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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

COETZEE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONDITION

Coetzee, South Africa, and Human Deformity

Coetzee's early fiction presents an extensive report on the human condition in the apartheid South Africa where the unjust sociopolitical system enforces racial segregation and conditions the interpersonal and interracial relationships in order to *re*produce itself. It provides a vivid portrayal of violence, suffering, and unfreedom in an insane society where the political system authorizes only certain types of intersubjective relations and vigorously prohibits other types. As Effe argues, "Coetzee's works constitute social, political, and philosophical commentaries … on South Africa under apartheid … on intersubjective relations … on suffering" (157). This study suggests that in order to reveal the workings of apartheid, Coetzee's South African novels foreground different dimensions of regulation of human relationality and subjectivity. They demonstrate how individuals' unhealthy power relations are the effect, and the reflection, of the broader macrocosm of institutional power, control, and discrimination, or, as Head remarks, that Coetzee's world is a world in which "normal human relations are distorted" (Head, 2009, 67). South Africa, then, is a society of distorted relationality, and the nature, the consequence, and the way out of this distortion are the major concerns of this study.

In 1987, Coetzee won the Jerusalem Prize for the Freedom of the Individual in Society. The jurors announced that Coetzee's works "combine extreme sensitivity to the condition humaine with a powerful prose condemning man's cruelty to man … John Coetzee stands out in his novel and essays as a fighter for human freedom and dignity" (Mitgang, 12). In his prize acceptance speech, Coetzee expressed his thought regarding the relationship between individuals under apartheid and the problem of "unfreedom" that inflicted South Africa. In general, his South African novels and their characters, this study suggests, represent the fictional embodiment of his ideas explained in the Jerusalem speech and of his belief about the

"madness" of apartheid. In *Giving Offence*, Coetzee rejects any justification of the workings of apartheid, stafting that those who "invented" apartheid were "possessed by demons." He also criticizes the "African historiography" strongly because of its "indifference" to the madness of apartheid (163-164). Accordingly, his fiction can be considered as an attempt to make up for this historical insensitivity by addressing and analyzing this madness. The present study examines the depths and the dimensions of the social madness of the apartheid regime arguing that it consists in producing and sustaining unproductive inter-human relationships.

In this speech, Coetzee mentions a law passed in 1950s which was a part of "a long string of laws regulating all phases of social life, whose intention was to block forms of horizontal intercourse between white and black" sanctioning only "vertical intercourse" (Coetzee, 1992, 96). Here, Coetzee's speech contains clear references to the Population Registration Act of 1950, which, as Clark and Worger say, "established mechanisms for determining and registering the race of all South Africans" (56), the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages of 1949, and the second Immorality Act of 1957, which "worked to prevent mixed marriages, including those formed outside South Africa, and to criminalize interracial sex" (Cottrell, 87). In *Giving Offense*, Coetzee explains how these laws were part of the segregationist policies of the apartheid regime meant to stop "seeping of non-white blood into European population" (171) and, therefore, to contain "the threat that blood-mixing holds for the white race" (173). It all indicates that the apartheid regime's survival depends crucially on reproducing certain forms of human relatedness.

Therefore, blood-mixing challenges the apartheid regime's sanctioned mode of relationality and should be rigidly prosecuted and severely punished, a fact that Coetzee deals with in his novels, particularly in *In the Heart of the Country* and *Waiting for the Barbarians*. These laws are the regulatory measures necessary for "the survival of the white race" (1996, 173). Coetzee, moreover, emphasizes the constructed nature of these laws and "commandments" by denouncing the idea that the whites are *naturally*, or biologically, superior to the non-whites, that miscegenation is an *unnatural* way of interracial connectedness to be regarded as a crime and punished.

This "string of laws," which sanctioned racial superiority and segregation and the vertical form of intercourse among people in general and among the whites and the nonwhites in particular, made Coetzee unequivocally call South Africa the society of masters and slaves where even the masters

cannot experience freedom. In South Africa "no one is free. The slave is not free, because he is not his own master; the master is not free, because he cannot do without the slave" (Coetzee, 1992, 96). The white masters belong to a "closed hereditary caste" from which they cannot escape or "resign." They can pass "symbolic law" to repeal the discriminatory laws, but the hierarchical structure of the society will remain intact; they may perform a "symbolic resignation," but they will not be able to leave their caste in reality (Coetzee's Magda and Magistrate show the futility of such resignation). Coetzee refuses to believe that the unfreedom of masters in South Africa lies simply in "uneasy sleep" or "imagination of disaster," or "the return of the repressed in the form of nightmare," because a racial ideology is a "banal kind of evil which has no conscience, no imagination, and probably no dreams, which eats well and sleeps well" (96). This is the kind of evil that South Africa is facing.

The apartheid regime had divided the nation broadly into the minority of the white masters (16 percent) and the majority of non-white slaves (more specifically, South African population was divided into four 'racial groups': White, Coloured, Indian and African). Coetzee's main concerns in his South African fiction are to reflect the South African scene divided as such and to examine the way the members of these segregated sections of the society interact with each other along the lines of race and class. He also aims to demonstrate how this particular kind of relationality gave rise to violence and unfreedom that engulfed the society and turned it into "a situation of naked exploitation" (Coetzee, 1982, 8). In other words, the violent and unfree nature of South African society was rooted in its unproductive and destructive patterns of intersubjective relations that were the effect of the regulations enforced by the apartheid regime. Coetzee, in focusing on and analyzing interpersonal relationships, concerns himself with the damaging influences of social apartheid on both the oppressors and the oppressed. It is not only the nonwhite majority that experiences unfreedom and suffer from living a loveless environment, the whites are also basically unfree even though theirs is a "veiled unfreedom." According to Coetzee, as Pawlicki puts it, "the legacy of apartheid has led to a state of alienation among both the oppressor and the oppressed … where the bonds of fraternity do not reach" (46).

Having mentioned the problem, Coetzee proposes his solution. He connects the absence of freedom to love, a form of intersubjective contact, asserting "at the heart of the unfreedom" in South Africa lies "a failure of love." Moreover, stressing the association between love and "fraternity," he observes that this failure of love signifies the lack of "a wholly human and

understandable yearning for fraternity with the people among whom [one] lives" and reminds us that "fraternity ineluctably comes in a package with liberty and equality" (1992, 97). Here, Coetzee allies himself with Breytenbach, a fellow white South African author, who, similarly, describes South Africa by the lack of a sense of brotherhood and possibility of true human "integration." This failure of fraternity and impossibility of human integration in South Africa is brought about and intensified by the regulating laws that foster and perpetuate vertical relationships and "pathological attachments" among South Africans. The apartheid regime should, then, primarily be defined by "the unnatural structures of power" and "relations of contestation, domination, and subjugation" (1992, 98), the "task" it has set for itself being "deforming and hardening" and dehumanizing "the human heart" (1996, 164).

