


Intelligence and Propaganda in the Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan

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By

Murat Aslan

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To Teachers

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ADACO	Directive
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Force
CEAUSSIC	Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with US Security and Intelligence Communities
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJICTF	Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CSCE	Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe
DDR	The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs
DFS	Department of Field Support of the UN
DPA	The Dayton Peace Accord/Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN
EAF	Entity Armed Forces
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EW	Electronic Warfare
GFAP	The General Framework Agreement for Peace (for Bosnia-Herzegovina)
GIRoA	The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HIG	Hezb-e Islami Gulbettin
HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Team
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IFOR	Implementation Force
IIC	Information Campaign
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IMS	International Military Staff
IOs	International Organizations
InfoOps	Information Operations
JNA	The Yugoslav Federal Army
LCY	The League of Communists of Yugoslavia
MCOU	Military Community Outreach Unit
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MISO	Military Information Support Operation
MOE	Measurement of Effectiveness
NAC	The North Atlantic Council of NATO
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIC	National Intelligence Cell
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Public Affairs
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PD	Public Diplomacy
PDD	Public Diplomacy Department of NATO
PIO	Public Information Offices
PR	Public Relations
PKK/PYD	Terrorist Organizations (Kurdistan Worker Party and its Armed Wing)
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RS	Republika Srpska
RSM	Resolute Support Mission of NATO to Afghanistan
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SC	Strategic Communications
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
SHAPE	Allied Powers Europe
SHIRBRIG	Standby High Readiness Brigade
SRT	Serbian Radio and Television
UN	The United Nations
UNAMA	The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIR	The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNCRO	The UN Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia
UNMIK	The UN Mission in Kosovo
UNOC	The United Nations Operation in Congo

UNOSOM	The United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPREDEP	The UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia
UNPROFOR	The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNPA	United Nations Protected Areas
UNSC	The United Nations Security Council
UNTAES	The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As a collective defence organization against the “communist” threat, NATO had lost its viability with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This new era brought new challenges to NATO in that it had to invent its *raison d’être* to prove its relevance and importance. In this sense, NATO started to participate in conflicts under the rubric of peace operations in different regions while redefining its role in the post-Cold War environment parallel to the emerging crisis types. Intelligence and strategic communications, not coined as propaganda because of NATO’s image concern, appeared to be two functions of NATO that were essential to conclude the witnessed crises. This study thus examines the role of NATO in peace operations, focusing on its strategic communications and affiliated intelligence efforts in terms of their efficiencies and fallacies. Besides, academic debates on propaganda require the usage of this word as, disregarding its popular bad connotation, it is an effort not to regret within the scope of conflicts.

The motivation of such an effort emanates from the desire to search for effective methods in peace support operations, mainly by propaganda varieties and affiliated intelligence functions amongst others, as a complementary means to “hard” power applications.¹ Hence these two capabilities of NATO have been the core of the debate since NATO has assumed new roles in the newly established order so that both functions could promote NATO’s contribution to long-term global security and stability. Despite NATO’s changing role and the increasing prominence of peace operations, NATO’s integrated communications and relevant

¹ Colin S. Gray, *Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), p. vii.

intelligence activities have still fallen short of contributing to the peaceful termination of conflicts. A redesigned architecture of propaganda and integrated intelligence perception could ease the enterprises of NATO and the other security mechanisms of both the Alliance and the states in the long run.

While trying to analyse NATO's achievements or failures in peace operations in intelligence production and communication engagements, this study will question the multinational structure of the Alliance. The purpose is to see to what extent such multinationalism has hindered the success of intelligence and communication activities since these two fields are under the national authority of member/partner state actors. Another aspect, which will be examined within the framework of this study, is the concepts that were invested, re-invented, used, or to a certain extent abused in the process of defining NATO's role in the post-Cold War era.

The foci of the research – overcoming hindrances, appropriate and realistic conceptualizations, and the need for the integration and simplification of practices – seem to be prerequisites of today's international crises. With the end of the Cold War, NATO found itself in a new security environment² where previously ignored, or downplayed, regional/local conflicts have appeared to be the leading security threats in the international arena. Confrontations between standing armies of large nation-states are becoming rare. At the same time, conflicts with/against irregular/terrorist groups or civil wars are barely away from the local population, as seen in the Afghan, Iraqi, Libyan or Syrian case. In other words, complex power applications, such as overwhelming firepower, no longer guarantee victory.³ As a result,

² The US Department of Defence defines "environment" as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander." In this frame environment is circumstances of physical, social, psychological conditions in which a military process is being executed. The actors involved in this environment are also part of the environment. Federation of American Scientists, "Military Terminology", available at <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp3-0.pdf>, accessed on April 27, 2021.

