

Eventualism and the Foundation of an Eventual Metaphysics

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By

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**Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing**



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This book first published 2022

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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ISBN (10): 1-5275-8767-3

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-8767-0

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FOREWORD

In this essay, a philosophical theory will be formulated which is called *Eventualism*. *Eventualism* is a metaphysical conception concerning the whole Reality and every anything, simple or complex, which is verified or supposed to exist.

Anythings are not only those belonging to the natural or physical world, but also those generated by the human mind, individual or collective, and by artificial tools, such as those of AI.

Eventualism, also called *eventual metaphysics*, is a Heraclitean philosophical conception that, different from Parmenidean metaphysics, considers the whole Reality and its constituents as dynamical entities that are in a continuous state of transformation. *Eventual metaphysics* states that the primary character of each anything is *to be eventual: this means that it is what it is and also what that it could be*.

Each anything has many *eventuals* that could be realized. *Eventual* is something of an anything A' which is not effectively realized, but could be achieved under specific conditions or it has been realized in previous or analogous conditions.

Eventual metaphysics formulation begins in Chapter One in which every anything is considered as a portion of Being (or Reality) placed in space and time, and in different times and more than one space. Each anything is formed by its constituents, ontic attributes and the relationships that it can have with other anythings.

In Chapter Two, the concepts of *effectiveness* and *eventuality* will be analyzed, considered as the primary characters of every anything; on the one hand, the *effectiveness* according to which anything can have different *effectives*. *The effective of an anything A' is A' as it is actually realized and constituted*. On the other hand, the *eventuality* for which each anything possesses different *eventuals* considered as those anythings in which A' could transform into (*ontic eventuality*). Anything is eventual, not only because it can carry out some of its transformations, but, also, because it is the result of eventual processes that originated it.

In addition, to each anything can be assigned one or more perspectives from which it can be considered.

Chapters Three and Four will be dedicated to the examination of different characters of the anythings and, in particular, those of otherness, un-otherness, actuality and un-actuality.

Chapter Five presents an in-depth analysis of the structure of the eventuality of each anything and the ways in which it is generated.

Chapter Six analyzes the nature of eventual processes and their interrelationships.

Chapter Seven is dedicated to the eventualism of those anythings that are generated by the mind; this *noetic eventualism* is grounded on the way in which the human mind operates, therefore, an analysis of the mental processes that generate the eventuality of the mind will be presented. Noetic eventualism, on the one hand, concerns the activities of each mind (*idiosyncratic noetic eventualism*) and, on the other hand, the mental dynamics that generate the collective mind of a human group, or of all humankind (*memetic noetic eventualism*). In this essay, only idiosyncratic noetic eventualism as it relates to individual minds will be analyzed.

Chapter Eight, grounded on the analysis formulated in Chapter 7, takes into consideration the relations between mental anythings and Reality.

Chapter Nine outlines some other aspects of eventual metaphysics, considered as a metaphysics belonging to the way philosophical thought and the human mind operate. Thus, before formulating different aspects of eventual metaphysics, some fundamental characters of the philosophical thought that distinguish it from other operating ways of the human mind, such as ordinary and scientific thought, are analyzed.

This essay is not exhaustive and outlines only the fundamental aspects of an eventual metaphysics which is different from any other Heraclitean or Parmenidean metaphysics. This essay, too, is subjected to eventualism so that it can consider many other aspects that are not analyzed here and that could involve different philosophical research fields, such as epistemology and ontology.

Many thanks to Audrey Anderson for her rigorous English revision and to the Cambridge Scholars staff for their editorial support.

CHAPTER ONE

ANYTHINGS, ESSEICITY, SITUATIONALITY AND POSITIONING

1.1. Ontic/Ontological

The first theoretical concept that will be presented and analyzed in this essay is that of *anything*, but before carrying out the analysis it is useful to specify the meanings of the words *ontic* and *ontological*.

The word *ontic* is used to refer to every anything considered, uniquely, as existing (*being*) because it belongs to BR (Being-Reality) with ontic characters proper to all anythings and ontic attributes proper to any given anything that constitute what is called its *esseicity* (see Def. 1.2.2.); that is, the set of attributes that identify it as a given anything different from any other. These *esseic* attributes can be modified in an eventual process that can also change the *esseicity* of an anything, and thus, generate its transformation and the eventual constitution of a new anything that can also contain some attributes of the previous anything, or some new internal relations among its constituents.

The word *ontological*, instead, will be used as an adjective referring to the anythings in the case in which they are detected, observed, and known by others anythings, such as the human mind or artificial devices. In other words, ontological is an adjective used to point to the onticity of an anything detected by another anything that is able to outline the *esseicity* of another. Therefore, the ontic state of an anything is proper to it outside of any relationship that intends to detect its *esseicity*, while its ontological state is the result of the process of detecting the anything and its *esseicity*.