For Coetzee, the concrete manifestations of the unnatural structures of the South African society are "the deformed and stunted relations between human beings that were created under colonialism and exacerbated under what is loosely called apartheid and have their psychic representation in a deformed and stunted inner life" (1992, 97-98); this is what Barnard calls "apartheid's distorted map of human relations" (2007, 65). In *Giving Offence*, Coetzee looks at individuals' deformity with a slightly different focus. He places "self-interest" at the heart of apartheid and its madness. Individuals in their social relation are motivated primarily by the narcissism inherent in their social structure. This re-emphasizes the problem of failure of love and character deformity since intersubjective relationships become sites of power relations for maximizing self-interest. This necessarily brings about the question of dominance and subjection; the question that underlies Coetzee's fiction. Moreover, narcissism implies self's dependence; others *have to* exist, but only so as to the self can rejoice their attention and benefit from them.

Coetzee, therefore, places human relationality at the heart of the human condition in South Africa. While love and fraternity ensure freedom and peace, pathological attachments and deformed relations between individuals are the cause of violence and unfreedom. His South African fiction typically reflects the feeling of entrapment in a world characterized by a failure of love where (racially) separated characters unavoidably become entangled in unproductive and destructive relationships. Shattuck believes that in his fiction Coetzee shows "the cost of apartheid for all South African has been a stunted and deformed inner life" (145). Therefore, paying close attention to inter-human relationships in his fiction, is a key requirement for cultivating

a deeper appreciation of Coetzee's thought about the madness and social deformation of apartheid.

Love and pathological attachments and their interaction with the sociopolitical structure are the main concerns of the social thought of the German thinker, Erich Fromm, too. Like Coetzee, he stresses the relational aspect of human condition, foregrounds the redeeming power of love, and explores the pathology of individuals' relations by analyzing "symbiotic attachments." Indeed, the Frommian *insane society* where love, the horizontal discourse, is absent, and the vertical relationality of symbiotic attachments is dominant, parallels the Coetzean world of madness world of failure of love, pathological attachments, and moral deformity of individuals.

The Ethical Thought of Erich Fromm

The major concern of Erich Fromm's social and ethical thought, like Coetzee's, is the nature of interpersonal relationships. Individuals' modes of relatedness (why and how people relate themselves to each other and to the world around them) are his recurring themes. In Fromm's ontology of social relations, human beings' problem is basically the problem of social relatedness; of how to establish meaningful bonds with others and with themselves. For him, then, we are primarily social beings. In fact, after emphasizing that a "person does not exist other than as a relational being" (Funk, xiii), Fromm proceeds to investigate different dimensions of productivity and pathology of human relationality.

To put it differently, Fromm theorizes the risks and threats involved in human relationality in order to correct and root out "distorted personality [and] pathological relations" (Smulewicz-Zucker, 170) which are inhospitable to human growth and build a *sane society* based on equal, symmetrical, and productive relationships. The parallel between Frommian theorization of pathological relations and distorted personality and Coetzean pathological attachments and deformed individuals is clear but requires investigation. More importantly, Fromm takes human relationality as the starting-point for his theories about control/power and domination/subjection and builds his idea of the sane society on this relational side of human existence and the interaction of individuals with the structure of the society.

Sane Society and Existential Needs

Fromm believes what basically drives individuals to establish relationships with others is "what man most dreads" (2001, 15): "the unbearable feeling of isolation and separateness" (2008a, 19) or, as Becker says, "man's horror of isolation" and his "inability to stand alone" (1973, 139). For Fromm the state of isolation is "the belly of a whale" that provokes constant and considerable anxiety; what makes isolation doubly unbearable is its association with the feelings of inadequacy, passivity, and powerlessness. Moreover, he believes that this sense of alienation and isolation is existentially shared, and we all attempts to find ways to transcend this separation and relate ourselves to the world. As Yalom says, we seek mods of "coping with" isolation and disconnection: "Fromm's starting point is that the human being's most fundamental concern is existential isolation, that the awareness of separateness is 'the source of all anxiety,' and that our major psychological task, throughout the ages, has been the overcoming of separateness" (370).

In fact, avoiding social isolation and relating oneself to others, for Fromm, is one of human beings' *existential needs*. Different from *instinctual needs*, such as hunger and sex, which have biological origins and are more or less shared between humans and animals, existential needs arise from the very condition of human existence. They include the need for a meaning and a frame of orientation in life, the need for rootedness, the need for unity, the need to a sense of identity, the need to be effective, and need to be related to others. They are not products or constructions of the society or culture in which one lives but arise from human nature. They are "generic human needs … enduring and intrinsic to human nature in all times and places" (Burston, 2000, 139) and have their "ultimate roots in specific experiential features of the human condition … [they] have no basis in biological instincts" (Giles, 180). However, Fromm says, existential needs are subject to manipulation and regulation, and totalitarian states, like apartheid, control and regulate such needs to restructure and reproduce themselves.

Influenced by Fromm, R. D. Laing, in *Self and Others*, stresses the relational aspect of human existence by saying that we cannot "give an *undistorted* account of 'a person' without giving an account of his relation with others" (66; italics mine). He also, like Fromm, attempts to investigate the nature and significance of humans' existential needs and the role they play in their life. He considers relatedness, disclosing oneself to others, experiencing a sense of agency through potentiating acts, craving for truth, and "ontological security" as the basic existential needs by which "human

beings are animated" (Burston, 2000, 140), of which, he reiterates, the need for other people and the need for ontological security are the most important ones.

Similarly, Jackson, by saying that man does not live by bread alone, divides human needs into biological and non-biological ones. He emphasizes, and draws attention to, the significance, in one's life, of "existential imperatives that have always preoccupied human beings, regardless of their cultural or historical circumstances" (2013b, xi). Although these imperatives are not culturally produced, the cultural milieus influence and condition them. One's "well-being" depends on how such existential imperatives are addressed. The need to act, the need to be recognized by another human being, the need to resist being regarded as an object, and, more importantly, the need to relate to others are the basic imperative needs.