³ Vaughan Bell, "How to Win Wars by Influencing People's Behavior", *The Guardian*, March 16, 2014, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/mar/16/how-to-win-wars-by-influencing-peoples-behaviour>, accessed on April 27, 2021.

“change” has occurred in many aspects of the witnessed crises after the 1990s so that conventional⁴ military engagements do not address the full spectrum of conflicts. A new methodology of military engagements needs a thorough examination. Their validity needs to be tested if a low cost and proper crisis management⁵ and termination approach are desired for long-term commitments. Intelligence and propaganda, in this sense, are parts of emerging methodologies, mainly in peace-tagged interventions of NATO. Where diversified actors of witnessed conflicts are concerned, conventional responses to conclude the disputes are not promising even in the peace operations of the 1990s and 2010s since the security environment in these operations is challenged due to new motivations, flexible tactics, and extraordinary capabilities of emerging threats. Spillman points out the nature of change as follows:

In dealing with the increase of intra-state and ethnically motivated conflicts after the collapse of the bipolar system, the international actors soon had to learn that traditional concepts of peacekeeping were no longer applicable as the nature of conflict had changed. In the course of the many difficult

⁴ Conventional forces, on the other hand, provide the bulk of a nation’s military power. They consist of combat and support elements from all four services, excluding units dedicated to special operations and nuclear deterrence. The major categories of conventional forces are land, naval, aviation, and mobility forces. Conventionality indicates the application of traditional force structures and the regularity of exercises rehearsed to address regular military formations within the frame of fundamental principles of war. Extreme capabilities such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are beyond conventionality. Indirect tools in the environment of hybrid and asymmetric warfare are not conventional. Calvin Seah Serr Thong, “Combatting the Modern War”, available at <https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/safty/pointer/documents/pdf/V44N1a3.pdf>, accessed on April 27, 2021.

⁵ While Anceaux and Morel refer to many scholars to explain crisis management in their study, Pogalski’s definition is worth quoting. He argues that “there is a crisis when a system is confronted with an event, generally unexpected, of which the consequences are going to develop in time with a dynamic which can be very fast, producing significant risks which exceed the pre-existing resources in terms of procedures of actions and actors”. F. Anceaux and G. Morel, “Crisis Management: Theories and Methods”, paper presented at the *Arpege Symposium*, Paris, 2011, available at <http://disastergroup.kmu.ac.ir/Images/UserFiles/891/file/%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA%20%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86.pdf>, accessed on April 27, 2021.

operations that took place in the 1990s to ensure peace in troubled regions, previous peacekeeping doctrines were challenged. The new conflict environments were much more complex and necessitated different approaches to cover a wider range of tasks.⁶

As can be seen from the quotation, crises of varying sorts are more complex in the current age, making conflicts blurred and indefinite. The pace of change is speeding up and moving in such unpredictable directions for military decision-makers and security policy builders that structuring the military for a specific mission has become more challenging than ever. Ethnic, religious, sectarian, or tribal-based conflicts are intertwined with volatile dynamics, which can hardly be foreseen to define the codes of conduct for military bodies. For instance, ethno-motivated conflicts of the Balkans have not been outmoded from the international community's agenda. In contrast, religion-motivated rows have shown themselves to be prevalent, as Al Qaeda and ISIS threats in the wider Middle East could be seen. An additional ideological motivation of terror groups may extend the cyclically nested crisis environment to “complexities of complexities”. Every actor and unique feature of the crisis environment is complex, while the network of linkages creates another complexity upon all these complexities, as can be seen in the actors and conflict environment of Syria. Furthermore, conflicts may include differing dynamics that may brush a different colour on the picture of the conflict, but nobody could even make “black” without a mess of colours. The responses to questions like what the interests of the actors are, who are allied with which actor, and which allies support the enemy of the ally is complicating that there seems to be no common ground even for the members of NATO.