Ontology, therefore, is the analysis of the *esseicity* of the anythings. This essay is ontological, but its goal is also to present itself as an anything capable of detecting and delineating *esseicity* by placing between parentheses, as far as possible, the impact between the *esseicity* of the anything detected and that of the anything detecting. It is an *ontological*

epoché that requires the evaluation of the anything that detects another anything. Ontology, therefore, is related to the epistemology and gnoseology of the anythings.

On ontology, or rather on a specific ontology, a relative metaphysics can be formulated which means to justify and provide frameworks, comprehensions and theoretical explanations related to the ontic structures to which a given ontology refers.

In Chapter Nine, eventualism will be conceived as a metaphysics grounded on the ontology and onticity of the anythings.

1.2. The Anythings

In this essay on eventualism, and the eventuality of Being-Reality (BR), the word anything (in French *quelque chose*, in German *etwas*) is used to refer to any entity, phenomenon, process or event, natural, mental, social or artificial, without considering any other attribute of it, except that of belonging to Being or Reality (BR). BR is understood here, uniquely, as the set of all the anythings considered as existing, or supposed to exist, and it is the name of this set. BR is not an overall reality diversified from the anythings and considered as existing in itself; the existence predicate is not directly attributable to BR but only to the entities that are part of it; however, it is possible to indirectly assign the attribute of existing to BR because all the constituents of BR are, by definition, existing. In the following, the word entity will also be used to state that an anything is considered existing, that is, it belongs to BR.

When we say that an anything belongs to BR we are referring only to the fact that such anything is an element of the whole BR because it is considered as existing (entity), whether it is an anything from the physical-natural, or human, world or is an anything generated by the human mind.

Every anything belongs to BR even if there is no presence of any subject who may be able to detect it, and therefore, it is outside of any analytical, epistemological or gnoseological perspective. However, it is theoretically acceptable that for every anything there may be a subject or instrument that detects it, that is, another anything that relates to it, even if this relation may not be cognitive as it happens for a human or artificial subject that awarenessly detects the attributes of an anything.

An anything can be any something whose primary ontic attribute is only that of belonging to BR. The corresponding Latin term is *aliquid*: neutral of the pronoun *aliquis* which indicates something indefinite. Also, in Latin philosophical literature *aliquid* is used to refer to any kind of anything (*res*).

In this essay, we have preferred to use the word *anything* as primary and that of *something* as a parallel and secondary, in order not to limit the meaning of the term anything to that of ‘thing’, which is often used with reference to anything material or physical, empirically or perceptually detectable, and particularly to a specific thing. The anything is not a thing or it is not just a thing; the term can refer to something like a table, an atom or a star; not only to such things but also, as has already been stated, to all those entities, events or processes that are generated by the mind, by a collectivity of minds (memes), by a central nervous system complex enough to generate them, or by an artificial system.

From an epistemological perspective, the word anything refers to *empirical or perceptive entities* and to *theoretical entities* that are not, or are not temporarily, detectable by sensations, or with the use of any instrumentation capable of empirically detecting them or better describing them in empirical-perceptive words. However, it should be noted that this condition refers to the fact that these theoretical entities are not (or are not always) derivable (even inductively) from perceptions or empirical experiences, but in their formation process and once formed they can be empirically or perceptually detectable, and as such, are anythings existing belonging to BR. In fact, the processes of their formation are existing and are also detectable because they are BR processes, or of a similar nature, such as socio-cultural or artificial ones. Once formed, from one side, these entities are empirically or perceptually detectable not in themselves, but in their sign transcription, as happens for mathematical or logical concepts which are transcribed in the form of logical or mathematical signs, such as the notion of derivatives or integrals or other physical concepts expressed in a formal language, such as mathematics. Therefore, the distinction between them (theoretical) and other anythings (empirical-perceptive) is such only with reference to their generation and formulation, but not from the point of view of belonging to BR. They also belong to BR, but their state and ontic-esseic structure are different: they are empirical and theoretical ones entities.

On the other side, these theoretical entities formulated by a human mind can be detected, in some way, by observing the neurophysiological state or

process that generated them in a given neurophysiological place and time. So, such theoretical entities can be detected in two different ways: by detecting their sign-transcriptions and by the empirical observation of the neurophysiological processes that generate them, so they are, at the same time, both theoretical entities and phenomenic-physical entities. The anything can be defined as follows.

Def. 1.2.1. – *Anything*

An anything A' is a portion of BR located in space and time, and also, in different instants of time, and in more than one place, and is formed by its ontic-esseic constituents and attributes, by its internal and dynamic processes and by the relationships that it has with other somethings in a given condition.

Corollary 1.2.1.1.

Every anything is, at the same time, a set of ontic-esseic constituents and attributes, dynamic processes and relationships with other anythings.

Corollary 1.2.1.2.

Every anything A' exists because it belongs to BR.

Corollary 1.2.1.3.

The relationality of every anything is the set of its active relationships in a given condition.