Gratification of both instinctual and existential needs are essential for human life and happiness. Yet, while gratifying biological needs ensures humans' physical survival and is essential to their "zoo condition," the individual inevitably faces sever anxiety and insanity should his/her existential needs be left unsatisfied; that is, "the satisfaction of … instinctual needs is not sufficient to make [man] happy; they are not even sufficient to make him sane" (Fromm, 2008b, 24; italics in the original). Fromm stresses that existential needs "must be satisfied if man is to function sanely, just as his organic drives need to be satisfied if he is to stay alive" (1974, 5). Therefore, according to Fromm, our "mental health and spiritual development depend on the appropriate satisfaction" of existential needs and imperatives (Khandizaji, 2017, 34). However, destructiveness is an ineluctable consequence of improper gratification of existential needs. Bax writes that based on Fromm's theory, when our existential needs are not addressed properly, or when we cannot have "satisfaction on a higher level, [we] may create the drama of destruction" (321). Plant et al emphasize this point by stressing that destructiveness signifies "the urge to be cruel, to exercise power over others, or simply to destroy. This arises, according to Fromm, when a person finds it impossible to satisfy his 'existential needs'" (117). Therefore, it figures that governments can, to a large extent, determine the cultural spirit of their states by controlling the existing channels for satisfaction of the existential needs. That this constitutes a major theme of Coetzee's fiction will be discussed in the next chapter.

Nonsatisfaction, or improper satisfaction, of existential imperatives, then, results in insanity and/or destructiveness, or, as Burston puts it, "gradually erodes our sanity and deepens our tendencies towards destructiveness and

depersonalization" (2000, 139). Burston also argues that Laing, following Fromm, holds the idea that insanity is the ineluctable result of frustration of existential needs (2000, 140). Maslow, whose classification of humans' needs into "lower" or "safety" needs and "higher" or "growth" needs roughly corresponds to Fromm's instinctual and existential needs and who believes that the satisfaction of growth or higher needs depends on and follows full gratification, or "voluntary deprivation," of safety needs, also argues that if humans' higher needs are insufficiently gratified, "neurosis" is inevitable (1970, 90). Drawing upon Fromm's ideas, Calcagno, too, concludes that "destructive aggression results from the frustration of existential man's needs" (137), and Cope observes that for Fromm "frustration of certain needs, wants and relations specific to human beings" does inevitably result in "alienation from 'the human condition'" (150). Coetzee's characters, especially Michael K, experience the extreme form of such an alienation since apartheid systematically frustrates the basic existential need to relatedness.

Now, Fromm emphasizes that avoiding isolation by relating ourselves to others is our basic existential need; in fact, for Fromm, "human beings fear isolation as much as death itself" (McLaughlin, 39). Therefore, our sanity crucially depends on addressing and gratifying this existential need: "the deepest need of man … is the need to overcome his separateness, to leave the prison of his aloneness. The absolute failure to achieve this aim means insanity" (Fromm, 2008a, 9). Smulewicz-Zucker believes that Fromm "drew" this emphasis on relatedness from Marx; an emphasis that foregrounds the "the Marxian pedigree" of Fromm's thought (170). In *The Sane Society*, Fromm reiterates that this existential imperative remains "behind all phenomena which constitute the whole gamut of intimate human relations" and argues that if one fails to develop meaningful bonds with his/her fellow human beings and transcend his/her isolation, feelings of anxiety, passivity, and powerlessness will debilitate him/her (29).

Becker, for whom "the most terrifying burden of the [human] creature is to be isolated" (1973, 171), in a Frommian spirit, similarly believes that isolation is not compatible with sanity and views relatedness as one of the two "basic ontological motives of human creature" (152). Laing explores this issue, too. In *The Divided self*, he notes that relatedness is "present in everyone" (26). Burston in *The Crucible* clearly shows relationality for Laing is the fundamental dimension of human existence, *the* basic existential need upon which individuals' happiness and sanity depend. Laing emphasizes that loss of relatedness throws an individual into the state of "ontological insecurity;" a state in which one loses his/her sense of

identity and cannot experience him/herself as real. Beveridge observes that "Laing fully endorsed" the view that "loss of relatedness to others was the core problem in severe mental disorders" (133). Laing's views reflect Fromm's thoughts about inter-human relationships. A point worth mentioning here is that Coetzee read Laing and his ideas about human relations extensively during the period when he was authoring his South African fiction, Zimbler informs us (54).

Meanwhile, the form that our relatedness may take is largely unpredictable and regulated by sociopolitical factors. This is a key point in Fromm's argument since it marks the convergence of the psychological and the political sides of his thought. A major part of his oeuvre explores the positive, productive ways and the negative, destructive ways in which people attempt to overcome their isolation and aloneness. He highlights the fact that the manners of addressing the existential need to relatedness are largely determined by the sociopolitical climate of the society; it is the structure of the society that endorses and popularizes certain manners of human contact and vulgarizes, and even demonizes, other forms of attachment. This is what this study calls "regulation of relationality," its essential function being reproduction of the state.

Love and Pathological Forms

Fromm ties the question of human needs to the broader question of relations of power and domination. In *Fear of Freedom*, he concludes that relatedness might be "noble or trivial" (15), productive or unproductive. The noble, productive way of relating oneself to the world is "love," where one does not lose his/her integrity in such a relation. In *Art of Loving*, Fromm argues that "love makes [man] overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity." Love is, according to Ingleby, the "true relatedness," "essentially symmetrical," and "based on equality and respect" (2008b, xxviii). Love, for Fromm, means "the core to core relatedness to another" and is "the most durable refuge from loneliness" (Burston, 1991, 71). It is the mature, productive relationality, a form of connectedness to others without fusion based on "reciprocal validation of individuals" (Burston, 1991, 92). Love, as Fromm sees it, rather than denying and depreciating, admits and affirms interdependence as a part of human existence; it represents the dialectic between attachment and separation; it is the means through which we can "negotiate the dialectic between self and other" (Khandizaji, 2021, 54)

Meanwhile, there exist different trivial ways, or what Thompson calls "pathological forms," of satisfying the need to relatedness. One such way is "withdrawal." Withdrawal or "negative relatedness" is an attitude of indifference to the world and to others in order to cope with the sense of insignificance and powerlessness and/or avoid the anxieties of dependence on others. It is, in other words, "withdrawal from the world so completely that it loses its threat" (2001, 159). The unhealthy nature of this kind of connectedness is obvious as it plunges the individual more and more in isolation and fans his/her narcissistic attitude. Moreover, withdrawal idolizes independence beyond a practical sense and is often accompanied by a destructive impulse to destroy those that are regarded as a threat. Another unproductive kind of relatedness is "automaton conformity." Here, the individuals uncritically and unreflectively pick up the cultural patterns that the society provides and become what they are expected, and in fact prescribed, to be. In another sense, they believe that yielding "to the will of others may increase one's sense of significance (Jackson, 2005, 182).

