Religious Fundamentalism in an Age of Conflict

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Edited by

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In Memory of David Makofsky,

Our friend, colleague, comrade,

The originator of the book

With the sadness of not being able to see

your biggest dream come true

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I The Goal of this Investigation

This is a book of investigations by an international group of scholars who look into the rise of religious fundamentalism and identity movements that have their origins in the great wars of the twentieth century: World Wars I and II (1914–1945) and the Cold War between Russia and the United States (1945–1989).

The post-twentieth century conflicts, those of a new era, have been defined quite unexpectedly in religious terms, and involve three sources of faith and identity, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This new era is very strongly influenced by what in the West has been called populism, but might also be called a version of working-class politics. Because these movements are religious in character, it is interesting that fundamentalist forms of religion have played a major role: "fundamentalism" is a term that will be defined in Section IV of this overview. Members of fundamentalist movements are not strictly from the working class, but leaders employ a relatively authoritarian religious message that they hope will appeal to the working class, in contrast to a liberal or pluralist appeal to religion.

These are the social movements with a religious character that appeared after the great wars and the collapse of the Soviet Union:

- The increasing political/cultural role of Muslim working classes in their period of industrialization and modernization, and the increasing political/cultural role of Muslims in response to the most recent Western invasion of the Islamic world after the end of World War II. These movements had their origins during European colonial expansion in the nineteenth century.

- The appearance of an aggressive, expansionist, and nuclear-armed Jewish Zionist state following the 1967 war, intent on stopping not only Palestinian nationalism, but also intent on preventing any of its Muslim neighbors from entering the nuclear age.

- The anger and shock of the white Protestant evangelical population to a variety of events: the aftermath of the fall of the apartheid-based regime in South Africa; the emergence of Sinn Fein as a major political party in Ulster, UK; the successes of the Civil Rights, abortion rights, and gay rights movements in the United States; and the international rise of Islam.

Our group contains a range of scholars writing case studies concerning the general topic of religious fundamentalism and social change. The group includes two Turkish scholars, Hakan Koni and Bayram Unal; two American scholars, Jack Bloom and David Makofsky; a Canadian scholar, Abraham Weizfeld; and a scholar in from the UK, Gordon Ramsey.

II The Crisis in The Post-Twentieth Century Era

The British Labour historian, E.J. Hobsbawm and his followers spoke of “the long nineteenth century”—a continuation of the superficial stability seen in the late 1800s, which in 1914 was finally shattered by World War I. This was the period when the industrial process in Europe led to the creation of socialist political parties and the modern state.

II.I - The Religious/Identity Nature of the Crisis

"Almost two decades into the twenty-first century, we are now experiencing a comparable breakdown of the verities with which many of us grew up (Kallir, 2018)." Faith in the general prosperity of the period that followed

World War II has vanished, although this varies in different regions of the world. "The so-called post-war consensus that led to the formation of the European Union and its attendant international alliances is starting to unravel, partly as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Kallir, 2018)." During the period of the Cold War, NATO-allied governments subordinated internal crises by focusing on the “struggle against communism”.

Following the 9–11 attack in the USA in 2001, Western interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia have been accompanied by two decades of revolution and civil war without any sign of an immediate conclusion. "Nativist anti-immigrant movements have gained traction in countries (including the United States) formerly considered bastions of human rights. Income inequality has risen to extremes not witnessed since the 1920s (Piketty, 2014; Cassidy, 2014: chart 1)." Far from being immune to these external stressors, the religious leaders and their institutions demonstrate that they are at the center of the larger socio-economic forces that determine the future.

There have been great religious wars throughout history. The popular movements that linked ethnicity and religion dominated the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, and employed ideas that were thought to be part of the past, not the modern world. After Hitler and the Axis powers were defeated in 1945, many academics believed that a culture of “secular-friendly liberal democracy” had triumphed over a culture of “illiberal religious and national identity”. This was a period of optimism, but the victory actually set those opposed to pluralism back for only fifty years. The ethno-nationalist forces that propelled Italian Fascism and German National Socialism had been defeated, but only to emerge in different forms throughout Western and Central Europe, the United States, and in many societies in Asia.

Quite unexpectedly, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a rise of religious and religious-nationalist forces, and the persistent threat of war and violence have again surfaced. The investigators in our effort find that, within each of the major traditions, there has been an upsurge of right wing (that is, opposing liberal pluralism) religious identity groups.

For example, evangelical Protestantism in the United States: (from Bloom, **“**The Religious Right and Race”):

> It is clear that the right is ascendant in the United States, and that it has been for some time now. This trend has an economic, class dimension, especially

> in its modern incarnation in the Trump Administration: namely, an ideological insistence upon redistributing wealth by lowering taxes on the wealthy and cutting back on social safety net programs for the poor and middle classes. Included has been a redrawing of the rules to make the wealthy more able to use their wealth to shape political life. This program has also had a racial dimension that has included attacks upon affirmative action programs and seeking to diminish minority-and-generally-Democratic-leaning voter participation by means of voter IDs, purging of the voter registration rolls and extreme gerrymandering in the several states the Republican Party controls, as well as gutting of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As a result, the right's incarnation in the Republican Party has made that party almost exclusively occupied by whites. One of the remarkable features of the growing power of the conservative movement is how important the religious right has been in its development.