The definition specifies that every anything A' is considered in its state of existing in, or belonging to, BR and to affirm that it is a portion means that it is part of BR and, as such, shares the foundational-ontic character of BR: *being existing*. A portion that is at the same time inherent to BR and identified by its own ontic-esseic characters (constituents, attributes and processes) for which it is delimited in BR by everything that it is not.

Corollary 1.2.1.4.

Every anything is determined at the same time by what it is and by what it is not; what it is not causes it to be what it is and what it is causes it not to be what it is not.

These notions refer to each anything considered within space and time for which every anything is always located in space and time (not excluding,

only hypothetically, that it may also be, simultaneously, in different times and places (as it is stated by quantum theory); this allows an anything to take on the character of what is not in a given time and as such every anything is *eventual* (see Chapter Two) in different periods, or instants of time, and in different portions of space for which space and time are related to each other, with reference to the state of each anything (see below for the notions of *positioning*, *condition* and *situationality*, Sections 1.6., 1.7.).

The *anything is theoretically indefinite*, but the anythings of which BR is made are determined anythings that possess constituents, processes and ontic-esseic attributes that identify, and differentiate, them from each other: the set of such constituents and attributes of a given anything A' is called the *esseicity of A'*.

Def. 1.2.2. – *Esseicity*

The set of ontic-identifying constituents-attributes of A', and their relationality, is called the esseicity of A'.

Every anything, as will be specified later, is determined, but only in relation to its state and the condition in which it finds itself; from this, it follows that every anything is determinable with respect to its state and condition, but what it is can be transformed into something very different, as happens for macroscopic or microscopic anythings. This means that its esseicity is also changeable and eventual, hence the following thesis.

Thesis 1.2.1.

Anything retains its esseicity for a limited time, and space, and this esseicity is subject to eventual change so that even the anything changes.

This thesis is fundamental to the eventual outlook that will be treated in many parts of this essay.

The notion of esseicity will be analyzed in the following section.

1.3. Esseicity of the Anythings

The notion of *esseicity* can be associated with the medieval philosophical concept of *how questions* which indicates those constituents and attributes that are proper to every anything other than those of the class to which it belongs.

Thesis 1.3.1.

The haecceitas is what distinguishes each anything from any other and, in particular, from those of its class to which it belongs.

The notion of *haecceitas* was introduced in medieval philosophy with reference to individuals, including man, belonging to a living species in order to detect the identifying attributes that differentiate them from those of the class or species to which they belong. In Duns Scotus, the term *haecceitas* is used to refer to each anything and its individuality. Therefore, in this essay, we use the term *esseicity* as more or less equivalent to the Latin word *haecceitas*.

The notion of *esseicity* is here understood (Def. 1.2.2.), as well as the characters of every anything A' , that is, the set of its identifying ontic attributes and constituents (its individuality) and its processuality and relationality as belonging to BR; every anything is first of all ontic because it belongs to BR ($A' \in \text{BR}$) and, secondly, is made up of identifiable constituents and attributes called *esseic*.

The term *esseic* is also used to refer to one, or many, anythings that are part of another anything A' and that form its structure and, therefore, its *esseicity*; for example neutrons, protons and electrons are constituents of every atom. Even the attributes of an anything A' are part of its constituents; however, are the ways in which each constituent arises and relates within the anything, or with others, what makes an anything different from any other. Every anything possesses an attribute that concerns it as a whole: its mode of being and of placing itself within an ontic environment, that is, that portion of BR which is inherent of a given anything. Later on, the notions of *situation* and *positioning* will be introduced, which specify how an anything works within an ontic environment in addition to its spatial location (see Sections 1.6. and 1.7.).

The *esseicity* of every anything has been pointed out in general in the Def. 1.2.2. and it is specified in the following.

Def. 1.3.1. – *Esseicity*

The esseicity of every anything A (EST/A) is its belonging to BR and the set of its constituents ($Cost$), of its ontic attributes (At), of its processuality (Pro) and of its relationships (Rel) with other anythings ($Cost-At-Pro-Rel/A$):

$EST/A = (Cost-At-Pro-Rel/A) \in BR.$

Corollary 1.3.1.1.

Each anything is formed by its constituents and ontic attributes, by its processuality and by the relationships it has with other anythings in given conditions. Therefore, every anything can have a different esseicity with reference to the relationships that are established in a given condition.

Corollary 1.3.1.2.

Cost-At-Pro-Rel/A determines the esseic individuation of A relating to a given condition.

Thesis 1.3.2. – *Ontic area*

Every anything A' has an ontic area that is formed by its constituents, attributes, processes and the relationships between them, and the relationships that A' activates with other anythings in a given space/time and condition. Each ontic area is located in an ontic environment.

From this thesis derives the following one which concerns the relationality among anythings.

Thesis 1.3.3. – *Ontic area relationality*

The relationships between anythings, simple or complex, are relationships between ontic areas, so are the ontic areas of the anythings that interact and, therefore, also the anythings that are interacting.