However, the commonest type of trivial, unhealthy relatedness is "symbiotic attachment," by which Fromm means a form of "sordid intimacy with others" to alleviate separation and loneliness (Burston, 2020, 10). It is the state that Maslow calls "neurotic dependency" (1982, 61). Symbiotic attachment is the polar opposite of Fromm's notion of love; it means attaching oneself to others in a way that one's self is dissolved. Obviously, for Fromm what distinguishes love from symbiotic attachment is the integrity of the individual; love, while an answer to a person's need, preserves his/her integrity, but a symbiotically attached person loses and fuses it. That is why Burston calls Fromm's notions of love and symbiosis, "progressive" and "regressive" orientations respectively, and argues that for both Fromm and Laing symbiotic relatedness is the cause of suffering (2000, 39). Apartheid regime sanctions symbiotic mode of connectedness since it brings about dependency and weakness in which "one member submits to the exploitations of the other" (P. Allen, 184).

Two specific manifestations of symbiotic relationality are the *sadistic* and *masochistic* orientations which in essence, as Frøland puts it, mean bonding oneself to a "powerful whole or a weak- willed object" (168). Here, the individual's relations, devoid of equality and mutual recognition, become relations of power in which they give their selves up by fusing with and becoming submerged in another person (or group, or institution). The individual relates to others either "by becoming part of them or by making them part of himself. In this symbiotic relationship he strives either to control others (sadism), or to be controlled by them (masochism)" (Fromm,

1974, 233). Sadism and masochism are, then, "strategies for relating to others" whereby the need for "social security" is satisfied "either through dominating others or being dominated by them" (Chancer, 1994, 15-16). The individual, in other words, either "swallows" the other or let him/herself be "swallowed" by the other (Fromm, 2002), and, in this way, becomes a *pathological character*. Masochism, the desire to submit in order to overcome isolation and gain security is the passive form of symbiosis and sadism, striving to dominate others, is the active from of symbiotic orientation. The motivation of symbiosis, then, is a willed dependence of the self on the other since such a dependence yields a psychological relief from unbearable isolation; it arises from our need "to escape feelings of isolation and self-uncertainty" (Hardie-Bick, 255).

What distinguishes Fromm's theory of sadomasochism from other theories is its nonsexual nature. Other accounts of sadistic and masochistic tendencies typically start from and rely on sexual relationships, but for Fromm they reflect deep nonsexual human needs and longings; they are psychosocial phenomena. In fact, sadism and masochism are two kinds of "answer" to the problems of human condition when better, healthier answers are not to be attained. The essence of sadism and masochism, for Fromm, is domination and control, and the security they bring about: the sadist, by controlling others, controls and secures the precariousness of his/her life, and the masochist, too, attempts to bring life and future under control by freeing him/herself from the burdens of isolation and responsibility (Becker calls this "transference"). In other words, sadomasochistically inclined people are "characterized by a deep fascination with *power*" (Frøland, 167, italics in the original). Coetzee's characters are Frommian sadist and masochists under the apartheid regime which is a regime based on system of "total control" and power relations (Daye, 129).

This question of power and control interacts with another aspect of symbiotic attachment: the sadist and masochist cannot tolerate "unpredictability" of life, since they are incapable of performing "spontaneous" activity and action. They merely wish to conquer and control others or allow themselves to be conquered and controlled by them so that they can avoid facing unpredictable situations in their relations with others. This lack of spontaneity and its concomitant obsession with power and security characterize symbiotic relationality; in *Social character* Fromm mentions that "complete domination over a powerless person is the essence of symbiotic relatedness" (74). The camps and institutions in Coetzee's fiction clearly represent such concerns with security and predictability of life.

Accordingly, sadism is not primarily and particularly about the desire to inflict pain and suffering upon others. In *The Heart of Man*, Fromm explicitly rejects the idea that the impulse to hurt and make others suffer is what motivates sadists (29); instead, in *Fear of Freedom* he regards this desire as the extreme manifestation of having complete mastery over others. That is, the sadists, people with exploitative orientation, are driven to the impulse to make others suffer, physically and/or mentally, not primarily because it is enjoyable for them, but because it assures them of complete domination over the other (a fact that reflects apartheid's system of total control). Wishing to inflict pain and suffering, as Egiert, suggests, is secondary to the desire to control and dominate. In *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Fromm reiterates this point:

> the core of sadism, common to all its manifestations, is *the passion to have absolute and unrestricted control over a living being,* whether an animal, a child, a man, or a woman. To force someone to endure pain or humiliation without being able to defend himself is one of the manifestations of absolute control, but it is by no means the only one (288-89, italics in original).

Fromm also distinguishes between "benevolent" and "malevolent" sadism. This distinction stems from the nature of the control exercised. In benevolent or "loving" sadism, Egiert calls it "mild sadism," one is *ruled* for one's own good; that is, the control asserted proves helpful, and furthers one's potentials. Yet, as it keeps the person in bondage and inevitably involves control and power relationship, so Fromm considers it sadistic attachment, even if it is benevolent and fruitful. The best example of loving sadism is Balzac's novel Balzac's *Lost Illusions*, Fromm says. In fact, for him, it amounts to domination *masquerading* as love; an attachment in which the sadist denies the ruled any kind of freedom and independence. This kind of "benevolent domination" is often observed in the relations between parents and children.

Malevolent sadism, on the other hand, seeks only pure control and domination, making the other the helpless object of one's sadistic impulses without the positive sides of the former kind. It is much more common than the milder kind of sadism. Nevertheless, as both kinds involve asymmetrical relations of power, they are unhealthy and unproductive: "complete control over another human being means crippling him, choking him, thwarting him" (Fromm, 1974, 289). In Coetzee's novels both kinds of sadism are observed. Yet, the primary strategy of the apartheid state is to make individuals dependent on itself, that is, to fashion masochistic parasites that helplessly are dependent upon the state.