The conflicts and emerging threat types have disregarded the legally established borders of state actors utilizing unconventionally organised irregular groupings, such as local networks of “once” militias but current organized extreme nationalists in the Balkans, opposing forces in Afghanistan, DEASH or PKK/PYD. Covertness of threat and religiously/ideologically inspired dogmas are two prominent characteristics

⁶ Kurt R. Spillman et al., *Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives* (Zurich: Centre of International Studies, 2001), p. 21.

of current threat types. However, they can also orient themselves to cooperate with contrasting inspirations, such as the commitment of the Marxist PKK's offshoot organization PYD with its prominent supporter – the USA.⁷ The targets of these actors have become “people” rather than solely security forces within two differing perspectives: to deliver fear among the masses or to obtain public support. Hence, people's attitude has become the main effort to have mobility and permanency in society for the new threat types, making intelligence and communications a primary tool of “public understanding, management, and its shaping”. In this sense, social influence and dissuasion have become the main apparatus to suppress people-centric undertakings of emerging threats, as “kinetic” force will lack adequate skills in these commitments. The military has fallen short of responding to address the prerequisites of such “complexities of complexities” with traditional assets. On the other hand, intelligence and strategic communications appear to be essential functions of military formations to be of benefit in every possible conflict type if any individual human being or a group of people is included as an actor in the conflict.

Another concern is the cost of military engagements in terms of finance, human loss, political outcomes, or credibility. Democratic states of the current age no longer retain conflicts if the cost is not tolerable for the voters. Moreover, the financial burden of the conflict surpasses the economic capacities of state actors in that a single state actor cannot tolerate the long-term burden of the conflict by itself. For instance, Afghan and Iraqi interventions of the US-led Coalition indicated that the cost of current conflicts exceeded the capacities of the involved state actors. The quests of state actors thus stream towards cost-effective solutions to prevent or suppress conflicts by peacekeeping/support operations under the authority of international organizations or constructed coalitions rather than their direct involvements. The collective response, through international organizations, has become a justification method of military engagements as an imposed narrative upon the public. Hence western state actors, as agents, preferred to attribute new tasks to NATO as the collective security structure, against emerging threat types and instabilities of a complex nature

⁷ Raymond Thomas, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=itAWLPHZrBc>, accessed on April 28, 2021.

to realize their interests. In other words, the design of the international system has become a “mean” for the desired “ends” of member/partner state actors. As a result, the NATO “structure” has become the central apparatus of state agents to realize agendas in troubled regions by peace-tagged undertakings, mainly for the USA.

Under the clout of these concerns, NATO started its transformation after the Cold War pending a perceived security environment and reviewed its strategic thinking. In this frame, NATO summits described the probable threats for a “desired” international structure and foresaw potential missions of NATO.⁸ For instance, the Strategic Concept attached to the Declaration of Brussels Summit in 1994 listed terrorism, organized crime, disruption in the flow of resources, and uncontrolled movement of a large number of people as threats/risks along with conventional/regular threat types. This step was a complete diversion from the original founding principles of NATO that required a collective response to the traditional Soviet threat.⁹ It underlined conflict prevention and crisis management by actively engaging the emerging threat types in crisis response operations. In this frame, the Brussels Summit of 1994 added terrorism and instability in the security of the Mediterranean region and inter-ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as new concerns of overall security additional to conventional ones.¹⁰ The Washington Summit of 1999 indicated the change in the structure of potential threats¹¹ and adapted itself to a new security environment, entirely consistent with the Alliance's perceived security challenges.¹² Finally, the

⁸ The Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, “The Brussels Summit Declaration”, Brussels, January 11, 1994, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease, accessed on April 28, 2021.

⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 1.

¹⁰ The Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, “The Brussels Summit Declaration”, Brussels, January 11, 1994.

¹¹ The Declaration by the Heads of State and Government, “The Washington Summit Communiqué: An Alliance for the 21st Century”, Washington D.C., April 24, 1999, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>, accessed on April 28, 2021.

¹² The updated Strategic Concept reaffirms commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; takes account of the challenges the Alliance faces; presents an

Istanbul Summit of 2004 clearly announced the latest strategic thinking in the “wider world” rather than limited within the North Atlantic area, expanding its operations. The Summit’s concluding declaration underlined that the threats have substantially changed to a far wider area, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hence, since the end of the Cold War, NATO had defined a new perception of threat pending the events of the decade that were already experienced rather than expected. But the common issue was that peace operations had become the preferred engagement method of interventions, disregarding the nature of the threat and spatiality as would be seen in the Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan interventions of NATO.