On Contemporary Islam (from Makofsky, **"**Jewish Fundamentalism, Muslim Fundamentalism"):

> In an influential article, "The Task of Liberal Theory after September 11", J. Judd Owen (2004:25) puts forth as the principle issue of the new millennium: "the single most profound theoretical challenge since liberalism's origins ... is ... the challenge of illiberal revealed theology." Judd raises this issue when discussing the Islamic theorist Sayyid Qutb, the leading theorist associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, from his work *Milestones* (2003). Are these claims to be made only about Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood? As we show in this volume, the issue extends far beyond Islam.

On Judaism, in Israel, speaking of the rise of a violent settler movement (Makofsky, **"**Jewish Fundamentalism, Muslim Fundamentalism"):

> It was found that members of a little-known organization, Gush Emunim were reported to be responsible for a plan to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock on Temple Mount, and for a score of lesser acts of violence against Arabs. What was surprising in April 1984 was not so much existence of the terror group as the identity of its members, many of whom were associated with military and civic leadership. Though it was an aggressive settlement movement, Gush Emunim had never openly embraced an ideology of violence. The religious leadership asserted a biblically based Jewish claim to what was called by secularists the Palestinian West Bank of the Jordon River. In the 1970s Gush Emunim did not advocate deportation of the Arab population, although this would change.

II.II The Economic Background of the Crisis

The advent of cultural modernism, and the politics of advanced industrialization *coincided with Europe's transition from rule by a land-based aristocracy (Kallir, 2018)* in the eighteenth century to industrial capitalism. "Industrialization created great extremes of wealth and poverty, but it also spawned a significant middle class. In the first half of the twentieth century, the two world wars and the Great Depression levelled the playing field for this emergent class by wiping out large stores of accumulated wealth.

To ameliorate capitalism's harsher side effects and to ward off the threat of communism, governments in Europe and the United States created social safety nets, regulated industry, and instituted various forms of progressive taxation. Between 1913 and 1948, income inequality dropped by ten per cent in the United States (Kallir 2018)." The three decades following World War II were characterized by rapid growth and low unemployment throughout the developed world. Per capita income rose at rates unequalled before or since (Piketty, 2014; Cassidy, 2014: chart 2,3). "Many blue-collar workers, traditional members of the proletariat, earned middle-class wages (Kallir, 2018)."

Cultural modernism and the politics of advanced industrialization are "inseparable from the rise of the Western middle class. In nineteenth-century Europe, the bourgeoisie created a vast new market (Kallir, 2018)" for higher education and specialized professions. In every country, major cities became educational and cultural hubs, replete with university research institutions, financial research institutions, museums, galleries, concert halls, theaters and publishing houses. The small colleges that had characterized the aristocratic age were transformed into large university systems that depended on governmental support to connect scientists with research applications for industry. As the middle class expanded in the second half of the twentieth century, advances in every field of specialization further broadened the demand for secular expertise.

Just as cultural modernism and the politics of advanced industrialization were sustained, politically and intellectually, by the middle class, a parallel event appeared. Many members of the working class had previously been associated with liberal causes when these causes dealt with wage gains and economic equality, but those in the American and European nativist demographic groups became associated with religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism.

At the same time, in the Muslim world, the needs of European industry and the desire to control natural resources created the political and economic impetuses to draw these Asian and African countries and their labor force into the globalist world order. Western globalists expected that modernization would produce political elites and parties compatible with western globalist rule.

Yet, some in the Muslim world drew the opposite conclusion. The westernized middle classes and the cultural elite were said to represent everything that was wrong with contemporary society.
As one of our scholars, Hakan Koni (**"**On the Limitations of Democracy as a Political Regime*"*), puts it, from the Muslim point of view, secular leadership is morally and financially corrupt:

> The suffering of a great deal of democracies from rampant corruption, the delegation of various policy areas that must be managed with knowledge and expertise under popular control, the change of state policies and programs together with the change of the government in occasions, the instability and political problems related with the difficulties of establishing and maintaining viable coalition governments, and finally the attachment of excessive importance to the individual in democracies at the expense of various religious, moral and social norms that serve critical functions for the order and stability of the society.

Although these complaints are hardly new, or hardly specific to one region, at a certain point a population has simply had enough; and there is a great deal of cynicism in American society. It is worth noting that in the 2016 presidential campaign, supporters of both Republicans and Democrats believed the respective other candidate was a criminal. The FBI suspected that significant legal violations occurred due to the unprofessional handling of thousands of sensitive documents by Clinton, while special counsel investigated possible illegal financial transactions with foreign governments by high officials in the Trump campaign.