1.4. Ontic Constituents, ἀρχή (arké) and Foundations

The *ontic constituent* is an anything A' that is part of the esseicity of another anything A'' and is an element of it, such as protons and neutrons of the atomic nucleus, the pages of a book, the different parts of a PC, the leaves of a tree and, in general, all the parts that form an anything, an entity, a subject, an event or a process.

The *ontic attribute*, however, is a property, an attribute and a modality of A': the modalities in which each constituent arises and relates within some A' and some A' with other anythings.

In the case in which the anything A' is analyzed to detect its constituents and attributes, their detection is expressed with the use of a language,

formal or not, of a propositional character (subject and predicate), properties, attributes, modalities are considered as predicates of a propositional subject, the propositional anything to which it is intended to refer them: hence, the semantic reference to every anything existing as portions of BR. This distinction is only analytical since each anything belongs to BR because it bears ontic constituents that make it part of BR.

The esseicity of an anything, as stated in Def. 1.3.1., is formed, in addition to its ontic constituents, by a large number of attributes depending on its constitution and complexity and, in general, they are of the following types: a) *arketic*, b) *structural*, c) *spatial-temporal*, d) *dynamical*, e) *relational*, and f) *eventual*.

The *arketic* attributes are the founding ones and, considered as a whole, are referred to with the term ἀρχή. *Structural attributes* are those that concern the relationships between constituents and the identitive ontic attributes of every anything. Every anything A' is placed in time and space and this determines its *spatial-temporal attributes*. The *dynamical attributes* are attributes that derive from the internal processual dynamics of an anything that involves relations with an ontic environment and with other anythings. *Relational attributes* concern the relationships that an anything A' possesses or establishes with any other anything. The *eventual attributes* concern the anythings in their eventual processes: their eventuality.

The founding attribute of every anything A' is the ἀρχή, considered as the foundation or origin.

Before defining the notion of ἀρχή, we pause to analyze the meaning assigned to the term ἀρχή by some philosophers, in particular by Aristotle.

In the *First Book* of *Metaphysics*, after having outlined what is meant by science or knowledge, Aristotle briefly analyzes the thought of the first philosophers (among which he also includes Hesiod, who in his *Theogony* states that Chaos is the principle of all things) and stresses that their goal was to find some principles and causes, (*Book III*, 6) considered as the primary causes, (*Book III*, 1) of all things. He also points out that these first philosophers considered the principles of all things as only those of a material kind, and this deviates from his purpose which is to investigate the first non-material principles: the goal of his metaphysics.

Both the ones, beyond their reduction of the principle to the sensible kind, and the other indicate that the primary goal of philosophy consists in the research, or investigation, of the *principles* which are the cause of all things: that is, those principles, those causes, or those elements that cause things to be what they are. In other words, whether a single indefinite principle such as Anaximander's *apeiron*, or a single principle such as Thales's water, or the four elements of Empedocles, is both the cause and foundation. Every anything is caused by such a principle and is founded on it; in other words, the being of this anything is such only because this principle founds or supports it.

In *Book V*, Aristotle specifies what he means by *principle* and *cause* outlining the different meanings of the term principle and the various kinds of cause.

With reference to the *principle*, Aristotle uses the term ἀρχή considered with different meanings: “foundation”, “starting point” or “beginning”, “cause”, “occasion” and proposes the following semantic distinctions. “A principle is said to be the part of a thing from which one starts to move [A]: for example, a line or a road has a principle from which one goes in one direction, and another in the opposite direction. Principle is also the point from which a thing starts in order to succeed in the best possible way, for example, in learning sometimes one must not start from what is first and from the principle of the argument, but from where it is easier to learn [B]. In another meaning, the principle is that from which a thing takes its first origin and which is inherent to that thing, for example, the keel for a ship and the bricks for a house; and for animals, some hold it to be the heart, others the brain, and for others, some other part that has the character of principle. Principle is also that from which a thing takes its first origin, and which is not inherent to the thing, but from which, by its nature, the movement and change begin, for example, in the case of the son, the father and the mother, in the case of the scuffle, the offense [C]. There is also a beginning when there is something that, with its choice, makes things move and changes those that change, for example, the city magistrates, oligarchies, kings and tyrants are called principles, and in this sense, the arts are also principles, especially architectural ones [D]. Furthermore, what on the basis of which a thing can be known is also a principle; and this too is called the principle of the thing, for example, in the sense in which it is said that hypotheses are the principle of demonstrations [E].

The word *cause* is also used with many meanings, because *all causes are principles*.

All principles have something in common: they are the first step from which the Being, the becoming or knowing starts; some principles, then, are inherent in the things of which they are principles, others are external to those things. Therefore, nature, element, thought, choice, substance and purpose are also principles: and, in fact, the principle of knowing and becoming for many things are the good and the beautiful (*Metaphysics, Book V, 1*). [Letters (A) to (E) are ours].