For Fromm, there exist two kinds of power: "power over" others which means the ability to dominate them, and "power to" which expand one's life and potentials based on integrity and relative independence. Thus, "power to" has nothing to do with control and domination. He emphasizes that "power to" must not be confused with "power over," potency with domination, since it often results in praising the latter with devastating consequences. This distinction between the two kinds of power in Fromm's characterology becomes significant when we realize "what the sadist is striving for is power *over* people, precisely because he lacks the power *to be*" (1974, 296).

An important point about sadism is that it can be practiced by everyone in everyday situations. One does not need to have only institutional power to exercise, although it definitely creates more chances for sadistic control. Any relation between individuals can turn into a symbiotic attachment. In fact, people "on lower social levels can have control over somebody who is subject to their power. There are always children, wives, or dogs available; or there are helpless people, such as inmates of prisons, patients in hospitals, if they are not well-to-do (especially the mentally sick), pupils in schools, members of civilian bureaucracies" (1974, 289). However, the macrocosmic patterns of power and relationality influence and permeate everyday encounters. The broad structure of power may either restrict or permit the above instances, and, thus, help decrease or increase the possibility of sadistic relationality and control. Sadistic control represents Frommian "power over;" it is exploitative control, and, therefore, unwanted and the opposite of rational authority.

Fromm's emphasis that sadomasochism primarily concerns domination and control, in other words, reiterates the significance, in his thought, of the interaction between microcosm and macrocosm. It stresses the fact that the ways individuals come to establish bonds with one another is an effect of, and regulated by, macrocosmic relations of power which are informed by "a spirit of manipulation and instrumentality;" a spirit that increases individuals' sense of isolation and insignificance (2001, 102). The insane society requires that its broad, public patterns of subjugation and control be repeated and reaffirmed in the more private layers of the society; it is how it can reproduce itself. As Mestrovic puts it, Fromm's theory of control and submission reveals and foregrounds "the mechanization and systematization of sadism" within society. In fact, "Fromm's understanding enables one to shift the focus from sadistic persons or acts to sadistic systems, programs, and social institutions—including the information media and documentary films" (275). The insane society, then, depends critically on the systematization

of sadism, "the cultivation of the sadistic impulses of 'the masses' by the ruling classes" (Matravers and Maruna, 134); it is a society characterized by institutionalized violence and discrimination.

Fred Alford, Borderline Experience, and Freedom

Human beings in general may vacillate between two extreme poles of their existence: integration and separation. Layder writes, "set against the fact of existential aloneness is the equally pressing fact of our social involvements and connectedness with others" (52); Tannen calls this the "duality" that "reflects the human condition" (15). Here, Tannen points to a basic concern that has motivated many philosophical and social investigations: transcending the state of separation always contains the risk of dissolution of self. That is, when individuals, troubled by the unbearable anxieties of isolation, seek to relate themselves to the world of others, they may get involved in symbiotic relatedness which is in essence a sordid bond in which they do not have a secure sense of self and are filled with need and insecurities. This represents an unavoidable threat arising from the fact of relationality of human existence: it is "one of the inherent and enduring features of social life [which] involves maintaining a sense of our self-identity as distinct from others, while at the same time attempting to merge and achieve maximum rapport with those with whom we are currently involved." (Layder, 51). Therefore, striking a balance between one's uniqueness and one's dependence is a crucial aspect of one's life; a balance that has a special place in Fromm's ontology of social relations.

In *The Divided Self*, Laing, in his discussion of human beings' relatedness, talks about "ontological security." This is part of his analysis of "interpersonal dynamics" (Kotowicz, 55). It is a state in which the individual feels real, has a firm sense of self, and finds him/herself capable of establishing meaningful mutual bonds with others without losing his/her integrity. In fact, as Burston in *The Crucible of Experience* and Cooper in *Existential Therapies* argue, Laing considers ontological security as one of humans' basic existential needs which has to be addressed. A person with a secure sense of self is capable of experiencing him/herself as a separate entity, even as s/he is closely connected with others.

In other words, ontologically secure people can "keep balancing the needs for involvement and independence" (Tannen, 15), which is "a precondition for establishing non-dependent and non-manipulative ("healthy") relations with others" (Layder, 52). This is similar to Fromm's idea of mature relationality. Here, an important point is the social aspect of ontological

security. Laing, like Fromm, believed that interpersonal relationships are conditioned by sociopolitical conditions of the society. In fact, under regimes insensitive to human beings' existential needs, "extreme situations" result in loss of ontological security, which is a "fashion of being-in-the-world" (Kotowicz, 17). This loss is, for Laing, the "root" of madness and adversely affects, and distorts people's relations with one another.

For ontologically insecure individuals, on the other hand, there exists a "polarity … between complete isolation or complete merging of identity rather than between separateness and relatedness. The individual oscillates perpetually, between the two extremes, each equally unfeasible" (Laing, 1990, 53). For ontologically insecure people, independence in interpersonal relationships is a real issue; they are bound to satisfy their need for relatedness in symbiotic attachments. Kleinbard stresses this point by saying that an ontologically insecure person "is almost entirely dependent upon other people for his reality as well as his [or her] personal identity" (154). The insecure people are incapable of overcoming the duality between distance and involvement, dependence and personal autonomy, in interpersonal relationships. Although they cannot bear the debilitating anxieties of existential aloneness, all they can achieve is a parasitic relationality in the form of sadistic or masochistic attachments.

Laing stresses the pathological nature of insecure relatedness by drawing attention to the point that while people with a secure sense of self experience relatedness as a source of mutual satisfaction and contentment, ontologically insecure people find no pleasure in relationality; in fact, for them "relatedness to other persons [has] a radically different significance and function … In the individual whose own being is secure in this primary experiential sense, relatedness with others is potentially gratifying; whereas the ontologically insecure person is preoccupied with preserving rather than gratifying himself" (1990, 42). Therefore, in the state of ontological insecurity people either feel utterly alone, which is synonymous with insanity, or are pathologically dependent upon others.

Like Fromm, Laing stresses the fact that when one is conscious of one's existential separateness, but refuses or is unable to "relate authentically" to the world of humans, one is threatened by "madness and despair" (Burston, 2000, 96). In the state of ontologically insecurity, then, people can secure a sense of identity "either by hurting another (sadism) or by submitting to another's blows (masochism)" (Noble, 16). Moreover, Laing stresses that the sociocultural milieu plays a primary role in creating a state of ontological (in)security. The horizontal structure based on mutual

recognition is the fertile ground for cultivating a secure sense of self. On the contrary, the dehumanizing essence of totalitarian regimes crushes the possibility of a relatedness based on love and throws people into the state of ontological insecurity. Coetzee's protagonists experience this state which deforms both their inner life and their relations.