III The Response of Religious Leaders and the Creation of Religious Identity Movements Against the Threat posed by Secularism

Religious communities gradually came to recognize that secular education, and, in particular, secular science had marginalized religion. Now it is scientific medicine rather than faith that heals, and the physicists and evolutionary biologists and social scientists explain where we came from

rather than sacred texts. In addition to the social class and citizenship issues that captured the attention of labor struggles in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, religious and identity struggles are now comingled with social class. Religion is one part of identity; another part of identity is "ethnicity" in the multi-ethnic modern state. Large-scale migration, related to economic crises and wars, has resulted in nativist resentment very similar to what occurred in the United States and Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The nationalist, authoritarian movement in different countries came to see globalism and secularism as a threat to group identity.

Additionally, what is most interesting from a psychological point of view is that these fundamentalist and national identity movements typically oppose the psychological hallmark of cultural modernism and liberal pluralism, namely, empathy with the "other."

This is a critical issue, since one of the facts about the new millennium is the ethnic nativist hostility to the "other," sometimes directed as Christian and Jewish hostility towards Muslims as foreigners of a different race, and, then again, often directed by Muslims against Jews, Christians, and foreigners in general. This antipathy, the opposition to pluralism, is one psychological attribute of fundamentalism.

- Christian Demographics (*Pew Forum, 2011*)

Christianity has more than 2.3 billion adherents. The faith represents one-third of the world's population of 7.5 billion, and is the largest religion in the world, the three largest groups being Catholicism, Protestantism, and Eastern Orthodoxy. The largest Christian denomination is the Catholic Church, with 1.2 billion adherents. The second largest Christian branch is either Protestantism (if it is considered a single group), or the Eastern Orthodox Church (If Protestants are considered to be divided into multiple denominations).

- Jewish Demographics *Jewish Virtual Library (2018)*

The worldwide Jewish population was 14.6 million in 2018, less than .005 % of the Muslim population. Globally, the Jewish population is not growing. From 2000 to 2001 it rose 0.3%, compared to worldwide population growth of 1.4%. The largest Jewish populations (2018 estimate) are in the United States, 6.9 million, and Israel, 6.7 million. The rest live in "Western" type countries, such as France (453,000), Canada (390,500) the United Kingdom (290,000), Russia (172,000), Argentina (180,300), and

Germany (116,000). In Africa, the largest Jewish population is in the Republic of South Africa (69,000).

- Muslim Demographics (*Pew Research Center, October 2009)*

There are (2009) over 1.5 billion Muslims living in over 200 countries. Most of the Muslim population lives in Asia and Africa; twenty per cent live in regions most closely associated with Islam—the Middle East and North Africa. Two principle denominations in Islam date from a conflict in the late-sixth century—Sunni and Shi'a. Ten to thirteen per cent of the Muslims are Shi'a, and most Shi'a live in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the states along the Gulf, and India. The other 87 to 90 per cent are Sunni Muslims.

The Middle East and North Africa represent the largest region of Muslim majority countries and leaders of these countries often serve as spokespeople for the religion. There are many countries with large Muslim minority populations, such as India, China, and Russia.

Some followers of Jewish and Muslim faiths are engaged in long-term conflict over the unending expansion of the Jewish Zionist state in Palestine. The groups are very different. Those of Jewish ethnicity live primarily in western (United States, European, or European-like Israel) settings, while the large majority of Muslims live in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Speaking of the United States, the Jewish population enjoys a substantially higher income than most Americans, and certainly higher income than most in the Muslim world (*A Portrait of Jewish Americans*, Pew Research Center**,** 2013, Summary, p. 13: "Fully one-quarter of Jews (25%) say they have a household income exceeding $150,000, compared with 8% of adults in the public as a whole."). The Jewish population has had, proportionally, substantially more secular education than most of those in the US, and has certainly had more than most of those in the Muslim population (*A Portrait of Jewish Americans*, Pew Research Center**,** 2013, summary, p.13: "Jews have high levels of educational attainment. Most Jews are college graduates (58%), including 28% who say they have earned a post-graduate degree. By comparison, 29% of United States adults say they graduated from college, including 10% who have a post-graduate degree."

IV The Comparative Framework

Despite the enormous differences among Christianity, Islam and Judaism, a comparative framework exists following Appleby and Marty (2002) and

Emerson and Hartman (2006) *(from* Makofsky—"Jewish Fundamentalism, Muslim Fundamentalism")**.** Therefore, we are using the following characteristics of theology and institutional organization to describe fundamentalist movements:

- Social Change and Marginality

Fundamentalism is the response of religious believers to the marginalization of religion, since **f**undamentalism is principally the defense of a religious tradition.

For the Muslim population, the change in educational and work demands, and gender authority in work and family life have been dramatic. For Jews, the events in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, followed by the rapid rate of assimilation, have produced a population of Jewish identifiers who feel quite isolated, opposing intermarriage and overtly hostile to those who oppose Israeli policies. For Christians, it is believed that a large section of the Protestant evangelical movement feels overwhelmed by their loss of status in both the United States and internationally.

- Behavioral Limitations

Members of fundamentalist movements face behavioral limitations. "Rules about appropriate speech, dress, sexuality, drinking, eating, family formation, children, entertainment pursuits, and other behaviors are common (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)." Many in all three major religions interpret their behavior as in keeping with sacred texts.