Peace operations, which have varying strata of force engagements, require NATO and the state actors to develop new doctrinal approaches. Military coercion is still an appropriate course to eliminate the armed resistance of insurgents. But interventions after the 1990s have indicated that military interventions were concluded by limited success because it is usually hard to terminate crises once they erupt. Long-term termination of conflicts and establishing a secure environment in compliance with the interests of dominant state actors required the persistent application of perennial methods that would get through to the root causes of the conflict. In this frame, intelligence and strategic communications have appeared to be two main functions to deter, persuade, and, if needed, coerce the conflicting parties of peace support operations.

Efficient and long-term solutions to crises require both intelligence and propaganda activities to identify the context of the crises, respond to challenges, and shape the events before being shaped by them. The

Alliance readiness and with a full range of capabilities to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area; commits to building the ESDI within the Alliance; highlights the enhanced role of partnership and dialogue; underlines the need to develop defence capabilities to their full potential to meet the spectrum of Alliance missions, including forces which are more deployable, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively; and provides guidance to the NATO Military Authorities to this end. Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm, accessed on February 21, 2021.

efficiency of both functions can reduce the costs of peace support operations, improve the security and survival of NATO forces, mend the faults, and evade adversaries' claims. Hence these two fields may be benefitted even during peace to deny conflicts. But both fields' bad connotations and contextual shortfalls hindered their efficient execution. There is a hesitation to use these conceptualizations, especially in the peace-tagged operations of NATO and the UN, due to the prejudices of theory builders, practitioners, and interested communities.¹³ Intelligence and propaganda-tagged communicative efforts are perceived as antagonistic undertakings that would breach the *bona fides* of the intervening actors. In this sense, propaganda activities are denied, mainly in NATO circles, as if this is a malevolent engagement. However, an academic conceptualization of propaganda may be appropriate for assessing communication.

Putting aside the whole discussion about the ethics of propaganda and intelligence in NATO and academic communities, these functions are practised under new titles and improved by established processes according to evolving information technologies. Consequently, this book argues that propaganda is being employed and not dead but evolved under new conceptualizations in contemporary communication engagements. Propaganda makers, which also regretfully use new terminology to define themselves, ignore the exploitation of intelligence that both need to be affiliated functions under the clout of emerging crises. On the other hand, NATO could not transform its once-propaganda – nowadays strategic communications efforts and affiliated intelligence paradigm pending the requirements of peace support operations. NATO has fallen short of communicating with the targeted audiences. In this context, the ascribed context of an integrated intelligence and propaganda function in peace support operations will be examined, covering an academic description of it, especially in the realm of unconventional warfare. The ontology and methodology of such functions need to be scrutinized to employ an efficient intervention by international organizations, which usually do not have a unified effort and command unity.

¹³ Interview with Lothar Buny, NATO SACT Information Operations Department, email message to author, February 14, 2014.

This book consists of seven chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The second chapter examines the characteristics of NATO's peace operations after broader scrutiny of the UN doctrine. A contextual analysis of these will define the limits of intelligence and propaganda. The main question in this chapter is identifying the context of peace support operations in terms of actors, the operational environment, faced concerns, and challenges. In that way, the requirements of peace support operations will be discussed, mainly for NATO.

The third chapter reviews the doctrinal approaches and searches for new insights of intelligence and propaganda by investigating NATO's successes and failures in applying these fields within an integrated mentality. Hence the goal of the chapter is to question the current intelligence and propaganda paradigm, especially within the circles of NATO operations, to see efficiencies/deficiencies. For this purpose, the theoretical fundamentals of both fields are discussed with their shortfalls. The chapter's subject matter is to understand whether there is a shift in the ontology of intelligence and propaganda due to newly emerging actors and their capabilities, operational environment, and experienced concerns.

The fourth chapter focuses on the observations and experiences of interviewed NATO personnel to investigate the flaws in the practice of intelligence and propaganda activities. NATO has shortfalls due to doctrinal, organizational and structural deficiency because of its multinational nature. NATO personnel, the actual practitioners, experience hardships due to the witnessed issue fields in question to be discussed. The chapter argues that additional theoretical complexities make NATO's propaganda and related activities more complicated to achieve defined goals.

