 12th 1654* in Kenyon, 1986, pg. 319).

Cromwell declined the offer of the British Crown which was tendered to him in the spring of 1657, again with religious overtones. What was his calculation? Several reasons for his decisions have been suggested, such as the failure of his army in his "Western Design" taken as a sign of God's wrath and his troubled conscience about his failure to resist temptation (Little, 2009, pg. 218, 236). Cromwell himself gave a major argument in 1657: "at best I should do it doubtingly. And certainly what is so done is not of faith," and consequently "sin to him that doth it" (Cromwell in Hill, 1970, pg. 237). Addressing a parliamentary committee in April 1657 he specifically stated: "Truly the Providence of God has laid

this title aside providentially ... I would not seek to set up the Providence hath destroyed and laid in the dust, and I would not build Jericho again” (Little, 2009, pg. 218).

Was Cromwell therefore a revolutionary? Not so far as human design is concerned according to him. He admonished, “God knoweth what he will do with men, when they shall call his revolutions human designs, and so detract from his glory ...” (Cromwell in Hill 1970, pg. 234, 5). Cromwell was convinced that he was himself a “humble instrument of God” defending the “true Protestant faith” at the moment of revolution in English history (Ashley 1969, pg. 56). Although Cromwell made God the judge of unjust rulers, as is evident in his statement, “He that ruleth over men [quoting the Book of Samuel] must be just, ruling in the fear of God,” he made only one brief mention of the contract between the ruler and the people (Ashley 1969, pg. 45).

It was left to John Locke (1632–1704) to develop the concept of the Social Contract and who made the ruled people the judges. He refuted the divine right of kings theory and argued for limited government based on the consent of the people and the people’s right to withdraw the consent and revolt against absolutism (West, T.G., 1996, pg. 8). In this way, unlike Cromwell, Locke gave the people and their freedom, rather than God, the central role in a revolution. But Locke was no atheist, and in fact called for the persecution of atheists. His piety led him to understand religion through reason, but he supplemented it the supernatural and through the teachings of Jesus Christ (“John Locke” April 19, 2016, pg. 8).

As a pious person, Locke derived his political theory through the Bible both the Old Testament and the New Testament. For him, the law of nature, which existed prior to civil government, was based on the law of Moses (Aaron, 1971, pg. 297). Also, the law of nature demanded such conduct as would befit any educated Christian gentleman, according to Locke (Aaron, 1971, pg. 272). Paramount in this Law of Nature were human freedom and human equality, which were derived from Exodus 20:2 depicting the freedom of Israelites from Egypt, and from Genesis 1:26-28 which to Locke showed the basic human equality of Adam and Eve (“John Locke” April 19, 2016, pg. 9). Both concepts of freedom and equality were the basis of his theory of the right of consent of the governed and the right to withdraw the consent and revolt against executive absolutism. Moreover, in spite of the religious basis of his political theory, Locke called for the actual separation of church and state on the basis that the purely religious sphere is not political. He also called for toleration, as he abhorred narrow sectarianism. Priests and the pope, like the monarchs, were to refrain from absolutism (Aaron 1971, p. 292, pg. 294).

Central to Locke's political theory was his book *Two Treatises of Government*, which was published in 1690 after Filmer's *Patriarcha* in 1680. In the first treatise, Locke refutes Filmer's divine right of kings; in the second he argues against absolutism and proposes an alternate civil government based on the consent of the people. Concerned about Filmer's thesis of a patriarch ruling the state by divine right, Locke presents several counterarguments: (1) in a large and complex state a parent's rule is not feasible; (2) there is no basis to the claim of rulers being divinely ordained starting with Adam for Locke doubts the sovereignty of Adam over Eve and their children rather, he believes that honoring, not obeying, one's father and also the mother happens (West, T.g., 1996, pg. 10); (3) and yet, the child might learn obedience in their formative years, and as a grown adult they are free, and parental authority ceases; (4) this parental authority should not be confused with the ruler's authority, for they are fundamentally different; (5) even if Adam were to be conceived as having absolute power over others, it would be completely impossible to trace the succession of British monarch Charles II to Adam (Aaron, 1971, pg. 270, 274, 275).

In his second treatise, against absolutism, Locke starts with the State of Nature, which is a condition of peace and mutual aid if based on reason, then proceeds to a social contract of individuals in a community and civil-society establishment. This condition Locke considered as being the "original compact" by which individuals "incorporate into one society," a bare agreement "to unite into one political society which is all the compact that is, or needs to be, between individuals, that enter into, or make up the commonwealth" (Locke in Sabine, 1961, pg. 532). In the State of Nature the individual is "equal and independent" and uses reason. But they leave the State of Nature because the human is not wholly rational and is subject to the rapaciousness and greed of others, and therefore feels insecure; they realize that their judgment of others is not wholly reliable; and they lack the means of enforcing their judgments even if they were valid. Hence, they voluntarily give up their power of judgment and punishing to be performed by the state (Aaron, 1971, pg. 278).