- Future Rewards

For fundamentalists, history has a holy end. "At the end of time, at the return of an especially holy figure (the Messiah, the Hidden Imam, etc.), suffering will end, evil will be vanquished, and believers will be victorious. The Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) offer the most certain assurances (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)." For Zionists, it is an expanded and powerful "Jewish" state. For white Protestants, this involves a return to an era in which they believe Europe and the United States were effectively governed by leaders similar to them. For Muslims, the Sunni and Shi'a traditions have different vision of the glorious Islamic past, but most harbor resentment concerning their subordination during colonial rule.

- Authoritarianism as a Psychological Paradigm

Generally, fundamentalism is associated with authoritarian organizations. All the essays discuss these complicated social class/religious identity issues, but one fact is evident: fundamentalism and identity issues run through all the movements. Also worth considering is the fact that "fundamentalist movements are typically organized around charismatic leaders, and the others represent the followers. The leader (or leaders) is viewed by the followers as specially chosen by their deity, someone with near supernatural qualities or special access to the deity (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)."

- Challenges to Pluralism; Challenge to Secularism

Organizationally, fundamentalism is associated with an elect, chosen membership. "Those in fundamentalist movements tend to view themselves as called, selected out, set apart for their mission to defend the religious tradition (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)." This inherent belief, certainly evident in each case study, is an important constant.

- Role of Sacred Text

Fundamentalist religion typically possesses a sacred text that is always valid. "The texts of the Abrahamic tradition (the Torah, Qur'an, or Bible, for example) are of divine (inspired) origin, true and accurate (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)." This study concentrates on the Abrahamic religions, but events have shown the exclusivist role religion plays for Buddhists in Myanmar and Hindus in India.

- Reading of Sacred Text

Fundamentalists read sacred texts selectively. "Rather than simply defending a religious tradition, fundamentalism selects and reshapes aspects of the tradition (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)." Fundamentalism relies on hermeneutics rather than literalism, and uses "some aspects of modernity, such as much of modern science and modern forms of communication and other technologies". The Internet and social media are typical of modern means of communication. Finally, certain processes of modernity are singled out for focused opposition, such as abortion.

- Warring View of Reality

Fundamentalists often maintain a “warring view” of reality. Important divisions exist on each side within Muslim, Jewish and Protestant communities, and each conflict is different.

- Group Cohesion, Identity as Selected

Fundamentalist movements exhibit sharp organizational boundaries. "People are either in the fundamentalist group or they are not. The boundaries are clearly set; there is no confusion. One is either saved, righteous, a follower of Allah, a defender of the faith, or one is not (Emerson and Hartman, 2006:134)."

V Religious Identity Groups with Fundamentalist-like Beliefs

An excellent case of fundamentalist-like behavior is found in the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland—Ramsey calls this “sectarianism” (from Ramsey, “The Good Thing about Sectarianism”):

> Attendance and religious commitment are rare, and a significant number of loyalist band members, including those in leadership roles, are avowed atheists or militant secularists. In conversation, band members frequently distinguished, in their political discourses, between “decent Catholics” or “ordinary nationalists” on one hand, and “republicans”, who are understood as those committed to the violent overthrow of the Northern Ireland state. Band members emphasize that their quarrel was with the latter. In practice, however, the boundary may not be so easy to draw.
>
> There is ample evidence that the sectarian division in Northern Ireland extends from the top to the bottom of the class structure. Yet, McAuley notes that the culture of sectarianism is most easily identified within the working class.
>
> Working-class areas of Belfast and other towns in Northern Ireland are prominently decorated with murals, flags and banners expressing allegiance to loyalism or nationalism, as well as to various groups aligned with these ideologies, from flute bands and football clubs to armed paramilitary organizations. Such displays of communal solidarity are rare or non-existent in more affluent areas, unionist, and nationalist or mixed. Moreover, the ranks of the organizations represented by such iconography are overwhelmingly filled from the working classes.

VI Conflict between Secularists and Believers

Many of the diatribes and manifestos generated by religious leaders were designed to convert skeptical believers from the middle class, but especially from the working class, into loyal followers. This does not mean, however, that the fundamentalist message was a sham.

Beneath the seemingly apolitical doctrine of constitutionalism and "the separation of church and state," the paradigms set forth by the twentieth-century religious and political leaders were influenced by the power dynamics. It almost goes without saying that the secular world's key players were male and largely Eurocentric in their cultural orientation.