For the purpose of this analysis, the meanings (A), (C) and (D) are relevant. According to (A), a principle is what is considered as a “starting point” or “beginning” for which an anything is such as this principle has allowed a dynamics that has led to such anything. In the second and third meaning, however, the principle is understood as the origin of an anything or, in other words, what from which it “derives”. An anything, therefore, is considered such because a principle has allowed it to be what it is, or has become (here we are not interested in the aspect by which a principle causes anything to be known).

A principle, a ἀρχή, is thus *that by which an anything is what it is or by which it becomes*. On the basis of these indications, can it be said that the principle is a ἀρκή in the double meaning of what gives origin and, at the same time, is what gives foundation? Is it possible to say that given the origin of an anything, this origin is also its foundation? These two questions arise from the perspective of considering the principle, or ἀρχή, as what concerns the anything in itself as an attribute, or, better, that attribute which is *primary* (a first cause) for it is before any other because it is what grounds its existence. This attribute of an anything can be, as Aristotle states, inherent in it (internal) or placed outside it (external). Usually, when we think of a foundation of something we believe that it is placed outside of it because, if it were not so, it would be reduced to the something in itself and nothing else. However, if it is believed that the ἀρχή of every anything is within the anything then, on the one hand, it would be the cause of itself, while, on the other hand, it would be uncaused precisely because nothing caused it, then, either its existence cannot be predicated or that existence must be considered outside time and therefore “eternal”.

The relevant words in this analysis are “origin” (or beginning, or starting point), “becoming” and “foundation” and it is believed that the first two

are not semantically and ontologically identifiable with the third. Therefore, stating that an anything is the origin of another does not mean affirming *de necessitate* that the first is the foundation of the second. Similarly, if an anything is the result of the becoming of another, it cannot be said that this becoming is the foundation of the other. It may be the case that the origin is also the foundation, as can happen for a source from which a river flows: if the source fails, the river also fails and in this case it is a *founding origin*, or by necessity. In many other cases, however, the origin has a contingent character, as in that of the relationship between parents and children, also mentioned by Aristotle: although the origin of a child is the parents, they are not a founding principle of the child's existence. Think again of another naturalistic example, such as lightning: it is generated (or originates) from an electrostatic condition inside the clouds, but lightning is not based on this condition for the fact that what it is made of is different from the condition that generated it. In this sense, then, the origin does not found it. In general, therefore, the origin can be contingent or necessary and it can be said that given the origin of something, this origin does not necessarily constitute its foundation for which it is what it is, even if this being what it is derives from the principle that generated it.

The word foundation, therefore, does not apply to these contingent conditions for these conditions concern an anything that is different from an anything which is what it is.

The *foundation can be understood as that anything for which another is what it is*, or '*as what constitutes it*'. In this analysis, the foundation is understood in this way and it is stated that the first does not concern the anything but what is placed prior to its existence. The foundation, however, is not reduced to the notion of origin even if it can contain it; the foundation of an anything can also be its origin, but only if that origin is 'still' actual in it and this does not happen in the two examples that have been presented above, and particularly in the second.

The foundation can be understood in four ways: (1) *it is inherent to an anything and it is what keeps it as it is*, (2) *it is its whole constitution*, (3) *it is the cause of its transformation* and (4) *it gives a structure to the relationships with other anythings*.

At this point, the other pair of terms is analyzed: *foundation* and *becoming*. The reasoning is analogous to that developed for the origin-foundation couple. Is what is considered as the principle of becoming of

an anything also the foundation of it? In this case, too, a distinction can be made between necessary and contingent. The first case referred to as necessary is not acceptable because what allows the becoming of an anything does not necessarily constitute its foundation, even in the fourfold sense of foundation as outlined above; for example, heat allows a metal to be transformed, but molten matter does not have heat as its foundation precisely because it is not heat. An even clearer example could be that of the bombardment of the nucleus of an atom by elementary particles: what derives from this nucleus will be the emission of particles, such as electrons and protons, whose nature is not grounded on that of the particles that bombarded the nucleus and generated its transformation. Later, the nucleus will no longer be what it was before the bombing, but it is not characterized by what allowed its change, that is, still the elementary particles that bombed it. The ontic attribution of particles cannot be assigned to the nucleus after its bombing.

Once again, the term becoming is not comparable to that of foundation and considering it as such is misleading, because an attribution is applied to what happens next while it is attributable to what happens before. The principle of becoming is different from the anything that has been transformed and, as such, it does not constitute it: obviously, if the term foundation is understood as that which constitutes the anything. Otherwise, however, the becoming does not concern the something in question but another that is different in constitution and, therefore, cannot be the foundation of what it is. The second meaning, that of *contingent becoming*, can be accepted within the perspective that is considered, but it is not in any way relevant to determining the foundation in the way it is conceived in this essay.