The fifth and sixth chapters will cover Bosnia Herzegovina and Afghanistan interventions as case studies. Both the fallacies and superiorities of propaganda and affiliated intelligence functions will be compared in both cases. In this context, NATO's and preceding organizations' intelligence and propaganda activities will be examined during and after the conflicts. NATO's claimed achievements and failures in both cases will be reviewed to analyse if there existed a social-cultural search of host publics and its reflection in intelligence and propaganda activities.

The Bosnian case in the fifth chapter will initially investigate the discourse of the conflict and identify the intelligence and propaganda activities of all parties in the conflict to portray what NATO had faced. The intelligence and propaganda functions of NATO's IFOR and SFOR will be questioned by scrutinizing their capacities and capabilities. The Afghan case in the sixth chapter, which is more comprehensive than the Bosnian case, will focus on a concise review of the history of the conflict. The intelligence and propaganda functions of opposing militias and the preceding Coalition will be investigated to see countering and inherited intelligence and propaganda processes. ISAF's undertakings of both functions will be discussed by observing the products and processes.

It is worth explaining why the Bosnian and Afghanistan interventions are selected for this research. The cases of NATO's Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan interventions present a complexity if the features of both events are compared. The Bosnian intervention is significant in terms of its ethnoreligious nature. No matter how the crisis had developed, brutality was the main characteristic. Additional issue fields such as Bosnia's economic and social inadequacy, ruined cities, permanent enmities of ethnicities, organized crime gangs, and policies of neighbouring and European states make the Bosnian theatre complicated. In terms of tactics and procedures against these problem fields, NATO's intervention and peace support operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was similar to the Afghan intervention. The Afghan case includes an ethnic assortment of various backgrounds, drug trafficking, the presence of outer actors, extremism, insurgency, poverty, thirty years of civil war, organized crime, immigration, epidemic diseases, social disasters, and many other features.¹⁴ Both interventions have continuity in intelligence and propaganda activities while evolvments in methodologies follow one another since NATO engaged both sequentially. Bosnia is the crawling phase of NATO in properly employing intelligence and propaganda activities in peace support operations. The Afghan intervention was built upon the lessons learned from the Bosnian experience regarding knowledge accumulation and enhancing tactics and procedures. Hence the continuity of tactics in both interventions indicates an evolvment

¹⁴ Joseph J. Collins, *Understanding War in Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2011), pp. 63-81.

in the process itself by obtained lessons. Nevertheless, in terms of their social and cultural aspects, the differences between the Afghan and the Bosnian cases are distinct, which would also harden the evaluation of the two functions. The arguments of these chapters indicate the inefficiency of NATO in terms of propaganda and related intelligence activities with its structural flaws and inadequacy in practice.

The closing chapter will conclude the overall research. In this context, the current doctrinal perspective of NATO will be analysed through the Bosnian and Afghan experiences to conclude the paradigm shift of propaganda and related intelligence activities.

The methodology of this research was a matter of concern because of the limitations. Intelligence is a field in which little information can be abstracted and used after thorough analysis due to previous engagements' high sensitivity and secrecy. On the other hand, propaganda is a biased term mainly for NATO personnel such that any research delving is met with precautions not to use it in describing the communication activities. Hence the study was directed to open resources and the obtained materials from the relevant authorities. Besides, the quantification of data in such research is hard to achieve. Getting numeric values to measure the effectiveness of communication, intelligence gathering, and assessment may be deceptive to abstract the overall picture, especially for conflicts' social and cultural dimensions. As a result, a qualitative evaluation is preferred in performing this research. Non-probability sampling is preferred due to the acceptance of subjectivity in evaluating efficiency surveys.

Primary sources of the survey are interviews with those who participated in NATO's peace operations, such as former soldiers, and the author's observations. Hence the preferred approach in the research is initially based upon participant observation. Interviewees are selected from academics and professionals who were a part of NATO circles and could present their experiences within the limits of legal prerequisites not to breach the security clearances. The reason for non-random selection is that NATO officials who participated in these operations are hardly accessible globally since there is no organizing body after they finish their tasks. After the interviews, the author realized that every interviewed NATO personnel member has their

own symbolic and subjective experience in one portion of the NATO operation and is more focused on one aspect of NATO's intelligence and communication activities. There was a need to test the reliability and validity of the interviews. The perspectives of the interviewed persons are compared with those of the other participants, although variations of views were ignorable.