For many in the Jewish population, the liberal, secular pluralism of the West was far more attractive than what was perceived to be the narrow and increasingly right wing focus of Zionism—from Weizfeld *("*Sectarianism and Reciprocity"):

> The major issue of the previous half century that continues on for the last 70 years is presented by Chaim Herzog at the United Nations General Assembly in response to the resolution that the ideology of Zionism is a form of Racism (Resolution 3379 10th November 1975).
>
> The re-establishment of Jewish independence in Israel, after centuries of struggle to overcome foreign conquest and exile, is a vindication of the fundamental concepts of the equality of nations and of self-determination. To question the Jewish people's right to national existence and freedom is not only to deny to the Jewish people the right accorded to every other people on this globe, but it is also to deny the central precepts of the United Nations.
>
> In the first instance, such a claim as such in the name of the Jewish People is open to inspection, considering that the Zionist movement did not have the legitimate consent of the people on behalf of which it claimed to be expressing itself. While the Zionist ideology was the hegemonic expression of the bourgeois class amongst the Jewish People internationally, the great bulk of workers and refugees did not hold the same perspective of building a state at any cost as an expression of national self-determination.
>
> In the second instance, but of even greater significance, is sectarian insistence upon self-determination as an absolute principle, even though it was claimed in opposition to the very same claim made by the indigenous Palestinian Nation struggling against the British colonial occupation, begun in 1917 by General Allenby in his campaign to complete the goals of the Christian Crusade by entering as the victorious champion into Jerusalem.

> To claim the right to self-determination while denying that very same right to the indigenous population is obviously self-contradictory. It is not that the two rights were necessarily contradictory, since the two national struggles could have been conducted conjointly against the common occupier, but rather it was an ideological choice to exclude the "other" Palestinian claim for self-determination in favor of an absolute claim on behalf of one Nation alone.

As the World War II period moved forward, a special crisis appeared in the Jewish community. After the massive extermination of European Jews there were only two major concentrations of Jews in the world—Israel and the United States. In the United States, Jews were rapidly becoming assimilated. Many would have cheered this social change, but to those who identified with Judaism the rate of assimilation was catastrophic.

A major research company was persuaded to do a study of American Judaism and the results were, to some, shocking.

Pew Report on American Judaism in Makofsky **(**"Jewish Fundamentalism, Muslim Fundamentalism"):

> The changing nature of Jewish identity stands out sharply when the survey's results are analyzed by generation. Fully 93% of Jews in the aging generation (born before 1927) identify as Jewish on the basis of religion, but just 7% describe themselves as having no religion. By contrast, among Jews in the youngest generation of U.S. adults, born after 1980, 68% identify as Jews by religion, while 32% describe themselves as having no religion and identify as Jewish on the basis of ancestry, ethnicity or culture. (p. 3). On intermarriage, Pew, (2013:5) "...intermarriage rates seem to have risen substantially over the last five decades. Among Jewish respondents who have gotten married since 2000, nearly 60% have a non-Jewish spouse. Among those who got married in the 1980s, roughly 40% have a non-Jewish spouse. And among Jews who got married before 1970, just 17% have a non-Jewish spouse."

In other words, many American Jews have almost no ties to any Jewish institution at all. The result of the assimilation process during and after the third-generation Jewish community was pronounced. In the United States, the Jews born around the time of World War II managed to achieve remarkable levels of education and wealth, and married non-Jews at a very high rate.

By the turn of the twenty-first century, Sussman states (2010*):*

> American Judaism faced an undeniable reality. With the exception of a number of Orthodox communities and a few other bright spots in or just off the mainstream of Jewish religious life, American Judaism was in precipitous decline. Not only is enrollment in non-Orthodox Jewish religious educational programs down, so is synagogue affiliation. Philanthropic giving in the religious sector of the Jewish community is also declining. For rabbis, Jewish educators, and communal leaders, it is a difficult moment. Jews are flourishing in America, but organized, institutional Judaism is in deep trouble, particularly after the 2008 economic crisis."

Since the future of Judaism in the United States is uncertain, those who worried about Judaism shifted their focus almost exclusively to Israel. The effect of this process is reflected, in Muslim eyes, in the writing of Hakan Koni (**"**On the Limitations of Democracy as a Political Regime") where he notes that the hypocrisy of the West is the establishment of the State of Israel:

> For Goody (2005: 10, 16), Israel stands as another stark example of how high standards of freedom and democracy enjoyed by a country could go together with its massive violations of human rights. The Freedom House ranks Israel as the freest and the most democratic country in the Middle East with its freedom score ranging between 1.5 and 2 out of 7 since 1998, but Goody asks the question what democracy could mean if it ends up with the election of governments responsible for the most terrible massacres of recent history. Could it be possible to establish a democratic state on a land occupied in violation of international law, and could it be consolidated with further territorial expansion and liquidation of the natives of a land? Israel also benefits generously from the support of a powerful coalition of democratic states in the world led by the US. It was, again, very ironic from a democratic point of view that in a peace plan sketched by the US in 2003, Palestine was urged to depose its democratically elected president, Yasser Arafat, as a precondition for the start of the peace negotiations.

VII The Great Change 1970–2020: Financial Collapse and War

The period 2001–2008 was dominated by long, frustrating wars in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. This was followed by the financial collapse of 2008. It is hard to overstate the sheer economic cost of the 2008 financial crisis. The combination of increased expenditures and decreased revenues resulting from the crisis from 2008 to 2010 is likely to cost the United States government well over $2 trillion, more than twice the cost of the seventeen-year-long war in Afghanistan. But the most important effects of the financial crisis may be political, social, and generational, not economic. The years

after the crisis saw sharp increases in political polarization and the rise of populist movements on both the left and right in Europe and the United States, culminating in Brexit in the U.K. and the election of Donald Trump in the United States. Such increases in political divides may be seen as a response to financial crises, but much of the antagonism is not framed in economic terms. Even the economic recovery experienced by the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Britain, is not enough to neutralize the long-term political and social effects of the collapse (*Harvard Business Review, 2018*).