For these reasons, while considering points (A), (C) and (D) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (to which Wolf's, and other rationalist philosophers', conceptions of the foundation is directly linked) acceptable and indicative, one cannot accept the statement according to which an ἀρχή is *at the same time* origin, becoming and foundation, because it generates a confusion that is not only ontic, referable to the state of being of an anything, but also ontological, gnoseological and epistemological. After this clarification, the four meanings inherent in the notion of foundation considered as different from those of origin and becoming are considered.

The four meanings outlined, of the notion of foundation, are framed in the metaphysical-ontological perspective (as well as epistemological if a knowing subject is included) that is being presented, according to which

the foundation of an anything is not external but is inherent to it. On the one hand, this foundation can be linked (even if not identified) with the notion of an internal (inherent) foundation pointed out by Aristotle, even in the passage from *Metaphysics* that has been reported. On the other hand, although it has been asserted just above that the foundation is not reducible to the notions of cause, beginning and origin, at the same time foundation can comprehend them as ‘consequences’ of its being inherent to the anything: specific aspects or ways of working of the foundation with respect to the anything; as well as, perspectives on it, if one places oneself in the condition of ‘observing’ or paying attention to the foundation, from a gnoseological point of view with respect to the anything.

Before analyzing the different meanings of the notion of foundation, it is necessary to underline that, from a strictly ontic point of view (i.e., from the point of view of the esseicity/onticity of the anythings) the meanings that will be analyzed are aspects of the foundation ‘within’ the anything or, if you like, are operational modalities of the foundation that operate within the anything and are a part of it. The meaning, therefore, concerns the notion of foundation and not the ontic foundation of the anything: one belongs to the sphere of detecting the anything, the other to the anything as it is believed to be. This distinction generates difficulties in order to be accepted, but it is not analyzed here and is adopted only from a methodological point of view. For this reason, the meanings of the notion of foundation are taken into consideration and, at the same time, it is just accepted that foundation is inherent to the anything of which it is the foundation. After this methodological clarification, the different meanings that have been pointed out, previously, are examined.

1) *The foundation is inherent to the anything and is what keeps it as it is*

This meaning is divided into two parts: *the inherence of the foundation with respect to the anything*, on the one hand, and *keeping it as it is*, on the other. The first part of this meaning reiterates what was stated above when the choice was made to consider the foundation as inherent (internal) to an anything: the foundation is part of the anything just as it is. Aristotle also refers (albeit in relation to the origin) to the fact that a portion of an anything can be considered as its origin. This statement can be accepted within the point of view that is being presented, but only if it is specified what is meant by *portion of an anything*. If this portion is distinct from the anything as a whole, then it should be assumed that an anything has inherent foundation in something that does not ‘represent’ it entirely:

something that differs from its unity which causes it to be an anything and not an 'assembly' of elements.

On the contrary, the foundation as inherent to an anything is such that it 'involves' it entirely in its unity (at least in the particular condition in which it is found, even temporally). The foundation is not an attribute of one of its parts, but of its complete unity, even if it can 'express' a limited part of it. The foundation involves the unity of an anything as a whole. The term inherent means that the foundation is proper to the esseicity of the anything: it is not a part of it, but it is a specific modality; it is an attribute that can be assigned to the whole anything. Being inherent (or own), moreover, means that the anything is such as it is because it carries with it, or within it, its being founded; its foundation is the anything as it is what it is. The anything, therefore, cannot be said to be such if it did not carry with it this foundation, which is precisely what characterizes it: it is what it is; the foundation is part of its esseicity, even in the given condition in which it is placed with reference to its ontic environment. This foundation is also part of its 'ontic-esseic identity' which is made up of constituents and some esseic (*arketic*) attributes.

Owning attributes and constituents is what founds it (its foundation) as a given esseic identity; *the set of its attributes and constituents* are its identity: *the foundation*, in this sense, *is its own and can be considered as the structure of its constitutivity-attribution*.

The second aspect of this first meaning is: *what keeps it as it is*. This aspect derives from the former, in particular, in its clarification of the notion of foundation as an identitive constitutivity-attribution. However, this second aspect refers to the anything in its dynamics between what it is, and what can be (its eventuality); in this case, the relevant condition is the temporality of the anything, which is also related to the third meaning of the notion of foundation, linked to the dynamics of the anything and its eventual transformation. The constitutivity-attribution, therefore, refers not only to the anything in its actuality, but also to its keeping as it is before any eventual transformation. This keeping, of course, is not merely the continuity of the anything in its state of being, but it is also *the process that preserves it*: the esseic identitive constitutivity-attribution ensures that the anything remains such in a given period of time and this is possible if this structure allows for the overcoming of various influences. This aspect derives from the notion of identity for which the identity of an anything (such as personal identity) means that it tends to maintain a given state-

structure in every condition; *the stronger, or broader, the identitive constitutivity-attribution, the more the anything retains its structure.*

The identitive constitutivity-attribution, however, is not such as to be opposed to any type of influence, therefore, it also provides for the eventuality of the transformation of the anything; it, therefore, plays a dual role: that of preserving the anything as it is and, on the contrary, that of allowing its eventual transformation, thus becoming, at the same time, the cause of this transformation.