Interviews are performed in a semi-structured nature, while snowball sampling is preferred in interviews. In this frame, broad questions are drafted to direct the conversations, but the questions are flexibly aligned with the experiences and background of interviewees. The questions are classified and categorized pending the planning process of propaganda efforts, intelligence support to propaganda, comparisons of the Afghan and Bosnian cases, lessons learned from the practices, doctrinal adequacy and futuristic perspectives. Some interviewees preferred to skip some questions due to their classification concerns and sometimes leapt to their experiences not precisely matching the query. The author directed questions pending the discourse of the interview by open-ended discussions. Hence each interview has a different course of mutual idea-sharing. I assessed interviews by categorizing the sentiments under four titles: the multinationality of NATO and its consequences, the flaws of NATO practices, the efficiency of intelligence and propaganda, and finally, benefitted means. The abstracted outcomes are compared with conceptualizations to further view their developments. Finally, I added to their observations by including my comments and assessments based on my tours during the Bosnia and Afghanistan assignments as primary data.

Other than the interviews, I examined the intelligence activities and propaganda, or, in NATO's preferred terminology, strategic communication products of NATO's contingents in their areas of responsibilities. The delivered messages and flaws of the products are discussed to show the structural shortfalls by content analysis of the products. The products are obtained from open sources and directly from the NATO commands through prepared CDs. In this frame, the intelligence assets/undertakings and propaganda materials of NATO (such as posters, advertisements, billboard messages, leaflets) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan are analysed to see how they could be perceived.

Other than products, the theoretical structure of peace support operations and intelligence and propaganda functions is scrutinised using published NATO materials. The doctrine gives general principles to practitioners, though; NATO's situation is more complex in terms of the doctrinal preferences of a multinational posture in peace support operations. NATO provides a broad doctrine frame via standardization agreements and Allied Joint Publications. Member states are obliged to have compatible procedures per the allied doctrine, although they may prefer their codes. Hence, the UN and NATO benefit from the official documentation of the pioneering member states abstracting a generalized review of the theoretical background.

The secondary data are derived from the publications of selected authors, policy papers, and documentaries. In this sense, the author scanned open sources affiliated with NATO's interventions. Media coverage is monitored to see what was communicated and what types of changes are obtained. Other than local actors of peace support operations, delivered messages of NATO are reviewed to see what was the initial communication of NATO and how it was perceived. Memoirs and other accounts of experiences are included to cement the findings. Documentaries, which present the views of politicians and former soldiers, are utilized to hear first-hand thoughts. Academic publications are the definitive source of theoretical debates. Academics' perceptions encourage the exploration of new tactics and procedures in military engagements to reduce the workload with efficient grips. Especially, the academic research of military personnel and the surveys and policy papers of think tanks are influential upon decision-makers and strategy designers. The book reviewed these sources to out-surface the experiences and observations of both theoreticians and practitioners. Other than these sources, reports of specially established working groups, composed of distinguished politicians and soldiers, are authentic lessons in learned documents.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONTEXT OF PEACE OPERATIONS AND NATO

Before examining NATO's intelligence and propaganda commitments in peace operations, there is a need to define what is a peace support operation, how NATO started to take part in such engagements, and how the Alliance legitimized its involvement within such commitments in the international arena. The reason for such scrutiny is to locate intelligence and propaganda of the proper contextual standing. Besides, as NATO assumes responsibilities under the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it should comply with the UN Charter¹⁵ that the peace operation doctrine of the UN is a framework for NATO's peace-tagged undertakings. Hence the UN's adherence to peace operations is worth examining as to what the international community perceives from peace support operations and how intelligence and propaganda activities are performed within the frame of prevailing perceptions.

Peace support operations differ from conventional military thinking since military doctrines do not respond to emerging concerns and tasks in peace support operations. New inputs to military engagements have occurred. For instance, the public of the hosting country has become the primary concern in understanding and explaining the conflicts because it is the essential actor to "influence" efforts to let them cope with the established order. Or societies of NATO member states impose constraints that lead NATO members to be reluctant to use force or pay high costs when addressing

¹⁵ Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, Edition A, Version 1, December 2014, pp. 25-26, available at https://www.google.com.tr/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=yIrlV9bLIKHY8AfUwlzQAQ&gws_rd=ssl#q=++Allied+Joint+Publication+3.4.1%2C+Peace+Support+Operations%2C+2001, accessed on December 13, 2015.