The severity of the crisis was such that probably no government response could have eliminated these consequences; when the economy collapses, people will suffer, and they will blame the people in charge. From the view of critics, in the United States the way that the Bush and Obama administrations (2000–2016) chose to respond to the economic crisis greatly intensified the change in American political culture.

Aspects of the economy remained stagnant, and the competition for jobs and income exacerbated racial and generational divisions among the "haves" and the "have nots".

VII.1 The Impact in the U.S. and Western Europe

As we pointed out earlier, the result of these changes was what was perceived to be a loss of income and status by the white working class. These working-class and "nativist" groups had their impact felt in the United States and Europe, and one manifestation of this was Brexit in the U.K. and Trump's election in the United States.

Gordon Ramsey ("The Good Thing about Sectarianism"):

> The central demand of Marxism has always been for "workers of the world to unite", yet workers in Northern Ireland have stubbornly refused so to do. Marxists from James Connolly (an Irish "Republican" leader, 1858–1916) onward have blamed this refusal on the false consciousness of loyalist workers: bamboozled by the capitalists, and separated from their bosses' propaganda, Marxists claimed, they would recognize their oppression, and rebel against the capitalist British (Whyte 1990).

However, events have repeatedly shown that when working-class loyalists rebel against the unionist establishment (those who support the union between Britain and Northern Ireland), they do not turn to nationalism, but to more extreme forms of loyalism (Whyte 1990).

Similarly, nationalist working-class desire for a united Ireland does not imply a desire for union with working-class loyalists. Rather, Orangemen should "Be loaded on buses and fucked off back to England where they came from" (Millar 2016). Ritual hostility (which can easily become real hostility) to working-class loyalists forms a central part of working-class nationalist identity—enacted musically through "rebel bands" and Celtic FC football songs.

The "false consciousness" model is not unique to Marxists. Middle-class liberals have blamed sectarianism on ignorance and lack of education, which has led working-class people to reprise past conflicts which have no relevance in the modern world (Ulster as "stuck in the past").

Some examples of unapologetically sectarian performance:

- Anti-Catholic antagonism was expressed more strongly by poor Protestants than by any others. This was, and is, regarded as a very common phenomenon in Northern Ireland. This was despite the fact that in Ballybeg, economic competition between poor Protestants and poor Catholics was negligible, and that, in everyday life, they maintained friendly relations, cooperated in farming, and treated each other as social equals. In contrast, richer farmers, who condemned the bigotry of Orangemen, had very little contact with Catholics.

- Those who refused to join the Orange Order justified their refusal by claims that it was too bigoted, too drunken and too egalitarian.

When prestigious members of the community (such as a religious minister) joined the Order in the hope of influencing it, they were forcefully reminded that all brethren were equal within the Lodge. This rule of equality made the Order attractive to poorer Protestants who were anxious that professionals and yeomen should also join, precisely because they could be spoken to more plainly in Lodge Meetings than in any other context.

When actual behavior was considered, there was little evidence for the greater bigotry of poorer Protestants. Accusations of Orange bigotry or lack of Protestant commitment by professionals were motivated by class hostility and distrust.

In the United States, the situation for white Protestantism was different, but in the same manner as the Protestants in Northern Ireland, many white workers felt abandoned by the social elite. The expansion of religious identity and fundamentalism over the past quarter-century was stimulated in the West by a combination of globalization and an influx of baby-boomers, then in their peak earning years. As boomers age out of the market, they are not being replaced in comparable numbers. On average, millennials earn twenty per cent less than boomers did at their age. Since the 1970s, financial deregulations, supply-side tax cuts, the evisceration of labor unions, and slowing economic growth has greatly eroded middle-class incomes. By 2010, twenty per cent of the national income of the United States was going to 1 per cent of the population (Piketty, 2014; Cassidy, 2014: Charts 1–2).

Thomas Piketty (2014) warns that "inasmuch as the rate of return on capital has historically exceeded the rate of growth, income inequality is likely to become self-perpetuating unless governments step in to reverse it. So far, despite rampant populist rhetoric, little is being done to rein in our resurgent oligarchy."

Just as white Protestants in Northern Ireland recognized the threat to their identity, so did the white southern, evangelical fundamentalists.