This polarity of human relationality is one of the recurring themes of Fred Alford's works, too. Alford, who emphasizes the relational nature of humans' life by saying that "humans are creatures of attachment" (2016, 76), concerns himself with the question that how one can achieve a healthy, productive balance between the two poles of preserving one's personal autonomy and one's dependence on others in interpersonal relationships. While humans, on the one hand, cannot tolerate being isolated and "emotionally abandoned," they are, on the other hand, "creatures of belonging" (2006*,* 134).

Like Fromm, Alford seeks to theorize and characterize a middle state where one can maintain one's self and integrity as one attempts to transcend his/her separateness and attach him/herself to others. This is what he calls "a subtle psychology of human attachment" (2002, 109). He emphasizes the fact that people need to continually forge ties with each other to preserve their mental health, but he never fails to warn us against the threat of symbiosis since "much of the misery in life comes from … dependent attachment" (83). In other words, the affirmation of dependency in humans' life should not be regarded as synonymous with dissolution of self, since, as Wilde puts it, "indulging in our dependence is a form of masochism and self-humiliation" (47).

Alford's subtle psychology of human attachment turns around the interaction of two key points: "borderline experience" and "freedom with." Generally speaking, borderline experience indicates the inclination toward extreme poles of any experience; it is an all-or-nothing quality, it is marked by the "tendency toward the extremes of all or nothing characteristic of borderline thinking" (Alford, 2005, 16). Applied to human relationality, borderline experience, like Laing's state of ontological insecurity, signifies the lack of healthy orientation, the lack of a productive balance between isolation and connection in life; it signifies the extreme experiential poles of "losing" and "fusing." Translated into Frommian vocabulary, the pole of losing is the state of isolation and narcissism from which one seeks to escape, and fusing is the sadomasochistic state of neurotic dependence on others. In the following chapters, Coetzee's fiction is discussed an extended report on apartheid South Africa as a society of borderline experience.

Individuals in such a society, as in the state of ontological insecurity, are likely to oscillate between experiencing the state of utter isolation where they lose all human connections which give meaning to human life and make it worthwhile and experiencing the state of complete dependency upon others in which they fuse themselves with others: "We all live between losing and fusing … referring not just to the poles of borderline experience, but to the poles of human experience. It is somewhere between these poles that freedom is experienced" (Alford, 2002, 116). Alford's poles of human relatedness directly echo Frommian states of existential isolation and symbiotic/pathological attachments.

One of the major questions that Alford, like Fromm, addresses, then, is finding a balance in human attachments. The answer to this problem, for him, lies in true freedom, i.e. in a dialectic between the poles of borderline experience. Freedom could be experienced in a space between these poles: "freedom is not about freeing my will. It is about finding a place, always temporary, between losing and fusing, the poles of borderline experience" (Alford, 2002,110). While Alford considers true freedom the answer to the problem of human life, he does not equate it with the negative freedom of prioritizing one's individual will above and over everyone else's will. Unlike negative freedom, true freedom is not about achieving the state of separateness from others where my way of life does not generate any friction with others' ways of life. In other words, true freedom acknowledges, rather than denies, the existential need of relatedness and the fact that people are unavoidably dependent on one another. Yet, this acknowledgment does not exclude individuality and autonomy; it is a balance between losing and fusing:

> freedom is more than a transitional experience. Freedom is a solution to the problem of life, how to live between claustrophobia and agoraphobia… Freedom is how we make our way in the world, a path that passes between the poles of losing all we care about (agoraphobia), and fusing with it, and so losing ourselves (claustrophobia). In other words, freedom is a way of negotiating borderline experience. (Alford, 2002, 113).

In other words, for Alford, like Fromm, mature human relationality consists in a dialectic of separation and involvement. True freedom, the embodiment of a dialectical way of attaching oneself to others, is, then, neither the negative freedom nor the positive freedom; it is "a delicate balancing act," not freedom from others but "freedom with" others. Losing connections with others and fusing oneself with others in the name of freedom characterize the state of ontological insecurity; they are the qualities of borderline experience. In fact, true freedom "is a sense of shared freedom,

a freedom that involves my participation with others, neither serving nor enslaving them, but living with them, acknowledging my dependence upon others, but not transforming this dependence into an idealized servitude. "Freedom with," it might be called" (Alford, 2002, 111). Alford's freedom with is, therefore, an in-between space in interpersonal relationships.

To a large extent, Jackson's views of intersubjective encounters and productive relationality resemble those of Fromm and Alford. Like Fromm, he emphasizes the relational nature of human life by arguing that it is our relations that define us. He believes that avoiding social isolation is one of our existential imperatives the satisfaction of which will "increase one's sense of significance" (2005, 182) but reminds us that this need ought not to undermine the sense of our relative autonomy; in fact, he regards both dependence and independence existential needs: "the imperative need for self-determination or self-definition has always to be adjusted to the equivalent need of others" (1998, 19).

Drawing upon Laing's relational view of human beings, he believes we are always acting upon others and acted upon by others, concluding that "neither complete detachment nor complete engagement is a real ontological possibility" (2012, 3). He also agrees with Fromm that love, a ""productive" relationship to the world" is the answer to humans' existential struggles (2012, 95) and emphasizes that humans' life includes both individuation and participation, separation and integration: "human beings seek individuation and autonomy as much as they seek union and connection with others … we possess both a will to separate and a will to unite" (2013a, 6). We are constantly moving between the tendency to merge with others and the will to retain our individuality and uniqueness. In fact, "our being-in-the-world consists in a dual sense of sharing an identity with others … and standing out from others … as singular if not solitary persons" (2013a, 18).

More importantly, like Fromm and Alford, Jackson believes that healthy relationality lies in the balance between individuation and participation, between "sociocentric and egocentric consciousness" (2012, 3). Individual's life, for Jackson, is one long experience, emerging from his/her never-ending encounters with others and the concomitant negotiations regarding his/her participatory character. The satisfactory and productive participation is the one that transcends the poles of losing and fusing, and instead brings about an existentially poised state; it is the point where the individual experiences "well-being," and *feels at home*: "the notion of home … is a matter of being-at-home-in-the world—of working out some kind of

balance or adjustment between active and passive, autonomous and anonymous, modes of being." (Fromm (1974), too, argues that human beings' struggles are motivated by the ultimate desire "to feel at home" (226)). Jackson's middle space between independence and interdependence characteristically resembles the Frommian state of love and freedom and Alford's state of freedom with; in these states, we avoid separation and anxiety and actively participate, but we are conscious not to lose our integrity.