2) *The foundation as an intimate constitution*

In order to examine this meaning it is necessary to dwell on the notion of constitution and constitutivity. Here, the term *constitutivity* is assigned a double meaning, structural and dynamic, which includes that of constituent, which has been outlined above.

The first meaning of this term refers to the structure of the anything: its constitution-attribution (esseicity) and any relationship among its constituents-attributes. So, every anything is formed by a set of constituents-attributes and of the relationships among them. Its constitutivity can undergo various eventual dynamics while maintaining the anything in its ontic-esseic identitive form as a whole. Anything can 'lose' some of its constituents, attributes or relationships can change but this does not lead to the transformation of one into another, but can generate a different constitutive form of the anything that is part of its eventuality; think, for example, of the spatial deformations of an object: a liter of water can take on different shapes depending on the containers that contain it; a car is always the same even if it loses a fender on the road; a biological body is always the same even if it loses some of its elementary and non-vital functions; innumerable other examples can be brought to support the keeping of the esseicity (constitutivity/attribution) which is the foundation that makes it what it is.

The constitutive processes of an anything can be, and often are, of an *autonomic type*, that is, they are typical of the anything that generates them, while not excluding that they can be influenced by relations with the ontic environment. This character of constitutivity is expressed in what can be called *self-generation*.

More interesting, but also more difficult, is the dynamic meaning of the term constitutivity with its correlates. The constitutive term in this second meaning refers to an ontic-teleological condition whereby every anything

is the result of an eventual internal process that has determined its structure. This structure, therefore, is the result of the constitutive process: it is ontic because it concerns the being of the anything and it is teleological because it concerns its possible successive states.

As is well-known, various meanings have been assigned to the word constitutive among which the one pointed out by Husserl in his *Ideas* is relevant. Husserl uses this term to indicate the way in which subjectivity forms the intentional object. In this work, referring not to subjectivity but to ontic anything, it is stated that the anything is what it is on the basis of a constitutive process that is at the same time an eventual process.

In this analysis, constitutive being is an attribution that can be assigned to an anything *for which what it is is determined by processes of the anything that are constitutive/eventual processes that also trigger relationships with the ontic environment to which an anything belongs. What it is is presented as the result of an autonomic-eventual process that makes it what it is.*

3) *The foundation as the cause of the modification of an anything*

The third meaning, instead, refers to what was stated above: the foundation is the origin and cause of the modification of an anything. In this way, a meaning of the term foundation or principle is reacquired in the Aristotelian sense which, as is well-known, is shared by many ancient and modern philosophers. In this case, however, once again it refers primarily to the inside of the anything and not to an external source, even though the latter often influences the eventual transformation of an anything.

The constitutivity of anything allows its transformation while keeping its ontic-esseic identity.

It must be added, as will be stated later in dealing with the eventualism of the anythings, that this constitutivity is also the one that allows the eventual transformation of one anything into another.

4) *The foundation as a structure of relationships with the ontic environment*

The last meaning is already referred to when the transformation of an anything was treated with reference to the ontic environment. In specific terms, it can be affirmed that the constitutivity of an anything, as it is stated, is also what (or the cause, if you like) determines the modalities of

the relations between this anything and the ontic environment in which it is in a given condition.

These reflections lead directly to the conclusion that the foundation is not external to the anything but is inherent to it and is, as stated, its constitutivity-attribution structure which is its esseicity.

After this analysis of the meaning of the notions of ἀρχή and of foundation, the definition of ἀρχή is formulated.

Def. 1.4.1. – ἀρχή (*arké*)

The ἀρχή of every anything A' is its belonging to BR which consists in being a portion of it with archetic attributes: each anything A' is a portion of BR and is placed in a time and in a space.

The arketic attribute is primary and is to belong to BR and to belong to it in a given way and in a given time and space. Outside of these conditions (way, time and space) every anything, due to its *esseic eventuality*, can lose its *arketicity* and that of which it is constituted and thus does not belong as such to BR even if its constituents, or only some of them, can continue to belong to BR and can generate a new anything with its own *arketicity*.

The ἀρκή, therefore, is the foundation of every anything but only as long as it is such, that is, it maintains its constituents, attributes and its processual and relational structure with other anythings over a given period of time. Every anything with its relative ἀρχή is formed by its constituents and the esseic attributes which form its structure. The esseic constituents, as already stressed, are those anythings that form another, just as, for example, electrons, protons and neutrons make up an atom. However, each anything is formed not only by its esseic constituents, but by the esseic relationships among them as well as by the relationships it has with anything else (its ontic environment).

The esseic constituents do not belong to BR themselves, as such, but only because they constitute an anything. At the same time, an anything belongs to BR because the esseic constituents belong to BR, but they belong to it only insofar as they constitute an anything. Hence, we can formulate a fundamental thesis of the eventual metaphysics.