People unite voluntarily to free up individuals from the insecurity of the State of Nature, according to Locke, "for mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates which I call by the general name, property" (Locke in Aaron, 1971, pg. 280). This is a tacit and renewable agreement (Aaron, 1971, pg. 279). For Locke this compact is conditional: "The people, being always, the supreme authority in any state, have a right to depose; it is their sacred duty to overthrow any individual who seeks to make his power over them absolute and despotic" (Locke in Aaron, 1971,

pg. 283). Therefore, the people not only have the right but also the duty to depose a despot. However, the right of resistance resides not in the individual but in the people when the appeal to law is being generally denied. Locke does not present a recipe for instant revolution because, as he points out, the people usually put up with their rulers and are usually unwilling to use force to remedy the situation (Parry, 1978, pg. 143).

Locke chides both absolutist legislatures and executives, but concentrates on the latter. In the case of a monarch inclined towards absolutism, the legislature of the people, which is independent and separate from the ruler, limits them and acts as an umpire between the king and the people in their dispute (Parry 1978, 145). In this way the legislature, in defense of liberty and property, limits the executive, and the community controls the legislature (Sabine, 1961, pg. 538). Therefore, Locke showed a preference for constitutional or limited monarchy, a mixed government. And so Locke in the end considered the restoration of British monarch Charles II in May 1660 as a revolution overturning the rebellion of Cromwell (Parry, 1978, pg. 141).

Format of the Book

Having placed in context and shown the importance we attach to sectarianism as surveyed the literature on Religion and Revolution; and having dwelt on the religious ethos, or atmosphere of the periods preceding the two revolutions, we will cover, in terms of Revolution, Religion and Sectarian Strains pertaining to the Right to Rule and the Right to Revolt in Islam and the West, we embark on our study of middle-range revolutions, often overlooked by the Literature of Revolution. Both of our middle-range revolutions came after periods of instability generated by the attempted Major Revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the English Revolution of 1641–9 (followed by Cromwell's Protectorate until 1658).

In both of our middle-range cases, the perceived imposition of internationalism of Catholicism and the Muslim Brotherhood went against the grain of the nationalism of the other sects in Britain and Egypt. Both rulers, James II and Mohamed Morsi, had very short reigns. The Morsi Presidency was by far the shorter, lasting only one year, whereas the kingship of James II lasted four times as long. This relative shortness may perhaps be interpreted very simply by the vast improvement of modern communications technology, from the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, the television, and now to the amazing internet of our time, where steadily increasing speed is the sole criterion driving the inexorable course

following the Industrial Revolution of the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Centuries. Social media figured prominently, as will be seen in this book, in the fall of Morsi in 2013 when the Tamarod Movement utilized it as a great, quick, and effective tool in mobilizing and generating the vast turnout of the discontented, people power.

Both cases of the middle-range revolutions, we will study ended with the assumptions of power in bloodless revolutions, or coups, by military interventions, namely the invasion by William of Orange in 1688 in Great Britain and the taking over of the reins of power by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2013 in Egypt.

We will concentrate on why sectarianism led to the loss of power of James II and Morsi in the pages to come. What were their basic blunders that led to the peoples' perceptions of the rulers' impositions of their sectarian bent?

Brief Summary of Book on Sectarian Strains and Revolution against James II and Mohamed Morsi

This book analyzes the religious ethos which characterized divisive sectarian societies in England and Egypt in the seventeenth-century Britain and twenty-first century Egypt after the Arab Spring. It concentrates on the brief periods of rule of James II and Morsi reflecting sectarian strains in Europe after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years' War and 2011 Arab Spring in the Middle East.

In the case of James II we look back in chapter two to consider the origins of sectarian strains in Tudor and Stuart England. In chapter three we depict James II's toleration policy toward religious dissent of both Catholics and Protestants among accusations of Catholicization and packing the parliament. Chapter four deals with the Basic Blunders which were magnified by the sectarian strains and which brought a quick end to James II's rule in 1688 after only four years on the throne.

Our study then takes us to Mohamed Morsi's brief democratic presidency of Egypt, which lasted only one year from June 2012 to July 2013. In chapter five we present the religious ethos and sectarian strains in Egypt amid accusations of Brotherhoodization posed by the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) transnational leanings (chapter six), which led to Morsi's downfall by magnifying his Basic Blunders (chapter seven).

Our book is a study of perceptions which led to the magnification of the Basic Blunders of these unfortunate rulers in divisive societies imbued with sectarian strains which emphasized religious zeal.

We aim at middle range Theories of revolution and sectarian strains in chapter eight.

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