Although we all expect some reciprocity in our relations with others and are willing to compromise to some degree in order to gain such reciprocity, we need to preserve an autonomous sense of self and separateness. Expressed in Laingian terms, individuals need to feel the state of ontological security in which they experience the feeling of separateness-in-interdependence. In fact, for Jackson, an "oscillation between being an actor and being acted upon is felt in every human encounter, and intersubjective life involves an ongoing struggle to negotiate, reconcile, balance, or mediate these antithetical potentialities of being" (2013c, 32-33). In other words, the productive intersubjective relation for Jackson consists in striking a balance between being an actor and being acted upon; what he calls humans' need to "reciprocal balance." Like Fromm, Laing, and Alford, Jackson stresses the fact that this is not the effect of a particular kind of culture but a "universal" principle of human relationality. However, repressive social structures, like apartheid, indifferent and insensitive as they are to universal/existential human imperatives, make achieving such a balance impossible.

Fromm, Freedom, and Violence

As was mentioned above, Frommian difference between love and symbiosis reiterates the important point that affirmation of dependency in intersubjective relationships does not and should not preclude autonomy of the person. In fact, love, the true connectedness, implies a dialectic of separateness and relatedness, of dependence on others and personal independence, of participation and individuation. It should be noted that relatedness and freedom are closely connected in Fromm's thought. Freedom is the constructive mode of relating oneself, of participating, of being-in-the-world. Indeed, in the words of Dagostino and Lake, Fromm wishes to furnish "a positive solution for the psychic need for relatedness. This human need must be addressed in order for people to fully appropriate positive freedom" (18). To put it differently, for Fromm, securing freedom

and living authentically should be regarded as the true goals of individuals' life.

Being free, however, is not synonymous with "negative freedom." It involves appropriating both positive and negative freedom. Alford dismisses the negative sense of freedom by rejecting the popular argument that "free will" *is* the true freedom. For Fromm "freedom is not only freedom from political servitude but also freedom to realize one's humanity" (Lundgren, 51). Negative freedom, or "freedom from," primarily signifies the freedom of will, freedom from others and from external forces and restraints. Even though it does reinforce the sense of individuality and uniqueness, it is in essence a "burden," even a "curse," as it can turn an individual into an isolated being "whose relationship to the world is distant and distrustful and whose self is weak and constantly threatened" (2001, 224). Fromm contends that humans cannot endure negative freedom because it implies living in a state of complete separateness from the human world, disregarding the participatory character of people. It is in their attempts to escape from this negative freedom, i.e. complete isolation, which individuals attach themselves parasitically and symbiotically to others, and are "driven into new bondages." Sadistic and masochistic patterns of relationality, thus, become mechanisms of escape.

While "freedom from" increases aloneness and anxiety, "freedom to" means the experience of independence and connection at the same time; individuals are free but not alone. This is the state of ontological security where a healthy balance is struck, and relatedness to others does not signify a threat to one's individuality. Quite the contrary, positive freedom is an affirmation of the uniqueness of the individual; in short, it is "the affirmation of man's capacity to lead a loving, reflective, productive" life (Friedman, 119). Like love, it is a middle state between Alford's poles of losing and fusing in which "the individual exists as an independent self and yet is not isolated but united with the world, with other men, and nature" (2001, 222). This is also similar to Jackson's state of well-being, of reciprocal balance, where one is both acting and acted upon. Love embodies the emancipatory potentials of "freedom to," avoiding the threats inherent in the burden of "freedom from."

True connectedness, therefore, does not involve submission or domination; it indicates how individuals can address an existential need and take part in the relational world without losing or compromising their desire for autonomy and integrity: "*Productive*, *mature love*, … allows us to overcome our sense of separateness but we still retain our integrity and individuality

without the unproductive dependence involved in symbiotic relationships" (Thomson, 2009, 52). In fact, unlike ontologically insecure people, the mature individuals need to experience both a healthy dependence on others and an independent sense of self; in fact, Fromm insisted that "love [is] the only passion that held the two needs in balance" (Friedman, 186). In addition, Fromm reiterates that in the societies of borderline experience where people can only experience either the pole of isolation and loss of self or dependence and fusion of the self, it is the symbiotic/pathological attachments that prevail. Morris emphasizes that Frommian love "neither involves the dissolution of the self, nor the possession of or submission to the other person or the world of nature; but their affirmation in a relationship that is dialectical not symbiotic" (363).

In other words, while love means "to be closely related and at the same time to be free" (Fromm, 2010b, 75), symbiotically attached individuals remain essentially unfree. Symbiosis plunges individuals in a basic unfreedom because they effectively "live on each other and from each other" (Fromm, 2008b, 29). That is, individuals cannot be free because they have given up their selves, and are irredeemably dependent; as Durkin says, "in both sadism and masochism, freedom is given up and a negatively individuated dependency is adopted" (87). In sadomasochistic relationships individuals are not free because they are parasitically dependent on one another, and should the others on whom they are dependent disappear, they start to totter. Despite the apparent independence, the sadist is not free: "while it appears that the sadist is free of his victim, he needs the victim in a perverse way" (Fromm, 1974, 292). While isolated individuals and symbiotically attached people live their lives in terms of borderline experience, and vacillate between the poles of losing and fusing, love marks a middle state between the state of utter isolation and symbiotic dependency, the absence, or better the *failure*, of which characterizes the insane society. Chancer refers to this point when she argues that "unless both the needs and longings for freedom and autonomy, as well as connection and belonging, are simultaneously fulfilled," there can be no sane society (2000, 35).

Another significant aspect of symbiotic attachments is the violence they always carry. The situations including sadists and masochists are instances of what Fromm calls "authority situations" (2001 and 2008b). "Authority situations" are hierarchical relations of power and unhealthy dependency where one is under another person's guidance and control. Authority situations are not inherently occasions for exercise of violence and exploitation. As in teacher-student situations, they can be based on love, care, and responsibility in which case the authority relationship "dissolves

itself," and the distance between the two parties decreases. However, particular instances of authority situations always involve and are based on exploitative relations of power. Symbiotic bonds are of this latter kind; they are "based on mutual need and dependence rather than a secure sense of self," and, as such, are always "fraught with conflict" (Thomson, 52). As Chancer has it, they are eventually "unstable, unsustainable … always on the verge of crisis, and thus tending toward its own self-compelled destruction" (1998, 219). Here, the gap between the two parties widens, and interpersonal violence, hostility, and resentment inevitably arise.