From Jack Bloom ("The Religious Right and Race"):

> David Kuo, who served as the second in command of President George W. Bush's Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, said that although he felt that the issue of abortion was the most important motivation for right-wing Christians to become involved in politics, five years after *Roe*, an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to consider eliminating the tax-exempt status of private Christian schools also infuriated Christians. *Roe* had convinced many Christians that America was morally lax, and the IRS convinced them there was a Big Brother out to get them.
>
> *Roe v. Wade* was decided in 1973, so, five years later was 1978, and the president at that time was Jimmy Carter, an evangelical himself. Many in the Christian right saw the threat of losing the tax exemption that was available to private Christian schools as even more important in moving the group into politics than Kuo did.
>
> Paul Weyrich, a founder of the conservative Heritage and Free Congress Foundations, and of the American Legislative Exchange Council, which coordinates right-wing legislation in the states, felt that the IRS policy "shattered the Christian community's notion that Christians could isolate

> themselves inside their own institutions and teach what they pleased." Richard Viguerie, a long-time conservative activist who was an innovator in direct mail donations long before the Internet became the way to solicit money, said that the new IRS policy "kicked the sleeping dog. It galvanized the religious right. It was the spark that ignited the religious right's involvement in politics."

VII.II The Transformation of the Muslim World

The Muslim world has felt the greatest impact of the decades of unending war.

The modernizing revolutions, parallel to those that occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' western experience, have resulted in a lengthy war with very heavy foreign intervention between Iran and its allies against Saudi Arabia and its allies.

A great deal of finger pointing has been aimed at the Muslim community when it comes to fundamentalist beliefs and identity movements. The involvement of the poorer classes in the Muslim communities has had an enormous impact on the entire world, as the involvement of the poor had in the previous revolutions in Western Europe, Russia, and China. As the working class/labor historians of past eras have shown, this great shift in culture and economy runs against the forces that wish to control the direction of cultural change.

Israel, the United States and Russia all have economic and control reasons for intervening in the Muslim world, and the easiest explanation they provide is that they have been asked by local forces in the area to respond to terror from the other side. This intervention not only creates victims and refugees in the Muslim world, but it significantly erodes any semblance of a liberal order all over the world by promoting the use of poison gas, missiles, drone strikes, and torture.

The general failure of secularist leaders internationally and in the Muslim world to offer a solution that is satisfactory to major portions of the population has been associated with the rise of fundamentalism. In the Muslim world, the availability of "liberal" secular or religious leaders has always been present, but their capacity for leadership is in question. These secular leaders who have failed, include Nasser of Egypt, the Assad family in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and have destroyed the credibility of secular government. The public had misperceived the initial secularist,

nationalist leadership as idealistic and not self-serving, an opinion which is quickly reversed once in power. The stagnant economy, often described as the consequence of capitalist neo-liberalism, is what destroys these secular monarchs.

One of the legacies of the Iranian Islamic Revolution was the creation of a distinct western attitude to militant political Shi'ism. The initial vehemence of its anti-Americanism, energetic desire to export its revolutionary doctrines, and penchant for hostage taking and terrorism made Sunni activism appear less threatening in comparison. This attitude prevailed throughout the 1980s, only to be rudely awakened in the mid-1990s following the Sunni backlash to the first Gulf War. The leadership of the United States, in recognition of unease amongst its Sunni Allies, has now come full circle. In a bid to restore a favorable equilibrium to the Shi'a-Sunni balance of power, United States' leadership is increasing military aid to Sunni regional powers, and enlisting the assistance of Sunni militants.

This may, in the short term, bring apparent stability to Iraq, and reassure Saudi, Jordanian and Egyptian allies of the support of the United States. The wider regional impact of establishing the first Shi'a ruled Arab state (Iraq) was only seriously addressed by specialists following the transfer of power to the Interim Government.

The Saudis are involved in repression of its own Shi'a community under a cloak of religious sectarianism, and they urge other Sunni Gulf States to do this as well.

By encouraging fear of Iran in response to a vigorous Shi'a revival, the Saudis justify their tacit support for more controversial policies. The Saudis fear Hezbollah and Iran's support of the Palestinian cause and a Shi'a challenge to the political control of Lebanon.

VIII The Formation of Identity: Case Study

David Makofsky, Bayram Unal, and an assistant, Maimaitijiang Abudugayiti, conducted ethnographic and survey-based research on an ethnic Turkic Muslim group, the Uyghurs of Chinese Central Asia. The case study is in two sections; "Fundamental Life Style and Identity Hierarchy Among Uyghurs", written by Dr. Unal, and "The Formation of Uyghur Muslim Identity: Working Class and Gender Contributions", written by Dr. Makofsky. The focus of this study was on some of the very factors raised in this volume: the roles of gender, social class, and historic memory on the

formation of identity. Although much of the research was done in Turkey, everyone who was interviewed was born and raised in the Muslim and Turkic speaking area of the Uyghur Independent Republic of Xinjiang, one of the northwest provinces of China.

The Uyghurs, together with their close linguistic neighbors, the Uzbeks, are among the most populous of the Turkic-speaking Muslim people of Central Asia, who live in the vast region of grasslands and mountains that stretch from the Mediterranean to the center of China, Xian. Numbering more than 20 million, the Uyghurs are one of the largest ethnic groups in China. Their nomadic ancestors migrated westward from the eastern part of Central Asia to what is now contemporary Anatolia, over the course of many centuries. Among those whose ancestors did not migrate are the Uyghur Muslims of China. The Uyghur dialect is considered close to old Turkish.