Thesis 1.4.1. – *Ontic inclusion*

The esseic constituents of every anything belong to BR for they are included in an anything.

Corollary 1.4.1.1.

There are no esseic constituents outside of an anything and that have a belongingness to BR independent from whatever anything.

Thesis 1.4.1. and Corollary 1.4.1.1., underline that there is no distinction, at least clear, between anythings and esseic constituents; the corollary, in particular, denies any form of corpuscularism, also typical of classical metaphysics, according to which corpuscles have an autonomous ontic existence and are the ‘ultimate substance’ of the being with which anything can be formed. In other words, this assertion also holds for contemporary physics. Although, it can be argued that atoms or elementary particles can be isolated in space, or generated by a particle accelerator, such cases, if indeed they exist or are detectable, appear as rare exceptions. This is because the esseic constituents, whether they are referred to as elementary particles or else, are such only insofar as they are part of an anything, and the latter is such because it is formed by these constituents: the constituents and the anythings owe their existence to a *close relationality* or *ontic interpenetration* so that one does not exist without the other.

Thesis 1.4.2. – *Ontic interpenetration*

The anythings and their constituents are esseically interpenetrated; the anythings are interpenetrated by their esseic constituents and the esseic constituents interpenetrate the anythings.

Corollary 1.4.2.1. – *Ontic reciprocity*

The anythings and their constituents (which are also anythings) mutually exist. Their esseicity is reciprocal.

The *ontic interpenetration* and *ontic inclusion* ensure that the anythings belong to BR as they are interpenetrated by esseic constituents and the esseic constituents belong to BR because *they interpenetrate an anything* understood as a portion of BR.

These theses underline the ontic relationship between esseic constituents and anythings, but this does not mean that one or the other cannot be detected and investigated in themselves, but *not always independently*,

because both are esseically mutually interpenetrated in the sense outlined (it is emphasized that constituents are also anythings and are such when they are part of an anything). In particular, also with regard to the anythings, a thesis can be formulated analogous to those of the inclusion and ontic interpenetration of the constituents, according to which every anything is always placed in an *ontic environment* in which it has relationships with other anythings; therefore, every anything, even if delimited, is always so with reference to its ontic environment and to the relationships it possesses in that environment.

Thesis 1.4.3. – *Ontic embodiment*

Every anything is always embodied in an ontic environment and is what it is with reference to the relationships it has with the anythings in that environment.

(These issues will be taken up in different terms in Section 9.3.)

Thesis 1.4.3. refers to every indefinite anything and, therefore, it does not include its esseicity, which is proper to each given anything.

The primary, and founding or arketic, attribute of each A' is belonging to BR ($A' \in BR$), its arketicity or ἀρχή. Corollary 1.2.1.2. emphasizes that the onticity of A' (its existing) is such only because A' belongs to BR. There is nothing that exists without belonging to BR. At the same time, BR is such because it is made up of all the ontically inherent anythings: they are part of it. BR, *therefore, is the set of all its anythings' partitions (the anythings).*

The anythings are always subject to eventual transformation and this also derives from a transformation of its constituents. Therefore, we can formulate the following thesis.

Thesis 1.4.4.

The constituents and the ontic-esseic attributes of A' are subject to transformation and change that generate a modification of (Cost-At-Pro-Rel/ A') and of EST/ A' [the esseicity of A'] with respect to space and time, (EST/ A')_{s,t}.

1.5. Esseic Specificity of the Anythings

In Def. 1.2.1. every anything has been defined as a portion of BR and, as such, participates in the founding character of *being existing (or belonging to)* in BR.

However, each portion of BR, the anything, has an esseic characterization that holds for all the anythings and, at the same time, a characterization that is specific to each given anything (A') and, thus, outlines its esseicity. This characterization, in other words, is made up of variables that take on a specific value for each given anything.

The esseic specificity of all anythings and the derived esseicity of every anything (its ontic and ontological individuation) can be stated in the following way.

Def. 1.5.1. – *Esseic specificity*

Each anything is esseically characterized by the following variables: 1) three attributes: a) belonging to BR, b) ontic structure, c) relational onticity; 2) five conditions: a) occupying a space, b) be placed in an ontic environment, c) be positioned in a situation S, d) possessing or not a mass and a volume, e) be situated in time; 3) two characters: a) ontic keeping and b) eventuality.

Corollary 1.5.1.1.

The value of each variable of the esseic specificity identifies a given anything A' with respect to its situational condition and its positioning in it in relation to space and time.

The notions of situation and positioning will be specified in Section 1.6.

Attributes, conditions and characters, stated in the Def. 1.5.1., hold for anything A that is not defined and these variables, as stated in Corollary 1.5.1.1., are determined for each specific anything A': they identify it as a given anything A'.

1) *Three attributes*

a) *Belonging to BR*

The first attribute was previously outlined with the definition of every anything as a portion of BR, with the relative corollary and with the