Chancer believes that the instability and unsustainability of sadomasochistic attachments spring from the disturbing knowledge that lies at the heart of this kind of unproductive relationality. In symbiosis, both parties realize that their physical and/or psychical survival is unquestionably dependent on the existence of the other. It is not only the masochists that come to this understanding, the sadists, too, find out the extent of their dependence on the masochists and their need to be recognized by them; Egiert emphasizes this point by saying that "the symbiosis leads to the loss of integrity and freedom" of both parties (218). In other words, symbiotic relations are instances of authority situations where one exercises sadistic control over others, undermines their independence, curtails their freedom, humiliates them, and, therefore, denies them their full humanity: "the person who has complete control over another living being makes this being into his thing, his property, while he becomes the other being's god" (Fromm, 1974, 289). This realization becomes, in turn, the source of violence since it points toward the fact that one's humanity is under threat, and one's humanity/individuality cannot disappear without violence. Moreover, it is at odds with humans' longing for independence and freedom.

As Bax contends, exercising complete sadistic control over another person transforms, or rather reduces, that person into a mere "thing," an "object;" the person becomes less than a human. These are, as Jackson observes, deep "existential wounds" that do not close and demand adequate retribution. Indeed, sadistic domination disregards "the imperative need of every human being to be recognized as a person in his or her own right, and not be reduced to an object of other people's wills, a slave to their desire" (2005, 181). The sadist is, therefore, facing the constant threat of "conscious or unconscious hostility which is bound to arise from the symbiotic relations" (2008b, 29). Symbiotic attachments, in other words, contain a violence that may erupt at any moment; they breed interpersonal violence. In this regards, Shaw tells us for Fromm sadistic control and exploitation implies "the rape of the

personhood, the subjectivity, of the other," and, as such, it is "traumatizing" (58). Coetzee's characters are often subject to such traumatization.

Here, it should be emphasized that Fromm's theory of individuals and their relationality does not stop at a purely psychological and/or existential level. His theory is a fusion of Freud's psychoanalysis and Marx, with a far greater emphasis given to Marx's social thought. Fromm is, in fact, primarily concerned with "men in their social existence" (Fromm, *Chains of Illusion* 5), and constantly stresses the close interaction that there is between individuals' psychological mechanisms and the dynamics of social processes. People's relationality, the way they relate themselves with other members of the society, is largely conditioned and influenced by the sociopolitical conditions of that society. In this regard, Kucich reminds us that exploring individuals' relational orientations can help decode sadism and "masochism's ideological significance" (21). In *The Sane Society*, Fromm summarizes his ideas about the interaction between social structure, people's attachments, and violence by saying that while a "healthy society furthers man's capacity to love his fellow men … an unhealthy society is one which creates mutual hostility, distrust, which transforms man into an instrument of use and exploitation for others" (70).

All this indicates that violence for Fromm is not simply part of human beings' nature; in fact, he finds Freudian "instinctivist theory" of humans' violence quite inadequate. Nor does he accept the social determinism of behaviorist account of human beings. He rather believes individuals' *character* to be the effect of the interaction between existentially shared features and the needs of the individuals, such as the need to be related to others, and the sociocultural climates in which they live; it can be said that in Fromm "whether a person's dominant passion is love or sadistic destructiveness depends not on an instinct humans have inherited from the animal kingdom (and which 'civilization' has done its best to 'weed out'), but largely on social and environmental circumstances (Bax, 58).

Fromm, therefore, argues that violence is rooted not in innate predispositions but in interpersonal relationships and is escalated by the social conditions that hinder productive ways of satisfying existential need of relatedness, permitting only unproductive, conflict-ridden symbiotic interactions. For Fromm, when the sociopolitical forces impede "productive potency," individuals "turn from 'living productively' to desiring domination and exerting power over others" (Bax, 39). In fact, in such societies individuals fall into the state of ontological insecurity in which they merely seek the unhealthy mechanisms of sadism and masochism to relieve the anxieties of

being isolated, and, as was discussed above, such a relationality invariably contains violence. It is the "pathological forms of culture," Thompson says, that produce character deformity or distortion (50). That is also why, Salerno believes that, For Fromm, interpersonal "ties merely represent the values of society" (68). The "insane society" is, then, characterized by individuals' neurotic orientation, unfreedom, and a thinly veiled hostility. McGettigan and Smith in a Frommian spirit show how a society based on unproductive connectedness and racism fuels violence and antagonism both at personal and social levels. They posit a similar interconnection between macrocosm and microcosm in an insane society. Such a society, like apartheid, is conflict-ridden where "the powerful have a propensity to sadistically denigrate the powerless," the ineluctable result of which is "intense hostilities between competing ethnic groups" (59).

Chancer, with a slightly different emphasis, argues that sadomasochistic tendencies are reinforced during periods "when social anxieties are at their height." These are the times when "questions of insecurity and insignificance … take on an especially loaded meaning"; these are the times for individuals to make "last-ditch efforts … to grab for safety and a sense of fleeting control amidst the increasingly frightening reality of powerlessness." The result of these efforts are "extreme dependence" and/or "destructive violence" (1994, 16-18). Salerno, similarly, suggests that it is the periods of "insecurities" within the societies that give rise to unproductive relationality and lack of freedom. In fact, according to Fromm, "one could adjust to one's sense of insecurity by either attempting to rigidly control the outside world in order to feel more secure or becoming inordinately submissive and compliant with those in authority" (Salerno, 100). This fact is observed clearly in Coetzee's *Disgrace* which depicts a world in transition filled with such anxieties, insecurities and concerns that make productive relatedness almost impossible.

Coetzee's Fiction and Pathology of Love under Apartheid

As was discussed, inter-human relations and how they interact with, and are to a large extent conditioned by, the sociocultural organization of the society feature prominently in Coetzee's South African fiction and Fromm's social theory. This book suggests Coetzee's early fiction, set in South Africa, revolves primarily around individuals' pathological attachments and stunted, deformed relations and the adverse effects of apartheid regime on people's relatedness. Some critics have described the sadistic and/or masochistic orientations of Coetzee's characters. Moreover, as Gamgee