Using a sample of Uyghurs in Turkey, we tested the inclusion of social class and Islamic customary practice on modernization theory as it applies to the Muslim world. Modernization theory, developed in the 1960s by applied social scientists from a Western-oriented sociological tradition, has had its own shortcoming: it is too general to be useful. By specifying the impact of Islam and social class, we hope to improve its utility. A questionnaire was developed concerning the issues raised in the process of the modernizing revolution of the Muslim world: ethnic identity, the maintenance of customary Muslim community practices, social class and gender differences.

One part of the study investigates the perceived and lived identities of Uygur youth temporarily living in Turkey through fundamental determinants: Hawlback's concept of social memory and Assman's concept of communicative memory.

The memory that defines the students' sense of belonging to their racial roots was structured on normative and formative foundations. It has determined the quality of "attitudes towards collectiveness" and was used to determine fidelity among the members of the community. However, it is naïve to assume that the social/cultural memory is the only factor constituting the individual's identity without understanding changes over time and geographic distances. Especially in the diaspora, social memory is not sufficient in contributing to belonging, and we find that "historical memory" has been transferred to the everyday life as a differential interpretation of the past.

The other part of the study investigates ethnic identity—the maintenance of customary Muslim community practices, attempting to focus on social class and gender differences. A sample drawn from Uyghur students and professionals in Turkey, in the spring of 2015, was supplemented by visiting a Uyghur refugee camp in Turkey.

IX Conclusions

Although it would appear to be self-evident that the success of moderate and assimilationist-secularist oriented followers could provide some basis for future cooperation, the real obstacle to this goal is that a sizeable portion of all three movements opposes moderation and secularism in their own communities. Consider each one of these religious communities:

> The increasing political/cultural role of Muslim working classes in their period of industrialization and modernization, and the increasing political/cultural role of Muslims in response to the most recent Western invasion of the Islamic world since the end of World War II. These movements had their origins during European colonial expansion in the nineteenth century.

The fact that the modernizing revolution has been associated with an Islamic awakening represents the global challenge of our time. As the Muslim community confronts secular urban life both in their homelands and, as migrants, in foreign countries, it is evident that secular and Islamic cultures are very different. The case study of the Uyghur community uses survey analysis and interviews and finds a great deal of conflict over issues, such as the "woman's role" in society and loyalty to "national" objectives when they contradict Islamic customary practice. Tension between secular and religious norms serves to weaken secular authority.

In many Muslim societies, there has been a great deal of cynicism towards Western claims that Western institutions might provide a model for the Muslim world. As Hakan Koni **("**On the Limitations of Democracy as a Political Regime"*)* points out:

> The cause of the war (2003 and onwards) was in its course changed to fight against tyranny and introducing democracy and human rights in Iraq, but this is also very far from being a legitimate excuse for war at the present stage of international law. And it was the scale of human casualties that discredited the US war in Iraq more than anything else as the number of Iraqi deaths between 200,000 and 600,000 according to the most and the least optimistic surveys (Hagopian et. al. 2013). And the estimates guess that more than 70 % of the casualties were civilians.

As turmoil in the Muslim world continues, a cold war between two factions, one led by Iran and called "Shi'a" and the other led by Saudi Arabia and called "Sunni" has emerged. It appeared, after the 2020 election, that the Democratic Party liberals might be somewhat more sympathetic to accommodation with Iran, and the Republican conservatives more hostile, but Israel and Saudi Arabia remain allies of the United States. Similar to the war on terror this Shi'a-Sunni conflict is a long and costly struggle that will not soon be resolved.

Although foreign powers are invited into the area to support autocratic rulers, foreign intervention is resented by the general population. The victims are almost always civilians. In the midst of the very real carnage, to claim that the foreign power is only there to support "moderate" Muslims may not be widely believed.

> The threat of neo-colonialism: the appearance of an aggressive, expansionist, and nuclear-armed Jewish Zionist state following the 1967 war, intent on stopping, not only Palestinian nationalism, but also intent on preventing any of its Muslim neighbors from entering the nuclear age.

Abraham Weizfeld ("Sectarianism and Reciprocity") concludes: "The exclusive nature of secularism is defined by a State that forbids the expression of any cultural attributes that differ from the State-sponsored theocratic culture and presumes that all the subjects of the State would adopt by assimilation such a common definition of citizenship in the mode of the Nation-State itself. Despite the horrendous consequences of such a definition, particularly in Europe over the course of the twentieth century, the lack of critique of such a model is most disturbing."

Only a minority of the Jewish people outside of Israel accept the words of the Biblical text as authoritative, and so the claim to a historical Jewish state rests on the moral authority of its claims that are directed to the ethnic loyalty of an assimilated and intermarried Jewish population in the United States. Events are changing, and a large Protestant evangelical population has embraced Zionism. Similarly, in the name of national identity, ethnic groups in Europe that feel threatened by rising Muslim migration have embraced the support of Zionism as a means of expressing anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments.

As the Zionists gain the support of the non-Jewish American and European right, then at what point might they simply be abandoned by the much more liberal Western Jewish community? As Makofsky points out in his article